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Abstract 
Modem security studies have demonstrated that military insecurity or 
confrontation create crucial obstacles in trade relationships between states. Unlike this 
widely accepted conclusion, the trade relationship between the ROK and the DPRK 
from 2002 to 2006 showed a stable growth despite increasingly hostile political 
confrontation and military tension caused by the North Korean nuclear program. This 
study analyzes under what conditions the security instability did not undermine 
economic interdependence and which factors predominantly affected the actors' 
behavior by focusing on South Korean SMEs. It will conclude that substantial change of 
inter-Korean relations after the summit talks in 2000 enabled the SMEs to continue to 
engage with the DPRK under the nuclear crisis. In terms of what actually motivated 
SMEs in these transactions, it will argue that South Korean businessmen's desperate 
desire to took for lower-cost production provided a key driving force for them to risk the 
military instability. This study will substantiate this argument by providing a result of 
structured survey of South Korean entrepreneurs who actually were involved in the 
inter-Korea trade in this particular period. By analyzing how security agenda and 
economic interest relates each other, this study will overcome either security-dominated 
or economy-centered bias in capturing the changed essence of inter-Korean relations. 
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CHAPTER1 
Introduction 
1.1 Aims and Research Question 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the causes that affected the pattern of 
behaviour of South Korean small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in its trade with 
North Korean counterparts between 2002 and 2006. 
In October 2002, the United States suspended economic support committed in 
1994, as a reward for the freeze of North Korean nuclear facilities. What became known 
as the 'second nuclear crisis' - following a prior international crisis about North Korean 
nuclear facilities between 1993 and 1994 - increased political tensions between the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) and 
other international actors. South Korean economic actors needed government permission 
to engage in trade with the DPRK and thus political tensions might have been expected 
to make inter-Korean trade more difficult. 
The statistical data between 2002 and 2006, however, shows an increase in the 
number of the South Korean SMEs which engaged in inter-Korean trade. The central 
research question of the thesis is thus about how we should understand this 
contradictory phenomenon. This thesis, therefore, aims to answer the question why the 
South Korean SMEs engaged economically, in terms of inter-Korean trade, with 
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economic actors in the DPRK between 2002 and 2006, despite increasing security 
instability caused by the second nuclear crisis. 
1.2 Scope 
This section wilt identify the key actors and key patterns of inter-Korean 
economic engagement which will be explored in this thesis. Various groups of economic 
actors carried out various patterns of economic exchanges in the ROK and the DPRK 
between 2002 and 2006. Although discussing systemic level of full scale exchange was 
highly premature, actors involved in inter-Korean economic exchanges during this 
period were not confined to state elites and government agencies. Private firms and 
workers emerged as new primary actors in inter-Korean economic exchange since the 
ROK government began to permit trade with the DPRK in 1990. These new actors were 
joined by interest groups in the South Korean industry and non-govemmental 
organizations (NGOs) that pursued inter-Korean reconciliation through economic 
cooperation. At the same time, the pattern of inter-Korean economic exchanges too was 
significantly diversified. The humanitarian aid program toward the North Korean 
population was a dominant pattern of economic exchanges between the two Koreas 
before commercial transactions exceeded the government-sponsored relief aid program 
(KITA 2008). Yet the growing volume of commercial transactions of merchandise 
began to replace non-commercial economic activities toward the DPRK. Central to this 
study is a commercial intercourse driven mainly by South Korean small and medium 
sized manufacturers and their trading partners in the North. Justification of this research 
focus will be presented in the following. 
3 
Ae South Korean SMEs 
Three different levels of actors deserve particular attention in tackling the 
relationship between political or military conflict and economic interdependence : 
national, subnational, and supranational actors. When it came to inter-Korean economic 
affairs, however, intervention by supranational bodies such as multilateral trade 
organization was not likely at least so far. For example, the non-tariff basis inter-Korean 
trade since the late 1980s has defacto existed outside the Most Favored Nation (MFN) 
clause in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Given the fact that the volume of the 
trade between South and North Korea was not considerable, no WTO member country 
has officially made an issue of the ROK's preferential trade treatment for the DPRK 
(Ahn D. K. 2005). In a bilateral trade relationship between the two Koreas, though 
observations on national leaders' determination as to how to design a trade regime 
yielded a set of important findings, inadequate attention has been paid to the role and 
function of subnational actors. In particular, the behavior of South Korean SMEs, as a 
main actor that has driven commercial trade with the DPRK, and their strategic 
interaction with national actors remained largely unexplored. A closer examination on 
how they react to turbulence of political environment in this regard is needed to fully 
understand the relationship between trade and security crisis in the Korean Peninsula. 
In the context of the South Korean business and industry, domestic corporate 
actors can be largely divided into two separate groups, that is, the major business 
conglomerates (better known as chaeboý and SMEs. Definitions of SMEs vary 
depending on the different taxonomies of different industries and individual 
circumstances of various countries. In this thesis, South Korean SMEs refer to 
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companies that have below 300 full-time employees. This definition is based on 'The 
Basic act of SMEs' enacted in 1999 by the ROK government. South Korean SMES have 
membership of the Korea Federation of Small and Medium Business (KFSMB) whereas 
large industrial conglomerates become members of the Federation of Korean Industries 
(FKI). 
SMEs in the ROK have existed showing mixed vulnerability both domestically 
and in terms of inter-Korean trade. They were less vulnerable in domestic economy 
from the frequent changes of the political environment, which stemmed from the lack of 
long term business plans and diverse sources of supply and demand for the production 
planned. But they were more vulnerable in terms of inter-Korean transaction because 
they were unable to sustain early stage financial loss since they had relatively limited 
resources. 
One could discern this vulnerability of South Korean SMEs in inter-Korean trade 
more clearly by comparing their predicament with chaebols. Chung Ju Yung, the 
founder and president of Hyundai Group, the second-largest chaebol in the ROK, was 
the first South Korean entrepreneur who visited the DPRK in 1989 since the end of the 
Korean War. He was a businessman with great success, who had been born and grown 
up in the North before the division of the Korean Peninsula. He stated in his 
autobiography that his lifelong wish would be making use of all his investment assets 
for his separated families and relatives still living in his ancestral homeland (Chung J. Y. 
2004). Chung in this visit signed a contract with the DPRK leader Kim Jong 11, 
Chairman of the DPRK National Defence Commission (NDC), on the joint development 
plan of Mount Kumkang, one of the most scenic landscapes in the northern half of the 
5 
Korean Peninsula, into a tourism resort. Kim Woo Joong, the president of Daewoo 
Group, also visited Pyongyang two years after Chung's visit. These two men visited 
Pyongyang before the ROK government enacted a relevant law to legitimize inter- 
Korean economic exchanges (1990). The ROK government however did not treat it as 
illegal under the then Roh Tae Woo administration's tacit permission. Unlike this 
acquiescence in a specific deal conducted by chaebol, most of the South Korean SMEs 
were unable to envisage business in the teffitory of the DPRK. The lack of government 
legislation was the main obstacle. This unequal position between chaebol and SMEs 
showed the preferential treatment for chaebol by the ROK government in the cross- 
border commercial transaction with the North before the 1990s. 
Until the mid-1990s, overseas Koreans emerged as main investors who were 
willing to carry out business in the DPRK. These American and Japanese businessmen 
who were bom in Korea and had headquarters in the United States and Japan played a 
role of intermediary in inter-Korean trade (Park J. K. 1997). For example, nearly 90 per 
cent of the operating joint ventures in the North Korean territory as of 1992, established 
on the basis of the Joint Venture Law of the DPRK enacted in 1984, was under the 
investment of the pro-North Korea entrepreneurs living in Japan. The Joint Venture Law 
had specific provisions to offer the entrepreneurs group who had an investment plan in 
North Korea preferential measures (Koh H. W. 2002,95-97). No direct channel of 
dialogue between the two Korean governments as well as businesses to discuss the 
modalities of inter-Korean trade existed in the 1990s. As the DPRK refused to hold 
governmental level talks on trade issues, the necessity to establish a semi-govemmental 
organization to address practical matters on inter-Korean transaction was raised (Kim 
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K. R. 2000,92). But still the SMEs that traded with the DPRK partners could not have 
sufficient backing from the government in comparison with chaebol and overseas 
Korean business groups. 
It was in the late 1990s that the South Korean SMEs obtained the government's 
active support in directly trading with North Korea. The Kim Dae Jung administration 
that came into power in 1997 announced that preferential loans from the Inter-Korean 
Cooperation Fund (IKCF) would be provided only to SMEs to invigorate their 
engagement in inter-Korean trade. The IKCF was estab is e in 1991 to support a wide 
range of projects to contribute to reconciliation between the ROK and the DPRK. But it 
was, in effect, not available for private firms until Kim Dae Jung removed this barrier. 
The inter-Korean summit talks in 2000 between Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong 11 created 
new business opportunities for the involvement of South Korean SMEs in inter-Korean 
trade. Pyongyang showed an evolving attitude after this historical juncture toward 
economic interactions with its former enemy (Eberstadt 2007,159-163). The industry 
the DPRK leadership wanted to develop with South Korean capital and resources 
support was, in the first place, agricultural and light industrial manufacturing to meet the 
population's basic needs (Yoon D. K and Yang M. S. 2005). South Korean small and 
medium-sized manufacturers, as a result, were able to secure the prioritized standing, 
compared to the role of chaebol, in inter-Korean trade. 
The introduction of the special economic zone (SEZ) in Kaeseong in 2002 by the 
DPRK government, located just 4 km north of the western part of the military border 
between South and North Korea, also promoted the increasing engagement of SMEs in 
inter-Korean business. The ROK and the DPRK government agreed to construct an 
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industrial complex in Kaeseong allowing South Korean enterprises to operate 
production facilities by employing North Korean low-waged workers. The Kaeseong 
Industrial Complex (KIC) provided South Korean SMEs, which were struggling to 
overcome deteriorating business conditions in China and Vietnam, with fresh 
opportunities (Lim K. T. and Lim S. H. 2003,33). The share of inter-Korean trade 
through the KIC project accounted for 16.7% of total trade volume in 2005 (KITA 
2006). The stability of the inter-Korean economic cooperative projects, therefore, was 
increasingly contingent upon the capability and the willingness of South Korean SMEs 
running their businesses in connection with North Korea. 
Inter-Korean trade 
The definition and taxonomy of inter-Korean trade in this study will follow those 
of the ROK government. The term 'inter-Korean trade' includes a range of flow of 
goods and capital between South and North Korea. ' Inter-Korean trade refers to not only 
transactions that have been conducted, on a commercial basis, mainly by private firms 
but also on a non-commercial basis economic exchange between the two Koreas such as 
humanitarian aid from the South to the North. Thus inter-Korean trade is classified by 
transaction type into two parts : commercial and non-commercial transactions. 
'Commercial transactions' include exchanges of manufactured goods/agricultural 
products ('general trade') and transfer of South Korean semi-processed material and 
1 The ROK government officially uses terms such as 'carrying-in' and 'carrying-out' instead of 'import' 
and 'export' to signify the internality of trade between South and North Korea, in which North Korean 
merchandise carried into South Korea has no liability for tariff. For more discussion on the domestic and international legal issues of inter-Korean transaction, see Ahn D. K. (2005). 
S 
parts for production in the North and shipment of completed merchandise to the South 
(processing-on-commission ; TOC trade'). It also includes other flows of goods 
associated with so-called 'economic cooperation projects'. 'Economic cooperation 
projects' by definition refer to a range of joint projects between the South and the North, 
with the purpose of reaping economic benefit (MOU 2006). Many of the projects were 
conducted through FDI-style economic transactions from South to North Korea. In order 
to be so designated, South Korean companies need the government's approval and are 
obliged to periodically report what they have conducted with North Korean 
counterparts. Kaeseong and Mount Kumkang tourism projects are listed as the 
categorization of the 'economic cooperation project'. The main pattern of general trade 
was the transfer of North Korean agricultural/fishery products and natural resources 
toward South Korea. In 2005, for example, 53% of inter-Korean general trade (from the 
North to South) came from North Korean agricultural/fishery products exports and 20% 
of them came from zinc nodules. North Korean high-quality metallic ores also had good 
potential to be exported to neighboring country (Lee J. K 2006,31). Construction 
material, factory equipment, and semi-processed materials supposed to be used in the 
South Korean companies in Kaeseong as well as Mount Kumkang resort facilities are all 
covered under the heading of economic cooperation projects. 
'Non-commercial transactions', on the other hand, refer to (a) humanitarian aid by 
the ROK government and a range of non-governmental organizations (b) socio-cultural 
cooperation projects. This transaction category also included the now-defunct light- 
water reactor (LWR) projects in which the ROK government was a leading participant 
9 
responsible for paying 70% of the whole budget to build two light-water reactors in 
North Korea following the Agreed Framework in 1994.2 
As of 2005, commercial trade accounted for 65.3% of total inter-Korean trade and 
non-commercial trade for 34.7% (Lee J. K. 2006,32-33). Table 1.1 shows the 
breakdown of inter-Korean trade by transaction type. 
Table 1.1 Inter-Korean trade by transaction type 
General trade Trade POC trade Commercial Economic Kaeseong Industrial Complex Transaction 
cooperation Mount Kumkang tourism 
projects Others 
I Non-gov rnmental aid Non- Aid I Governmental aid 
commercial on I Socio-cultural cooperati projects transaction 1 Lijaht- ater reactor PrOiects 
The share of commercial transactions within the total trade volume was on a 
continued upswing between 2002 and 2006. For example, commercial transactions 
accounted for 55.3% (0.36 billion USD) in 2002 and they became 68.9% (0.93 billion 
USD) in 2006 while the non-commercial trade relative share kept shrinking during this 
period. This shows the growing engagement of South Korean private firms in trade with 
North Korea during the second nuclear crisis, in both numerical terms and percentage 
share. As the scale of POC trade and Kaeseong project grew bigger under the Kim Dae 
Jung (1998-2002) and Roh Moo Hyun (2003-2007) administrations that pursued 
extensive engagement policy toward the DPRK, the contribution of private firms to 
inter-Korean trade became a major part of inter-Korean economic exchanges. Unlike the 
2 On the details of the LWR project agreed between the United Stated and the DPRK, see Wit et al. (2004). 
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relief aid and socio-cultural, exchanges specifically targeting the North Korean 
population, commercially driven cross-border trade is likely to be easily affected if 
politically shaped regional stability encounters turbulent situation. They are normally 
prepared to move their production facilities and capital seeking a safer and more stable 
production environment in this globalized economic world in an attempt to avoid 
geopolitical risk. The behavioral pattem of private firms, particularly SMEs that are 
vulnerable to political unrest, in this regard is likely to be a litmus test to demonstrate 
how security risk affects economic interdependence in the region. Particularly the closer 
observation of how main actors in inter-Korean trade responded to regional instability 
will demonstrate one of the analytical conclusions on whether inter-Korean trade is not 
only commercially viable but also politically sustainable amid the continued military 
tension. 
1.3 Original Contribution to inter-Korean relations studies 
This section will identify the contribution of this study to the existing trend of the 
scholarly and policy analysis of inter-Korean relations and the DRPK by categorizing 
and critically reassessing the achievements and the limitations of the existing literature 
in this area. Various attempts have been made to provide a pertinent analytical tool in 
capturing the essence of the DPRK regime and the relationship with its Southern 
counterpart over the last 60 years. Whereas one group of analysts paid primary attention 
to its security dynamic, which constituted a still dominant approach in international 
relations studies, another began to stress the significance of newly formed economic 
policy initiatives. 
Security perspective 
A fundamental assumption of the security-centered perspective on the 
establishment and development of the DPRK regime was built on the thought that the 
main driver to determine the regime dynamics and its interactions with external actors 
was its longstanding security concern. One of the most significant places from which the 
scholars started exploring this North Korean security issue was Kim It Sung, the 
founding leader of the DPRK, and his Ache 3 (translated as 'self-reliance') ideology. 
The North Korean charismatic leader Kim 11 Sung who governed the country from 1948 
to 1994 and his peculiar ideological doctrine stemming from the traditional roots of 
Korean antipathy for external domination became a core factor in creating this security- 
armed 'guerril I a-band -state' (Haruki 1992). Several pioneering researches on Kim 11 
Sung, particularly his anti-colonial guerrilla movement in the 1930s, contributed to 
identifying the indigenous roots of the formation of the military-centered regime in the 
northern half of the Korean Peninsula (Scalapino and Lee 1972, Suh D. S. 1988). Their 
scholarly attempts were fruitful in that such literature overcame the perspective which 
had merely described the formation of the DPRK in 1948 as a by-product of the post- 
War conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
The earlier attention on the idea of Ache (Cumings 1990,312-16), as a paramount 
ideology that had ruled every aspect of the life of the DPRK populations, guided follow- 
up studies in understanding the DPRK regime. It particularly provided the key means in 
interpreting 'the socialism of our style' propagated by the DPRK as a response to the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European socialist regimes in the 1990s. 
3 For the discussion to literally understand the term Juche in Korean linguistics, see Curnings (1990,313) 
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As the DPRK faced economic hardship in the mid-1990s, analysts produced articles 
focusing on the possibility of reinterpretation of the orthodox Juche idea by the DPRK 
authority. This research was increasingly salient as the thoughts of political self- 
determination and economic autarky included in the Juche idea contradicted economic 
engagement with the external world to revive its economy. In this area, the DPRK 
researchers discovered the attempts of the North Korean leadership that arranged an 
escape route by extending the range of Juche in an effort to allow the access of foreign 
resources (Rhodes 1996, Armstrong 1998). What is central to these earlier studies on the 
Juche idea as well as the new findings on Kim It Sung was the fact that international 
studies began to perceive the DPRK as a predictable polity rather than an inscrutable 
and mysterious 'hermit kingdom' beyond the analysis of social science. At the heart of 
the findings, the top analytical point to explore the DPRK regime was its significant 
priority on security issues. 
Two significant incidents offered a momentum to shift the scholarly concern from 
the DPRK's internal logic to maintain the regime to the ways in which the DPRK 
maintained its foreign policy on a variety of fronts. The first nuclear crisis that 
culminated between 1993 and 1994 drew attention to the DPRK's dealing with 
international affairs in bilateral and multilateral settings. Scholars analyzed the strategy 
of DPRK foreign policy at the macro level and its negotiation pattern at the micro level 
(Kang 1998, Niksch 1998). Western analysts evaluated its foreign policy more broadly 
focusing not only on its relationship with key allies such as China and the Soviet Union 
but also on the United States and Japan (Manning 1998, Hughes 1999), The U. S. -DPRK 
nuclear standoff particularly generated a voluminous literature on the development and 
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the aftermath of the nuclear crisis in the Korean Peninsula (Mazarr 1995, Cotton 1995, 
Harrison 1997, Khil Y. H. 1998, Sigal 1998, Curnings 1998, Wit et at. 2004, Kim J. S. 
2007). 
The outbreak of the second nuclear crisis occurred soon after the DPRK 
government introduced a new economic management system in 2002. It suggested the 
need for more complex analysis over why the DPRK leadership voluntarily admitted 
their nuclear program at this particular time. Scholars and policymakers produced 
various analyses of the second nuclear crisis ranging from accepting it as 'cry for help' 
tactics to regarding it as an actual threat to the United States (Cha and Kang 2003, 
O'Hanlon and Mochizuki 2003, Wit 2006). The progress of the six-party talks as a main 
vehicle that tried to settle the second nuclear debate was critically assessed (Kim 
T. H. 2006, Funabashi 2007, Hong H. I. 2008, Moore 2008). The level of analysis in tum 
was also expanded to the influence of the U. S. foreign policy on the U. S-DPRK nuclear 
standoff (Moon C. I. and Bae J. Y. 2005, Pritchard 2007). Despite the long list of 
literature that had dealt with the first and the second nuclear crises, however, there were 
few attempts to shed light on the security instability caused by the crisis in connection 
with DPRK economic relations with external actors. 
On balance, the DPRK studies that predominantly followed the trend on its 
security dynamics implied a shift of research focus from the overall concern on its 
national identity and history to individual issues such as its foreign policy strategies. A 
handful of pioneering quests, in addition, to establish an adequate analytical and 
theoretical framework for the post-Cold War political dynamics of the DPRK regime 
upgraded the level of analysis in the DPRK studies (Smith 1996, Kim 1998). 
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Economic perspective 
The momentum that brought about growing scholarly interest in the DPRK 
economy came from the great food shortages that the population had undergone in the 
mid-1990s. Intensive attention was paid to whether the regime could survive the 
catastrophic moment where more than a million people, even by conservative estimates, 
died from starvation or hunger-related illness from 1995 to 1998.4 Such a move 
produced various scenarios built upon the prediction of the possibility of the implosion 
of the North Korean regime likely to be triggered by the already collapsed food 
rationing system. The prognosis of economic degeneration derived from the famine and 
decrepit agricultural institutions '5 Most Of all, generated pessimistic analyses predicting 
the imminent demise of the DPRK regime (Eberstadt 1997, Foster-Carter 1998). Other 
analysts like Noland, on the other hand, made countervailing arguments anticipating the 
continuation of Kim Jong 11 regime under the tutelage of China (Noland 1997). In an 
attempt to rescue DPRK economy from the famine-caused devastation, Pyongyang's 
foreign economic relations also attracted growing attention from scholars and policy 
analysts (Noland 1998, Eberstadt 2007). 
A set of economic reform measures announced in 2002, in this sense, was another 
turning point for the DPRK that began to consider economic prescriptions partly based 
on market mechanisms, other than ideological means, to overcome its systemic 
difficulty in economic management. The DPRK government proclaimed the 
4 Estimates of the number of the North Korean people who died during the great famine varied depending 
on estimation techniques, for detail, see Noland (2001). ' For further discussion on the historical analysis of the DPPLK's agricultural institutions as a cause of the 
chronic food crisis, see Lee S. (2005). 
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introduction of a series of economic reform programs in July 2002 6. This reform 
package centred on an increase of the official commodity prices and the wages of 
manufacturing workers by readjusting them to a level close to the actual black market 
price (Kim Y. C. 2002,14-17, Cho D. H. 2003,124-145). It also included 
decentralization measures in production management and distribution. The reform 
initiatives generated various interpretations about the causes and effects of this 
unparalleled socioeconomic experiment by the DPRK leadership. The key points of the 
debate were whether the reform program was aimed at establishing a market economy 
or not. 
Although the DPRK emphasized the need to remedy the defects of the planned 
economy it had maintained for more than 40 years, there was a discrepancy between 
their official explanations about the background of the reform and the extemal observers' 
assessment. Newcombe (2003,59-60) interpreted the North Korean experiment for 
economic restoration as a consolidation of their command economy rather than 
transforming it. Noland (2003,29-30), in the same vein, was pessimistic about the future 
of this reform experiment, pointing out its own macroeconomic instability and the low 
likelihood of intervention by international development aid agencies. Also for influential 
policy advisors in Washington, the 2002 reform measures were far from being 
satisfactory. They asserted that it would fail to meet the North Korean people's demands 
such as the inception of profit-generating transactions and the assurance of economic 
6A set of announcement in July 2002 was named 'measures for improvement on economic management 
(Kyongie Kwalh Kaeson Chochi)' by the DPRK authority. In transliterating Korean into English, Kaeson 
(&*) has a closer connotation to 'improvement' rather than 'reform, which means Kaehyok (ak*) in 
Korean. However, the term 'reform' will be used in this thesis in order to be consistent in comparing it 
with other transitional economies and to embrace more market-oriented subsequent measures put in place later in the DPRK. 
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transparency (Eberstadt 2004). To put it differently, the 2002 reform measures were, for 
these Western skeptics, the too] to maintain its moribund regime (McKay 2005,96). 
South Korean policy advisors, on the other hand, interpreted the reform move 
from Pyongyang as something offering a positive signal for marketization by describing 
it as an 'astonishing' and 'bold' choice beyond the external observer's expectation (Cho 
D. H. 2003,121). Smith (2005b, 135-157) and Yoon and Lee (2002) also interpreted it as 
a revealing signal to introduce market mechanisms into the DPRK economy. Carlin and 
Wit (2006) shed more light on the existence of a reformers' group in the DPRK 
leadership by insisting that the reform was the result of the internal debate between 
conservatives and reformers within the governing power. 
Inter-Korean economic exchanges 
The security-centered or economy-focused observation on the DPRK regime 
tended to lead definitions of inter-Korean relations adopting one of the two biased 
viewpoints. However, what is closer to the reality was that the actual driving force 
pushing forward inter-Korean relations is likely to be found somewhere between the 
conventional security thesis and newly-emerging economic relations. Moreover, given 
the significant progress of inter-Korean trade amid the nuclear crisis continued, a 
realistic analysis of inter-Korean relations requires simultaneous consideration of the 
two factors in a structurally combined manner. Structural observation on how the 
transformation of security dynamics affected inter-Korean economic relations and the 
obverse will pave the way for a better understanding of the nature of evolving inter- 
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Korean relations. But analytical attempts to combine security and economy in an 
interconnected fashion in interpreting the development of inter-Korean relations were 
not invigorated in international relations studies. 
Inter-Korean economic exchanges under military confrontation were likely to 
offer an encouraging case study by combining the two elements to capture the essence 
of inter-Korean relations. But the study on the progress of the economic exchanges 
between the two Koreas has long stayed on the periphery. Analytical pieces of work, 
produced mainly in the ROK, to tackle the economic interactions between the two 
Koreas, have largely been confined within policy reports to underpin the government's 
policy recommendations (Kim Y. Y. 2005). Other analysts provided South Korean 
investors with practical and strategic guidance they were advised to follow in launching 
businesses in North Korea (Park H. 2005). Although international relations studies after 
the meltdown of the ideologically bipolarized world order required greater incorporation 
of the non-military, non-state agenda into the mainstream strand of analysis, inter- 
Korean economic relations still remained outside such discussions. Under this external 
environment, the contradictory phenomenon between the security instability and 
flourishing inter-Korean economic engagement could not properly be handled. 
It was the Kim Dae Jung administration that showed the possibility to incorporate 
economic exchanges into the ROK government's foreign policy agenda dealing with 
North Korean regime instability. In response to the economic problems the DPRK had 
been facing, Kim Dae Jung proposed wide-ranging programs of assistance for the 
DRPK economy. They aimed at improving the country's infrastructure including 
transport, electricity, and communications as well as structural support for agriculture to 
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help avert future famines (Kim D. J. 2004). To pursue a comprehensive and integrated 
engagement policy with the DPRK, Kim Dae Jung introduced an initiative, the so-called 
'Jongkyong Bulli' The term 'Jongkyong Bulli' meant, by definition, the 
separation of economic exchanges from the political situation. It implied, as a policy 
dealing with a hostile nation, that cross-border economic activities should consistently 
be carried out regardless of, and in spite of, political confrontation (MOU 2003). 
The institutionalization of inter-Korean economic exchanges supported by 
'Jongkyong BuIR', after the summit talks between Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong 11 in 
2000, generated studies exploring what the ROK government's posture should be in 
terms of inter-Korean economic transactions. The advocates of the 'Jongkyong Bulli' 
initiative insisted that this practical approach, as economic engagement was not affected 
by the unpredictable rise of military tension, contributed positively to the sustained 
development of inter-Korean relations (Kim K. R. 2000, Son K. Y. 2006). Their 
arguments led to support for the government intervention in promoting inter-Korean 
trade. However, critics argued that the government should 'constructively disengage' 
from the private sector in pursuing inter-Korean economic transactions (Noland 2000, 
352). They stressed that the intervention of the ROK government in inter-Korean trade 
by private firms would hamper the process of expected marketization of the DPRK 
economy. Cho Dong Ho (2003,241) suggested by the same token that the ROK 
government should introduce a 'flexible inter-linkage' strategy to respond to the need 
for economic sanctions against Pyongyang which might be caused by the North's 
provocative actions. These case studies on inter-Korean economic exchanges provided 
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scholars with a good research topic through which their hypotheses on how to shape a 
pattern of interaction between politics and economy in the hostile inter-state relationship 
could be tested. 
Although the ROK government sponsored inter-Korean economic exchange in 
the private sector, the main actors that pushed forward various economic projects were 
the South Korean SMEs as the chaebol avoided getting involved in inter-Korean trade, 
even after legislation by the govemment. Moreover, the corporate restructuring program 
in South Korea, recommended by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) after the 
financial meltdown in 1997, that had resulted in the phenomenon of 'low-growth' and 
'low-investment', also made South Korean chaebol extremely reluctant to push risk- 
taking investment which might need a longer time to realize revenues (Crotty and Lee 
K. K. 2002,2). As a result, the stability of inter-Korean economic transactions was 
increasingly contingent upon South Korean SMEs' capability and willingness to engage 
with North Korean counterparts. South Korean SMEs thereby remained as a principal 
economic actor in inter-Korean economic engagement. Given the growing importance 
of South Korean SMEs in inter-Korean economic engagement, it was remarkable to see 
little scholarly attention on this issue. 
Despite the growing significance of the role of the SMEs to inter-Korean 
economic exchanges, there was little substantial analysis of these developments. The 
most frequently analyzed point with regard to inter-Korean trade by South Korean 
SMEs was its low-profitability that ultimately was likely to make it commercially 
neither viable nor sustainable (Tait 2003, Yoon D. K. and Yang M. S. 2005, Eberstadt 
2007). They commonly argued that, as long as the SMEs' low-profitability structure 
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continued, inter-Korean trade including POC trade would lack stability, viability, and 
sustainability. 
Although such analyses showed economic insight, a key question still remained 
unanswered : what made South Korean SMEs continue to trade with North Korea 
despite the business continuing to lose money ?A couple of intuitive explanations were 
attempted to resolve this puzzle. Some pointed out the South Korean businessmen's 
desire to gain public fame as 'patriotic entrepreneurs' (Dong M. H. 2002). They 
emphasized the willingness of South Korean businessmen to improve their brand values 
by efficiently attracting more attention from the press, which seemed to be 'pioneering' 
companies (Han S. J. 2001,64). These accounts however lacked any evidence to link 
their likely economic loss and the uncertain and indirect benefit from the 'patriotic and 
pioneering' but at the same time 'unstable and risky' business. It had moreover limited 
explanatory power when it came to the South Korean SMEs which drew less media 
attention in terms of the scale and size of the inter-Korean business. 
What is more, scholars paid scant attention to the domestic predicament that had 
driven South Korean SMEs' trade and investment toward the DPRK. This study will 
therefore argue that, without consideration about the domestic conditions that the SMEs 
have faced, revealing the complex variables explaining South Korean SMEs' behavioral 
patterns in inter-Korean trade is by no means achievable. In that sense, this study on the 
behavioural pattern of South Korean SMEs in inter-Korean trade under military crisis 
environment will be a case study to show the inter-relationship between security 
instability caused by state actors and the economic engagement by the corporate actors 
in the private sector. 
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1.4 Theoreticalframework 
This section will propose the complex interdependence model developed by 
Keohane and Nye (1989) as the theoretical framework to understand the background of 
the substantial change in inter-Korean relations in the wake of the inter-Korean summit 
in 2000. The section will start by reviewing the literature that addressed the causal 
relationship between economic interdependence and security dynamics. It will then 
explain key characteristics of the complex interdependence model and demonstrate its 
applicability to the case of inter-Korean relations. 
Economic interdependence and security 
Modem international relations theories intensively explored the questions of 
whether and how economic interaction, mainly measured in terms of trade, affects 
international security relationship. The theoretical arguments linking economic 
interaction and security had as long a tradition as the classical realist - liberalism debate 
of intemational politics. 
As a result, it showed a similar division mirroring the contending strands of the 
classical international relations theory drawn from liberalism and realism. The earlier 
version of liberal argument on the significance of economic interaction to allay the 
likelihood of military conflict was created by Richard Cobden in the 1850s. As Cain 
rightly observed (1979), he simply asserted that intemational commerce had a panacea- 
like power in an industrial world to prevent and nullify warfare. Cobden, as an 
enthusiastic advocate of free trade, went on to argue that even the colonial attitudes by 
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Western countries in an attempt to acquire rare resources could be restrained by freer 
trading relationship. Free trade was not only morally required but also commercially 
efficient instrument, in his idealistic vision, to achieve international peace. 
This pacifying effect of trade was reemphasized by Norman Angell (1933) before 
and even after the First World War. He saw a new ways of thinking, namely 
commercial-basis trade instead of old method of power politics and war, is able to 
inhibit a likely interstate violence and as a consequence to promote peace between states 
involved. States retain greater preference of maintaining trade bonds, according to his 
formulation, to destruction of the trade partnership in an attempt to pursue a higher 
ground in political relations. Although war nevertheless breaks out between major 
powers regardless of the anticipated gain from peaceful trade, it was political leaders' 
miscalculation or ignorance on the unprofitable result of war that makes it extremely 
likely, Angell argued. 
The liberal arguments that had been made by Cobden and Angell were inherited 
and more extensively synthesized by Richard Rosecrance (1986). Central to his 
argument was that states can achieve their goals through trade with other countries than 
by trying to conquer and assimilate large tracts of land. His neatly summarized argument 
laid a foundation upon which many other liberal theorists could advance 'trade promotes 
peace' thesis in a various fashion. The most compelling of these is that trade generates 
mutual benefit but conflict will destroy it. One of the shared assumptions by the liberals 
is that political leaders are deterred, before making a decision on whether or not to take 
military action against key trading partners, by the fear of likely loss or reduction of 
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welfare gains from trading with them (Oneal and Russet 1997, Doyle 1997, Polachek 
1980). 
On the other hand, the modem realist understanding of economic interactions and 
conflict finds its roots in mercantilist thinking dating from the seventeenth century. The 
mercantilists' fundamental assumption that states need to secure greater control over 
economically essential goods by lessening economic dependence on other states 
provides realists with a key logic to develop their argument on the relationship between 
economic interactions and conflict (Heckscher 1994, Viner 1948). The realists 
understand that economic interactions will deepen and widen the level of mutual 
dependence between states and lead to a friction because of the willingness of sates to 
secure the goods they lacked. It has been argued particularly true when the states 
pursued economic interactions of strategic goods and materials which underpin their 
security. 
For Kenneth Waltz, for example, economic interactions that goes with 
specialization, in other words international division of labor, brings about high 
interdependence and in turn states are worried lest they become more dependent on 
others (Waltz 1979,160-161). For John Mearsheimer, states may try to extend political 
control to the source of supply, giving rise to conflict with the source. High level of 
economic interdependence, therefore, will probably lead to greater security competition 
(Mearsheimer 1992,223). In the realist arguments, all in all, strategic security concerns 
were more emphasized in understanding interstate economic interactions rather than 
economic short-term benefit. As a result, it was believed that states have incentives to 
take coercive or even military action to reduce their economic vulnerability from 
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increased trade and interdependence and to influence its adversary's behavior (Baldwin 
1985, Holsti 1986, Liberman 1996). 7 
Despite the prolonged debate between the two contending perspectives, 
insufficient attention has been paid to the inverse causal mechanism : whether and to 
what extent militarized conflict affects trade between the two countries involved. 
Economic interactions, as dependent variable was not necessarily is economic 
interactions (trade in particular) things are different. Moreover, both realist and liberal 
arguments on the mechanism were built on the shared assumption that militarized 
conflict inhibits, if not destroys, the existing level of economic exchanges (Barbieri and 
Levy 1999,463-66). 
Liberals argue that conflict will disrupt trade or at least adversely affect the terms 
of trade. The liberal hypotheses were built on the assumption that conflict increases the 
risk of trade disruption and generally implies the increased cost of doing business. 
Therefore, they expect that bilateral trade flows will decline as bilateral political 
relations become less friendly (Pollins 1989a, 1989b, Bergeijk 1994). Realist 
explanations suggest that the concern over relative gains will lead at least one of the 
belligerents to terminate trade in order to prevent its adversary from using the gains 
from trade to increase its relative military power (Greico 1990, Waltz 1979). Employing 
the realist interpretation, Gowa (1994) expects more trade between allied countries than 
7 The liberal-realist dichotomy does not apply to other scholars who have sought more synthetic approach. For example, Gasiorowski (1986) distinguishes simple economic interconnectedness and interdependence 
and argues the former declines conflict whereas the latter leads to increase conflict. Soroos (1997) and de Vries (1990) find that interdependence increases both cooperation and conflict. 
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with neutrals or enemies. Realist explanation also consolidated the belief that physical 
confrontation largely hampers the flow of trade between the two parties. 
Unlike these widely accepted arguments in IR studies, economic interactions 
between South and North Korea during the nuclear confrontation (2002-2006) in the 
Korean Peninsula and beyond showed considerably dissimilar trend to the theoretical 
assumption. The steady growth of inter-Korean trade and investment made while a 
hostile political relationship and military tension developed raised the need that the 
hitherto hypotheses about the influence of militarized conflict on the economic 
interactions need to be retested. 
To elucidate what caused this contradictory move, this study will, in the first half 
of the thesis in particular, demonstrate substantial change of actors and dynamics that 
had framed inter-Korean relations and attempt. to explain it by the complex 
interdependence proposed by Keohane and Nye (1977). This study will argue that the 
evolved pattern of inter-Korean engagement which is akin to the complex 
interdependence situation, offers a useful framework under which the South Korean 
SMEs' domestic interests worked with continuing their economic engagement in trade 
with the North. At the same time it will also point out a limitation of this model in fully 
analyzing the inter-relationship between economy and security in inter-Korean affairs. 
Direct application of the model to the whole of inter-Korean relations throughout 
the period after the Cold War is not convincing at all. However, this study will argue 
that the economic, cultural and human exchanges between South and North Korea, 
particularly after the inter-Korean summit in 2000, can be understood through the 
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asymmetrical interdependence model (Keohane and Nye 1989,16-18) in a bilateral 
retationship. 
Complex Interdependence model 
The complex interdependence model spawned from the post-war period realism- 
dominated IR studies and the challenges by a group of thinkers. After the wars, classical 
realist arguments gained undisputable explanatory power in analyzing the then interstate 
relationship and predicting how the relationship is going to develop in the future post- 
war world by predominantly emphasizing the supremacy of power, security, self-interest, 
and conflict in IR studies. They acknowledged a state as the only rational actor in 
international relations and inter-state cooperation is highly unlikely even by accord or 
law in anarchical nature of international politics in realist understanding (Morgenthau, 
1948). 
On the other hand, other group of thinkers suggested that states can cooperate 
within commonly agreed economic and political framework for their mutual benefit. As 
Mitrany argued, the cooperation between states initially occurs in technical areas where 
it was mutually convenient, but once successful it could 'spill over' into other functional 
areas (Mitrany 1948,350-63). In this regard, cooperative probability through non- 
governmental elites, one of the foundational claims of functionalism later constituted the 
key notions in developing interdependence theory. 
It should be noted, as Richard Cooper (1968) asserted that all economic 
relationships entails costly aspects, the theory of interdependence initially developed 
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from the need to assess the costs, in other words, the burdens of adjustment forced upon 
them, generated by the economic and/or political interactions rather than the benefits a 
8 
state can acquire from the exchange with other countries. However, by demonstrating 
'opportunity costs of severing the existing relationship' (Baldwin 1980,481-486) a 
group of interdependence theorists successfully transformed it into an efficient tool to 
explain a motive for cooperation rather than a source of conflict. Among them, Robert 
Keohane and Joseph Nye suggested extensive view to shed light on the cooperative 
relationship between states without recourse on military force by formulating a new 
ideal type of international relationship called complex interdependence. 9 
Such an attempt was a challenge to the IR scholars who had paid intensive 
attention to the use of economic means such as trade for the purpose of accomplishing a 
state's security objective in a political arena. Since Albert Hirschman (1945) had 
published his pioneering work on the power and influence of economic means - quotas, 
exchange control, and other instruments of economic warfare - in establishing and 
developing statecraft, economic interactions between states has largely been studied as 
part of national foreign policy to enhance relative gain of the particular state (Baldwin 
1985). 
' Realist explanations on the interdependence consistently emphasized vulnerability aspects of 
interdependence, indicating political weakness coming from dependent relationship with others. See 
Waltz (1979,13 8) 
9 Keohane and Nye published the first edition of 'Power and Interdependence' in 1977. Ten years later, 
they published a fresh article entitled 'Power and Interdependence revisited' to respond to the criticisms 
which had been made by both liberals and realists over the intervening ten years. They reformulated the 
relationship between military force and economic means as a bargaining toot under complex 
interdependence in this article. As they published the second edition of 'Power and Interdependence' in 
1989, they included the revised version of 'Power and Interdependence revisited' as an afterword for a 
fuller discussion. In this thesis, the second edition of 'Power and Interdependence' will be used as the 
main text from which the authors' conceptions will be cited. 
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However, Keohane and Nye showed that two states can be brought together not 
only by state to state diplomacy but also by involvement of a variety level of non-state 
elites. Under the complex interdependence model they theorized, interstate interactions 
is likely to occur outside of the realm of statecraft by government, attracting multiple 
actors in multiple issue areas through multiple channel among societies. Further, 
Keohane and Nye made a contribution to building a comprehensive theoretical structure 
to address how the various level of individual actors create a web of cooperative 
structure by widening their scope of analysis from simple bargaining practice to 
systemic approach to the intemational politics. 10 
Complex interdependence, as a notion to fill the theoretical space that realists 
insufficiently explained, has three main characteristics. Firstly, under complex 
interdependence in international relations, interstate interaction comes from the informal 
ties among non-governmental elites such as business persons and academics, as well as 
intergovemmental dialogues. The non-govemmental elites are able to create their own 
communication channels by the development of telecommunications without being 
entirely controlled by governments. Secondly, under complex interdependence, the 
foreign affairs agendas become increasingly broader and more diversified. The sets of 
interstate agendas also lack hierarchy among themselves as the distinction between 
domestic and foreign issues becomes blurred. Military security that political realists 
exclusively emphasized no longer dominates other multiple issues representing the 
interests of various domestic groups. Thirdly, complex interdependence caused a 
10 But it does not rule out the use of complex interdependence model to analyze a dyadic level 
relationship. One of the major parts of their case studies in 'Power and Interdependence' focused on America's bilateral relationship with Canada and Australia. See ch. 7 in Keohane and Nye (1989). 
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decrease in the influence of military force as an instrument to achieve an individual 
nation's goals. Military force showed limited usefulness and lost its prior standing as a 
dominant source of power as it was costly and uncertain in the era of complex 
interdependence (Keohane and Nye 1989,24-29). 
The changing features of international relations also affected the political process 
related to intergovernmental bargaining between strong states and weak states. In the 
international relations that political realists had portrayed, strong states tended to 
dominate a variety of issues by linking their own policies on some issues to other states' 
policies on other issues. The preponderance of military capability thus implied a 
dominant bargaining power demonstrating the political high ground to coerce a 
negotiating partner in the non-military issue areas such as trade disputes. Military 
priority was the physical source of power to make a stronger state achieve its political 
and economic goal by linking it to different issues in which the other states were likely 
to have inferior conditions. Significant progress has also been made in issue-linkage 
tactics through producing various patterns of those tactics (Oye et al. 1979, Haas 1980, 
Stein 1980). 
Under complex interdependence, however, the issue linkage strategy of strong 
states became less effective. The lack of hierarchy among issues made the strong states' 
attempts at the linkage strategy more problematic. This was particularly likely when the 
military force of a strong state was nullified for the purpose of intimidating the 
bargaining power of its counterpart aiming to protect national interest in non-military 
issue areas. Poor and weak states, instead, were able to link unrelated issues because 
their domestic interests were less complex in comparison with those of economically 
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advanced states in which a variety of interest group contested one another even within 
the government. Poor states could utilize the linkage strategy of unrelated issues as a 
means of extracting concessions or side payments from rich states (Keohane and Nye 
1989,30-31). 
Inter-Korean relations and the complex interdependence model 
The changed nature of inter-Korean relations after the inter-Korean summit 
illustrated the decreasing explanatory utility of statecraft discourse approach that 
emphasized the security dominance in international relations. The statecraft approach by 
a militarily or economically strong state shows a swing of the pendulum between 
integrated and separated pursuit of economic and security objectives depending on how 
much dominant the strong state's power to control the international order is in the 
particular period. The principle aim of the approach was to understand a stronger state's 
attempts to preserve its preponderance over a weaker state in international politics 
(Mastanduno 1998). But accentuation of the complex interdependence model lies not on 
one dimensional 'influential' vis-a-vis 'being influenced' relationship between a 
stronger and a weaker state. The model calls the unitary dominant role of state into 
question and rather stresses emerging transnational and transgovernmental contact 
channels between states indicating diversified engagement routes that undermined 
traditional diplomatic relationship (Keohane and Nye 1989,33-35). 11 In a changing 
interstate relationship, the model showed a possibility in which non-governmental actors 
" On the more detailed formulation of transnational and transgovernmental contacts in international 
politics, see Keohane and Nye (1972) and (1974) respectively. 
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from each country can collaborate, if not create a coalition, resulting in economic and 
social transactions among 'societies'. As a result, the complex interdependence model 
draws more attention to the alternative role of economic engagement by non- 
governmental and subnational actors in various issue areas. 
Inter-Korean trade by private firms and many other economic and social 
exchanges between the two parties even under the situation of the volatile security 
dynamics provides an empirical evidence to support the applicability of the complex 
interdependence model as a framework of analysis of inter-Korean relations after 2000. 
Since the ROK government legitimated inter-Korean economic transactions by 
private sectors in 1990, the absolute prohibition of non-governmental contact between 
the two Koreas was lifted. South Korean private firms began to import agricultural and 
fishery products from the North and to export their products to the North subject to the 
government permission. But it was after the two Korean leaders met and agreed that 
various channels for economic cooperation and information sharing, like cultural and 
academic exchanges, actually became a normal part of the inter-Korean relationship 
(Kim K. R. 2000, Oh S. Y. 2001). 
After the inter-Korean summit talks in 2000, exchanges between the two Koreas in 
non-political and non-military issues showed a dramatic increase. The number of South 
Korean people who visited the North, was 5,599 in 1999 but it reached 100,838 in 2006 
(MOU 2007,8-9). The purposes of these visits varied, ranging from the performance in 
Pyongyang by a South Korean pop singer to the joint publication of a Korean language 
dictionary (MOU 2007,12-13). These various events were separately put forward and 
implemented by the individual organizers. Neither priority nor inter-agenda hierarchy 
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was required by the government in arranging the individual projects. The South Korean 
government did not prohibit the cooperative projects pushed forward by the agreement 
between the South Korean organizations and its North Korean counterparts. 
The influence of military force that had dominated the inter-Korean relations since 
the end of the Korean War in 1953 also declined as a result of the increasing human and 
cultural exchanges. The military authorities in the two Koreas, for example, held high- 
level talks from 2004 and reached an agreement signalling substantial changes in the 
history of inter-Korean military confrontation. It included an agreement to prevent 
accidental military collision in the Yellow Sea and to dismantle the broadcasting 
facilities that had been used as a main vehicle to slander each other across the 
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between the Koreas (Yonhapnews 5h July 2005). 
The increasing inter-Korean economic engagement in the various issue areas 
occurred at the same time as the two Koreas managed to achieve a peaceful coexistence 
strategy, at least temporarily, after the 2000 summit agreement. Military issues as the 
only predominant negotiation agenda that had defined the post-Korean War relationship 
between the two countries began to lose a top priority amid a rising mood of inter- 
Korean cooperation. The more significant strategic goal, for both parties, was not to 
entrench military preponderance but to secure material and economic gains during this 
period. 
These fundamental changes shown in the evolving pattern of inter-Korean ties 
after 2000 reflects key characteristics of the complex interdependence model. The 
unprecedented multi-level exchanges and cooperation in multiple issue areas 
significantly corresponds with the key assumption of the complex interdependence 
33 
model. This also shows that the transformation of inter-Korean ties suggests the Korean 
version of complex interdependence was taking root after 2000 as a result of dramatic 
growth of inter-Korean exchanges quantitatively and qualitatively. The complex 
interdependence model in this sense, subject to further amplification on state capacity, 
provides one of the most effective theoretical frameworks to explain the pattern of 
change in inter-Korean relations from 2000 to 2006. 
1.5 Hyp o theses 
Three hypotheses will be suggested in this section in order to identify the main 
driving force for South Korean SMEs to enhance their economic engagement with the 
DPRK, despite the security tensions caused by the second nuclear crisis between 2002 
and 2006. These hypotheses were drawn from a series of changes in both Koreas' 
political economy between 2002 and 2006 and consisted of two pull factors and one 
push factor. The two pull factors came from the policy change by the ROK and the 
DPRK government respectively and the push factor derived from the changed business 
conditions in the ROK. This study assumes these three factors alike promoted inter- 
Korean economic engagement by South Korean SMEs during the nuclear crisis and tests 
the respective hypotheses employing a semi-structured survey and a variety of relevant 
literature. 
Firstly, the ROK government provided the SMEs which were involved in inter- 
Korean trade with a set of economic incentives. The preferential treatment for South 
Korean traders who engaged with the North included direct financial subsidies as well 
as tax incentives. The ROK government had funded over 6 billion KRW (some 6 
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million USD) by the end of 2005, for the purpose of offering lower interest rate loans 
than private commercial banks for firms participating in inter-Korean business (MOU 
2008). The Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund (IKCF) run by the Korea Export Import 
Bank (KEXIM), the South Korean parastatal bank, covered unforeseen financial losses 
which might be caused by any North Korean breaches of existing contract. This 
financial subsidization policy hypothetically encouraged the engagement of South 
Korean SMEs in inter-Korean trade. South and North Korea, moreover, did not levy 
tariffs on inter-Korean trade by treating their economic activities as 'intra-national' 
transactions. Non-tariff trade between the two Koreas also provided the South Korean 
traders with favorable conditions to keep their business costs down. Such preferential 
tariffs were likely to motivate South Korean traders to choose transactions with the 
North Korean partners rather than with other countries, if other terms of trade were 
equal (Oh S. Y. 2001,168-170). 
Secondly, a series of measures to improve North Korean economic efficiency 
announced in July 2002, just before the second nuclear crisis erupted, could be assumed 
as an encouraging signal for further development of inter-Korean trade. This 
announcement did not contain any specific provisions spelling out economic 
engagement with the ROK. However, the DPRK government's support for a market- 
oriented environment through its promotion of a decentralized economic management 
system was likely to motivate South Korean SMEs to increase their transactions with the 
North. If the first hypothesis explained the initial motivation for South Korean SMEs to 
engage with the North Korean counterparts, this reform signal projected by the 2002 
announcement further consolidated the progress of inter-Korean economic engagement. 
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To explore whether and to what extent such a reform experiment affected the scale and 
pace of inter-Korean trade, this study will examine the past and present of North Korean 
attempts for economic change. The reform idea to change the central ly-planned autarkic 
economy, through measures such as economic openness, decentralization, and the 
introduction of the profit motive in economic management since the 1980s will be 
examined. Debate over the real intention of the reform drive will also be explored to 
identify the achievements and limitations of the experiment. This study will ultimately 
show to what extent this economic reform signal actually affected the South Korean 
SMEs' behavior in engaging with North Korean economic units during the nuclear crisis. 
Thirdly, this study assumes that the worsening business environment in the ROK 
promoted the SMEs' quest to find alternative production sites in the DPRK. In this 
assumption the threatening situation triggered by the nuclear crisis was likely to be 
considered as a surmountable risk as long as the ROK government continues its 
engagement policy. Unfavourable business conditions included high labor and land 
costs along with South Korean workers' increasing reluctance to participate in the low- 
wage based simple manufacturing industry. The ROK government, on the other hand, 
gave priority to small and medium sized exporters to move into the KIC which resulted 
in signalling even higher growth in inter-Korean trade. The government provided such 
preferential measures particularly for less competitive marginal industry such as apparel 
and footwear manufacturing. The ROK government's policy that had preferred SMEs as 
key participants in inter-Korean trade shaped the KIC as a light industry-led production 
complex. For example, apparel and textile manufacturers that had failed to maintain cost 
competitiveness due to the influx of even cheaper products made in Vietnam and China 
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accounted for sixty per cent of the tenant companies in the KIC as of June 2009 
(KIDMAC 2009). South Korean SMEs' desperation to survive in an increasingly 
competitive business, according to this hypothesis, outweighed their increased risks 
caused by the political turbulence surrounding their business in the DPRK. 
1.6 Methodology 
A key methodological task in this study is to test the three hypotheses to identify a 
primary factor that motivated South Korean SMEs to continue to engage in inter-Korean 
trade under the nuclear crisis. Each hypothetical element will be comprehensively 
explained in the first place to demonstrate how likely it was that it contributed to South 
Korean traders making the decision not to slash their trade volume with the DPRK 
during the crisis. On this basis, a semi-structured questionnaire will be drawn up for the 
purpose of conducting a survey of South Korean traders who actually transacted with 
North Korean counterparts between 2002 and 2006. The result of this survey will 
provide a key evidence for this study to conclude that South Korean SMEs' predicament 
in domestic industry was a predominant factor that drove them to keep engaging with 
the DPRK in spite of the crisis. 
The questionnaire of this survey is organized into two parts. The first section is 
designed to see how the South Korean traders perceived the influence and ramification 
of the nuclear crisis and to what extent it was likely to affect their inter-Korean business. 
The central point in this part is two fold : (1) whether and how much the nuclear crisis 
influenced their decision-making in terms of trade volume (2) what were the causal 
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variables affecting their relevant decisions in connection with the three hypotheses 
presented above. 
The second half of the survey contains relatively more generic questions to show 
the consequences that resulted from Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun's engagement 
policy toward the DPRK after 2000. It is designed to investigate the influence of 
political changes on economic relations between the two Koreas. This part of the 
questionnaire will particularly reveal the diversified inter-Korean contact channel for 
economic engagement which fits in large part the assumption of the complex 
interdependence model. 
The questionnaires were circulated through the network of the Korea International 
Trade Association (KITA), the largest institution to which most of inter-Korean traders 
belong. The respondent group was selected based on the membership list of the Inter- 
Korean Trade and Investment Conference (KOTIC), a subunit of KITA specialized in 
inter-Korean trade. The questionnaires were distributed to the chief executives of a 
hundred inter-Korean traders by facsimile transmission in connection with telephone 
conversations. The KITA and KOTIC network was regarded as the most trustworthy 
route to collect data from individual inter-Korean traders since they had maintained 
periodical contacts with them in order to regularly identify any likely obstacles and red 
tape in carrying out a range of inter-Korean transactions. The ROK government 
statistical data that have been compiled by the Ministry of Unification (MOU) also 
relied on the data collected through this network. The survey through this network for 
this study was conducted from 20th July to 25h August in 2008 and the response rate 
was 40 out of the 100 copies that had been circulated. 
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Other source material for this study apart from the survey results will include 
primary sources and interview data, as well as secondary literature. Statements of the 
ROK government institutions and other literature authored by former key decision- 
makers on inter-Korean affairs have been collected and analyzed. Existing survey results, 
mainly conducted by the South Korean quasi-governmental institutions will also be 
employed to take a look at the perception of the inter-Korean traders on the present 
profitability, future prospects of inter-Korean trade and their response to the relevant 
government policy. This data will be helpful in demonstrating how and on what basis 
the South Korean SMEs responded to the external environment surrounding inter- 
Korean economic transactions. In-depth interviews were conducted to investigate 
individual entrepreneurs' experiences as to how the North Korean people's attitude 
changed with regard to economic engagement with the South Korean counterparts 
during the second nuclear crisis. The interviewees were selected from those who were 
significantly involved in inter-Korean trade from 2002 to 2006, subject to their 
willingness to testify their experiences. The interview data will support the survey result 
by adding another dimension of evidences based on the South Korean entrepreneurs' 
own episodes in dealing with front line trade partners in North Korea. The interviewees 
will also include a North Korean refugee, a former high-ranking official of Pyongyang- 
based trade organization, who can explain how inter-Korean trade developed during the 
crisis from the perspective of the DPRK. 
A methodological barrier to this study is asymmetric access to information 
produced in the ROK and the DPRK. Obtaining internal information in the DPRK was 
not as easy as in its southern neighbor. Although there have been many primary sources 
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announced by the DPRK leadership - party, cabinet, and other subordinate institutions - 
the lack of critical voices opposing the government policy made it difficult to achieve 
reliability and objectivity. Such an asymmetry of scientifically reliable information 
between South and North inevitably resulted in heavily relying on the data and sources 
in South Korea even in collecting North Korea-related data. However, an increasing 
number of North Korean refugees and defectors who had settled in South Korea and 
their testimonies were able to, at least in part, compensate for this asymmetric 
information problem. The secondary literature produced by South Korean scholars in the 
1990s and the 2000s involved growing number of interview data with North Korean 
escapees. The contributions by the North Korean defectors enhanced the explanatory 
power of the literature in interpreting causes and consequences of internal dynamic in 
the North Korean regime. This study largely relies upon data and information collected 
in the ROK including North Korean defectors' testimonies. But at the same time it 
examines North Korean state media and literature, accessible in the South Korean 
scholarly institutions, to explore the internal logic supporting the changes that occurred 
in the DPRK in connection with its foreign economic policy. 
1.7 Outline 
This thesis is divided into two major parts. In the first half which contains chapters 
2,3, and 4, the two pillars constituting this thesis - increased security tension and inter- 
Korean trade - will be intensively discussed. The three hypotheses mentioned in the 
above section will be tested respectively in the second half (chapters 5,6, and 7) to 
answer the key research question of this study. 
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Chapters 2 and 3 will suggest an analytical framework to interpret the 
transformation of inter-Korean relations after 2000 by focusing on key differences 
before and after the inter-Korean summit talks. More specifically, chapter 2 will analyze 
the development of inter-Korean relations before 2000 by focusing on the security- 
dominated relationship between the two Koreas. After reviewing the political and 
military dynamics between the United States and the DPRK, as a predominant element 
that has shaped security environment in the Korean Peninsula, the chapter will formulate 
a realism model-based explanation on inter-Korean relations. Chapter 3, on the contrary, 
will argue that the exchanges and cooperation projects implemented as a result of the 
Inter-Korean Joint Declaration in 2000 undermined the state/military-centric foundation 
of the inter-Korean relations since the 1950s. The chapter will demonstrate how this 
changed security environment in the Korean Peninsula engendered new actors and 
issues as well as new communication channels in inter-Korean interactions by 
highlighting the achievement of the former ROK president Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo 
Hymn. A survey result suggesting this changed contact route will be presented in this 
chapter. The chapter as a consequence argues that the viewpoint of political realism, 
which has dominantly construed inter-Korean relations since the end of the Korean War, 
no longer provides appropriate perspective as an analytical tool. It will then propose the 
complex interdependence model as a new analytical framework to interpret this 
substantial change. 
Chapter 4 will contrast the heightened military tension in the Korean Peninsula 
caused by the second nuclear crisis and the increasing trend of the inter-Korean trade 
from the eruption of the crisis to 2006. A detailed chronology showing the escalation of 
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nuclear tension and the responses of relevant players will be presented in this chapter. 
To illustrate a stable growth of inter-Korean trade, various dimensions of quantitative 
statistical data showing the upswing of the inter-Korean trade will be employed. It 
presents inter-Korean trade volume by sub-categories and the number of companies 
which were actually involved in these cross-border transactions. This chapter will also 
analyze the subsequent ramifications of inter-Korean trade under the situation where the 
hostile relationship did not yet come to an end. One of the central perspectives to 
observe this ramification will be how the mutual engagement by subnational actors 
ensures the continuity of the relationship in spite of rising tension. 
In the second half of this thesis, three hypotheses explaining the increasing 
economic engagement by South Korean SMEs during the second nuclear crisis will be 
discussed one after another. Chapter 5 examines the first hypothesis : the direct financial 
incentives from the ROK government to promote inter-Korean trade. Whether or to 
what extent the preferential measures granted by the lKCF contributed to facilitating 
more sustainable commercial transactions with North Korean trade partners will be 
tested in this chapter. 
Chapter 6 discusses the second hypothesis. This chapter will, first of all, trace the 
historical background of the economic reform programs announced by the DPRK 
government in 2002, just several months before the outbreak of the second nuclear crisis. 
It will also highlight the debatable intentions, characteristics, and the influence of this 
reform package. This chapter will ultimately explore whether these economic reform 
measures affected South Korean SMEs decision on inter-Korean trade volume. 
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Chapter 7 will shed light on the deteriorated business environment in the ROK as 
a main push factor that precipitated South Korean entrepreneurs' efforts to find out an 
alternative production base in the DPRK. Increasing labor and land costs along with 
South Korean workers' reluctance to participate in low-wage based manufacturing 
industry promoted their attempts to move the production facilities. This chapter will 
offer an argument explaining the engagement toward the North by the South Korean 
marginal industries such as apparel and footwear that faced difficulties in the domestic 
market. 
Additionally, the results of the survey conducted in the ROK will respectively be 
presented in chapters 5,6, and 7 to show why the South Korean entrepreneurs continued 
to push forward inter-Korean trade despite the unstable political climate. Chapter 8, the 
concluding chapter, will summarize the main findings of the thesis and suggest their 
implications on the ROK government policy to improve inter-Korean relations. 
Recommendations for future research on inter-Korean relations will also be made at the 
end of the thesis. 
1.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the dominant perspectives which will frame this thesis were 
intensively discussed. This thesis will first of all attempt to explore the inter-relationship 
between the increasing security instability and the economic engagement between 
potentially hostile actors. It will examine, as a subject for case study, the changing trend 
of the cross-border trade between the ROK and the DPRK amid the growing military 
tension caused by the second nuclear crisis sparked in 2002. The statistical data between 
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2002 and 2006 showed by and large an ascending trend in cross-border trade between 
the two Koreas despite the increasingly unstable security environment in the Korean 
Peninsula. To explore the causal variables which affected the increasing inter-Korean 
trade under the security instability, this thesis sets out three hypotheses. Firstly, the 
economic incentives such as the financial subsidization and the tariff exemption for 
South Korean SMEs will be assumed as an influential factor to promote the inter- 
Korean trade after the outbreak of the second nuclear crisis. Secondly, a series of North 
Korean economic reform packages announced in 2002 will be examined as the external 
variable that facilitated the active engagement of South Korean SMEs in inter-Korean 
trade. Finally, the deteriorating business environment in the ROK will be intensively 
discussed as a push factor for South Korean SMEs to risk an unstable security situation 
to secure low-cost production sites. By testing the validity of each hypothesis, this thesis 
will conclude that the domestic business conditions primarily affected the South Korean 
business community's behavioral pattern on whether and how deeply to engage with the 
North Korean economy. This finding ultimately implies that there was no specific 
pattern of causal relationship between economic interdependence and nuclear crisis as 
long as inter-Korean channels at multiple levels were maintained. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Inter-Korean relations before 2000 
21 Introduction 
This chapter will analyze the development of inter-Korean relations before 
2000 by focusing on those of the 1980s and 1990s. The central analytical point would 
be the relationship between economic interdependence and security concern. After 
reviewing the political and military dynamics between the United States and the 
DPRK, as a primary causal variable that has framed the security environment in the 
Korean Peninsula, the chapter will explore the key features of inter-Korean relations 
during this period. This chapter will, by doing so, show that political realism in IR 
theory provides a decent analytical framework to explain inter-Korean relations 
before 2000. 
Z2 U. S-DPRK relations under the Clinton administration (1993-2000) 
This section will discuss three main points. Firstly, it will analyze the origin and 
development of the notion of 'rogue state' presented by the Clinton administration in the 
1990S., 2 This will provide the groundwork to understand the key concept which framed 
12 The term 'rogue', 'backlash', 'outlaw' and 'pariah' were used interchangeably in policy and academic discourse. Alexander George (1993,49), for example, used the term 'outlaw states and their rogue leaders'. In this chapter, the 'rogue state', as a term that enjoyed more currency among Korean issue analysts as well as American policyrnakers, will be used for consistency. 
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the Clinton administration's viewpoint On the DPRK. Secondly, it will examine the 
literature of proponents and opponents of the 'rogue state' in adopting this notion to 
analyze the DPRK case. It will show there was no consensus in DPRK studies regarding 
the applicability of the 'rogue state' notion. Thirdly, it will argue that the attempts to 
apply the 'rogue state' notion to the DPRK case resulted in consolidating inter-state 
military dynamics in understanding the security environment in the Korean Peninsula. 
Origin and development of a 'rogue state' 
American foreign policy advisory groups were the main source behind the creation, 
shaping, development of the concept of the 'rogue state'. They used the term 'rogue 
state' as political and diplomatic rhetoric. Alexander George (1993,49) highlighted the 
rogue states' non-compliance with the norms of the international system. He argued that 
rogue states refused to accept and abide by some of the most important norms and 
practices of the international system. Anthony Lake, President Clinton's national 
security advisor, also paid great attention to the rogue states' aggressive behavior and 
their chronic inability to engage constructively with the outside world. He argued that 
their pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) made clear their inclination to 
remain on the wrong side of history (Lake 1994,46). President Clinton also stated that 
66rogue states posed a serious danger to regional stability in many comers of the globe. " 
(Clinton 1995). 
This conceptual ization, by the key officials and the advisors in the U. S. 
goverriment, of rogue state alarmed international actors about the catastrophic 
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consequence they might bring about. George argued that rogue states might seek to 
dominate and reshape the system to their own liking. He warned that they might aim at 
regional hegemony (George 1993,49). Madeleine K. Albright, Secretary of State in the 
Clinton administration, asserted that the rogue states' sole purpose was to destroy the 
intemational system (Albright 1997). 
What the Clinton administration attempted to highlight was the American role and 
its responsibility in coping with rogue states. The Clinton administration repeatedly 
emphasized that the United States ought to 'socialize' and 'reform' rogue states (George 
1993,49). Such responsibility included the American role for developing a strategy to 
f neutralize', 'counter' and 'contain' them through selective pressure (Lake 1994). The 
Clinton administration wished to articulate and achieve a post-Cold War containment 
doctrine by insisting on American hegemony in responding to the rogue states' 
aggression. The Clinton administration's notion of the rogue state superseded the 
foreign policy agenda toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War (Litwak 2000,3). 
Rogue state and the DPRK 
The DPRK was not a main component in the original rogue state categorization. 
Anthony Lake identified Cuba, Libya, North Korea as well as Iran and Iraq as 'backlash 
states' in his article published in Foreign Affairs in 1994. Iran and Iraq were indeed the 
main targets of what he called 'dual containment'. He presented this strategic initiative 
toward Iran and Iraq for the purpose of reconstructing the Middle East policy of the 
United States (Lake 1994,48-49). However, since the inclusion of the DPRK in Lake's 
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article, the rogue state discourse has provided scholars and policy analysts working on 
the DPRK issues with an analytical tool. A number of scholarly analyses on North 
Korea focused on finding out the similarities and distinctions between the DPRK and a 
group of Islamic states such as Iran and Iraq (Henriksen 2001, Litwak 2003-04, Howard 
2004, Huntley 2006). In contrast, historical, religious, geopolitical peculiarities, within 
which the DPRK had been established and transformed, were underestimated. 
A handful of policy reports following the logic of rogue states neglected non-state 
actors, which fell outside the 'rogue or non-rogue' dichotomy, William C. Triplett, chief 
Republican counsel to the U. S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, regarded North 
Korean non-state actors, such as its population, as mere puppets that were forced to obey 
the rogue regime. 
Foreigners who visit North Korea notice the people won't make eye contact 
and any conversations are stilted and ritualistic. Those who have not been 
brainwashed into submission have been terrorized (Triplett 2004,6). 
In making this point, however, he did not provide any evidence based either on 
extant scholarly literature or on his own interviews. The most visible evidence 
mobilized in order to stress the rogue nature of the DPRK regime was the description of 
the North Korean political leader's private life, drawing attention to the marble palaces, 
hunting lodges, women, liquor, jet skis etc. (Triplett 2004,5). This approach 
significantly impeded paying aftention to the North Korean agencies and institutions 
which framed its foreign policy and in turn created a broader Korean security 
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environment. Journalist Jasper Becker (2005) also showed inattention to influential 
actors engaged in the DPRK foreign policy. He simply presented fragmentary political 
episodes, observed through the rogue state discourse, under what he called the Kim 
Dynasty. 
On the other hand, there was no indisputable consensus over the inclusion of the 
DPRK among rogue states within international institutions. The United Kingdom, for 
example, as one of the Permanent Five in the United Nations Security Council, 
demonstrated a different approach regarding its diplomatic relations with the DPRK. 
British delegates in 1991, including two diplomats and seven Members of the House of 
Commons, visited Pyongyang to take part in the 85h Interparliamentary Union 
Conference. This event marked a significant step forward in the relationship between the 
UK and the DPRK (Morris 1996,89-90). A group of British scholars, in the same year, 
also participated in the first UK-DPRK social scientists' seminar in Pyongyang, hosted 
by the Juche Academy (Smith et al. 1997, ix). These episodes demonstrated that the 
notion of rogue state was not a universal concept that already obtained consent from key 
state actors in international politics. 
Scholars produced, at the same time, critical assessments on the rogue state 
discourse per se and, in particular, its applicability to the DPRK case. Chomsky (2000) 
argued that the United States was not qualified in attempting to demonize the hostile 
state toward itself. Smith (2000,115-19) pointed out that viewing the DPRK as a rogue 
state generated poor policy choices. She argued that its logic failed to grasp the 
complexity of North Korean politics. Dujarric (2001) criticized the criteria the U. S. 
considered when branding hostile nations as rogue states. He argued that the 
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demarcation between rogue and non-rogue states - human rights violations, possession 
and trade of WMD - was not impartial. He provided other examples such as Saudi 
Arabia, Egypt (human rights violation) and India, Pakistan (nuclear possession) in order 
to substantiate his criticism. 
Inter-state military dynamics 
The debate over a rogue state and its applicability to the DPRK resulted in 
confining the analytical tool viewing the DPRK within inter-state political dynamics. 
The literature of the rogue states emphasized the imminent risk of a military clash in the 
Korean Peninsula. They also demonstrated the neglect of the role of sub-state actors in 
the Korean security environment. They instead consolidated the significance of state- 
centric dynamics as a method to analyze the security environment in the Peninsula. The 
rogue state literature also highlighted the feasibility of a 'one-size-fits-all' strategy 
(Litwak 2000,9), which could be applied to every rogue regime including the DPRK. 
Their overarching assumption in the DPRK studies was that Kim 11 Sung and his 
successor Kim Jong 11 was the only determinant in underpinning their security concern. 
This meant that the security environment in the Korean Peninsula was built on this state- 
centric security dynamic. Scholars paid scant attention, in contrast, to the reality and 
possibility of various levels of interactions between the DPRK sub-state agencies and 
the rest of the world. As Sigal pointed out, during the Clinton administration, primitive 
realism took the place of pragmatism as an analytical tool to view the security 
envirom-nent in the Peninsula (Sigal 1998,13). This state-centric realistic approach 
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continued in the Bush Administration. The emergence of global terrorism, furthermore, 
consolidated the U. S. containment strategy against its political adversaries. 
Z3 Inter-Korean relations before 2000 
This section will investigate the development of inter-Korean relations in the late 
1980s and the 1990s focusing on inter-Korean economic interdependence and security 
concern. The section will assess the North Korea policy of the former ROK presidents 
Roh Tae Woo (1988-1992) and Kim Young Sam (1993-1997) in association with 
military tension in the Korean Peninsula and the emerging economic interdependence. It 
will argue that the security-dominated realist perspective offers an analytical tool to 
understand inter-Korean relations before 2000. 
Basicftamework and legislation: 1988-1992 
The first turning point in inter-Korean economic relations after the Korean War 
emerged in 1972. The ROK and the DPRK authorities announced the so-called '7.4 
Joint Declaration' in this year. Seoul and Pyongyang agreed in the Declaration that they 
would launch an economic sub-committee under the name of 'South-North Coordination 
Committee (SNCC)'. The SNCC was supposed to be a main vehicle to pursue a variety 
of cooperative projects. However, a range of disagreements between Seoul and 
Pyongyang surfaced in the subsequent working-level negotiations. The ROK insisted the 
economic sub-committee should be operated first. But the DPRK argued it should be 
done at the same time as the other sub-committees tackling military, diplomatic, and 
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cultural matters were organized. The disagreements showed the reality in which the 
North argued political-military (hard) issues should be handled first but the South 
preferred a non-political (soft) agenda as a preceding issue that needed to be resolved to 
deal with more substantial issues later. The ROK, in other words, attempted to make an 
agreement on the individually proposed functional exchange programs in the first place 
but the DPRK preferred a more comprehensive approach. The South's preference was 
for an incremental and phased approach in terms of the way of consensus building. But 
the North's strategy was aimed at package style agreements (Oh S. R. et al. 1995,57-60). 
The two parties nevertheless reached several interim agreements in this period. 
Examples were how to reconcile the import/export pricing mechanism and which 
currency would be adopted as means of payment for anticipated interactions between the 
two parties (SNCC 1975). The agreements however did not imply the creation of an 
institutionalized body through which both parties could further promote inter-Korean 
economic exchanges. The two Koreas failed to form any economic agreement in the 
1970s and 80s. The main cause was the existence of a wide perception gap on how to 
develop inter-Korean political relations in a broader context. 
The Roh Tae Woo administration that took office in 1988 created a legal 
framework in the domestic politics for inter-Korean economic exchange. Roh Tae Woo 
(1988-1993) started his term with the waning of the Cold War in international politics. 
His administration at this juncture normalized its diplomatic relationship with the Soviet 
Union (September 1990) and China (August 1992) during his term. It was understood as 
a response to the collapse of the Cold War system in East Asian regional dynamics. The 
changed climate surrounding the security dynamic in the Korean Peninsula also 
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influenced the North Korea policy of his administration. Roh Tae Woo announced a 
'Special Declaration for National Dignity, Reunification, and Prosperity' ('The 7.7 
Declaration') in 1988. He proclaimed in the Declaration that the ROK government 
would allow South Korean people to make economic engagement with the DPRK 
entities (MOU 1991). The Roh administration's conciliatory attitude came from the 
change in post-Cold War international politics led by the United States, the ROK's key 
ally. The DPRK at the same time adjusted its foreign policy line in response to the 
disadvantageous climate after the demise of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European 
allies (Chun J. S. 2003,39-44). The common efforts between the two Koreas to forge 
political reconciliation were made in the changed environment. The efforts resulted in 
signing the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchanges, and Cooperation 
in 1992. The agreement created a foundation on which inter-Korean economic 
cooperation could burgeon. 13 
The Roh government made efforts to display its willingness to permit cross-border 
interaction between the two Koreas. The government arranged guidelines for inter- 
Korean economic exchanges for the first time since the end of the Korean War (Suh 
D. M. and Nam S. W. 2003,246-47). This signalled that the cross-border economic 
exchanges between the two Koreas were likely to resume under the Roh Tae Woo 
administration. Any kind of exchanges between the two past enemies had strictly been 
prohibited until the Roh administration. 
Scholars therefore agreed that the initial starting point in the history of inter- 
Korean economic exchange on a commercial basis was 1990. The Roh Tae Woo 
13 On the details of the Basic Agreement signed in 1992, see MOU (1992). 
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administration enacted 'The Inter-Korean Economic Exchange Act' in this year. The 
government guidelines however could not in reality stimulate the ROK business actors 
to actually engage with the DPRK entities. The number of South Korean firms that 
engaged in inter-Korean trade in 1990 and 1991 was sixteen and fifty six respectively 
(Lee J. K. 2006,42). These figures were less than 10% of those in the Kim Dae Jung 
administration which took office in 1998. In spite of the legitimization of inter-Korean 
trade under the Roh administration, the stagnant situation in terms of actual mutual 
engagement continued throughout his term. 
No formal channel of dialogue between the two Koreas to discuss the modalities 
of the inter-Korean trade existed in the early 1990s. The only route to relate the 
interested parties to each other was to involve an intermediary body in a third country. 
Adjacent countries such as Japan, China, Singapore, and Hong Kong provided them 
with alternative meeting places. These indirect, or diverted, attempts for commercial 
transactions constituted a typical pattern of inter-Korean trade in the early 1990s (Koh 
H. W. 2002). This demonstrated that the longstanding political taboo between the two 
Koreas after the war, banning direct mutual contact, still inhibited the promotion of 
inter-Korean economic exchanges. 
Critics, for these reasons, pointed out that the Roh administration's economic 
policy toward the DRPK did not create a stable foundation to enable both actors to 
pursue a mutual engagement strategy. They argued that the administration's policy still 
centered on the assumption of military confrontation with Pyongyang. Choi, for 
example, pointed out that the administration's new initiative was based on the strategy 
to alienate the DPRK by making use of the ROK's advanced economy. He construed 
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inter-Korean economic cooperation as a tool to further consolidate the DPRK's political 
isolation in post-Cold War international, politics (Choi J. J. 1997,15 1). 
The driving force for inter-Korean economic engagement was so feeble that it 
could not push up subsequent economic exchanges. The weakness however did not 
undermine the Roh Tae Woo administration's attempt to ease inter-Korean political 
tension. It was true, at least, that the administration made a breakthrough in the political 
standoff in the Cold War dynamic in the Korean Peninsula. It was particularly the case 
when comparing its policy orientation with his successor, Kim Young Sam's foreign 
policy toward the DPRK. 
Nuclear crisis and issue linkage : 1993-1997 
The key words that defined the North Korea policy of the Kim Young Sam 
government were 'inconsistency' and 'ambivalence'. 14 Kim Young Sam earlier 
proclaimed that his administration would pursue a foreign policy focusing on national 
homogeneity between the two Koreas. He stressed this sympathetic approach toward 
Pyongyang in his inaugural speech. He stated in this speech that nothing was more 
important than the shared blood line in inter-Korean relations (The ROK Presidential 
Office 1996). Yet at the same time he revealed his hopeful expectation of the collapse of 
Pyongyang regime (Oberdorfer 2001,373-74). This perception showed the opposite of 
his verbal remarks which were ostensibly amicable toward the DPRK. 
" For the examples and episodes showing the Kim Young Sam administration's inconsistent North Korea Policy, see Choi W. K. (l 997,199-20 1). 
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The first nuclear crisis erupted in 1993 as the DPRK announced it would withdraw 
from the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Kim Young Sam made a dramatic reversal in 
his North Korea policy following the nuclear tension. Inter-Korean relations in the early 
1990s were accordingly dominated by the nuclear confrontation between the DPRK and 
the United States. Kim Young Sam's anti-North Korea remarks peaked against this 
backdrop. He revealed an ambivalent posture toward the DPRK. He stated that he would 
never shake hands with those who retained nuclear weapons (The ROK Presidential 
Office 1996). 
Kim Young Sam administration's policy line toward the DPRK became 
increasingly tougher after the North Korean nuclear program was unveiled. By contrast, 
the nuclear agreement between the Clinton administration and Pyongyang heightened 
the mood of thaw in the Korean Peninsula. The diplomatic settlement of the nuclear 
crisis achieved by high-level negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang also 
made a breakthrough in inter-Korean relations (Wit et al. 2004). The Kim Young Sam 
administration announced in 1994 a set of phased measures to permit the ROK business 
community to resume the inter-Korean economic engagement. It was one of the 
responses to the change of the external foreign policy environment. The administration 
placed greater emphasis on large scale investment and joint venture projects with the 
DPRK entities. The main actors that responded to this policy change were either chaebol 
such as Daewoo and Samsung or large scale conglomerates (KIA 1995,468-475). 
The less repressive approach by Kim Young Sam to the inter-Korean economic 
engagement further propelled inter-Korean exchanges. They showed a remarkable 
increase in the mid- I 990s as a result. The share of trade with the ROK in total foreign 
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trade of the DPRK reached 9.2% in 1995. The increase in inter-Korean trade coincided 
with a decrease in what they called 'concessional' trade between the PRC and the 
DPRK. The DPRK used to be given preferential terms of trade in 'concessional' trade 
between the two political allies (Huh M. Y. 1996,57-58). The decreasing barter trade 
with the PRC and Russia was another problem for the DPRK as the former political 
allies began to require a more commercial basis transaction. The stricter pattern of trade 
entailed immediate hard currency payment in return for imports. But as the DPRK was 
unable to make cash payments, its trade volume began to plummet (Kim Y. C. 2002,22). 
Inter-Korean trade played an important role to make up the deficit in the DPRK trade 
balance. 
More striking change in trade between the two Koreas in this period was the 
emergence of 'processing-on-commission (POC)' based manufacturing industry in the 
DPRK territory. The first joint project based on this pattern of trade was undertaken in 
1998. The POC generally meant one party sent raw material or parts to the other party 
and the receiver completed the manufacturing work by processing and assembling all 
the goods delivered. The sender pays for the receiver's labor in this scheme and 
repurchases the completed and labelled goods. The sender reaps adequate profits by 
selling them either in the domestic or the foreign market (MOU 2007,42). 
The policy reversal of the ROK government to permit production in the DPRK 
stimulated ROK industry. ROK firms such as Daewoo and Gohap sought government 
approval in 1995 for projects to manufacture their goods in the major cities in the 
DPRK. The ROK government accepted their offer. The new policy initiative enabled the 
ROK firms to utilize the North Korean workforce on site. They were supposed to chum 
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out products with the South Korean brand (Kim Y. C. et al. 2002,24-25). The operation 
of the production facilities in the DPRK implied that ROK firms no longer needed to 
contact their Northern neighbor through an intermediary. The processing-on- 
commission manufacture laid the foundation for deeper direct interdependence between 
the two Koreas. POC trade required more frequent human exchanges and a longer-term 
pre-contact before launching their joint business. This further buttressed 
interdependence between the South and the North. 
However, three points should be critically evaluated in viewing the inter-Korean 
trade under the Kim Young Sam administration despite the quantitative increase in inter- 
Korean trade. Firstly, Kim Young Sam regarded inter-Korean trade as one of the 
solutions to make up for the shortage of North Korean economic resources in the mid- 
1990s. Such a conceptual i zation of inter-Korean trade lacked proper understanding of 
commercial transactions as mutually beneficial economic exchange. This poorly defined 
role for the inter-Korean trade produced unrealistic policy recommendations for the 
ROK goverment. They included policy prescriptions such as support for the DPRK's 
accession to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the pursuit of a South-North 
free trade agreement (Huh M. Y. 1996,90-92). Before long when the IMF / World Bank 
fact-finding mission team visited Pyongyang, it became clear that Pyongyang had 
absolutely no preparation to cooperate with the international financial organizations, 
which required substantial information sharing with them (Harrison 2002,35-36). 
Secondly, the Kim Young Sam administration subordinated inter-Korean 
economic interactions to the insecurity caused by nuclear crisis. The security concern 
was heavily affected by the U. S. -DPRK nuclear confrontation. The administration 
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maintained an intransigent posture against the Clinton administration's efforts for 
diplomatic dialogue with Pyongyang to tranquilize the nuclear crisis. Direct engagement 
by the South government was largely confined within the realm of division of 
responsibility about how to denuclearize the DPRK. As a result, there were no more 
than 15 inter-Korean direct dialogues undertaken in the Kim Young Sam administration 
(1993-1997). This was much less than those under his predecessor Roh Tae Woo (1989- 
1993,82 times), who managed the inter-Korean relations immediately after the demise 
of the Cold War (Choi, W. K. 1997). A purpose of Kim Young Sam's attempts to link 
inter-Korean economic relations to the nuclear crisis was to acquire diplomatic leverage, 
by economically engaging with the DPRK, to press the Pyongyang regime to dismantle 
its nuclear program. But this strategy was unsuccessful. The strategy ended up losing the 
opportunity to create a strengthened interdependence between the two Koreas. He made 
the increasing inter-Korean economic interdependence subordinate to the hostile 
coexistence between the two Koreas. It consolidated at the same time the ROK 
entrepreneurs' perception that their investment in the DPRK would be fragile unless 
military tension ended in the Korean Peninsula. 
Thirdly, Kim Young Sam did not acknowledge the non-state level contact with 
DPRK entities. A momentum for direct humanitarian engagement came when the DPRK 
underwent nationwide famine in the mid-1990s after the two great floods. The Kim 
Young Sam administration however did not allow any involvement of non- 
governmental, humanitarian groups in the food aid being discussed toward the North 
Korean population. The administration instead insisted on the need for a 'phased and 
orderly' approach in sending relief material to the DPRK, which meant dismissing a 
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good deal of requests for contact with North Korean counterparts made from South 
Korean non-governmental organizations, with the only exception of the Korean Red 
Cross. Since the North already made clear that they would not accept any food aid 
through 'government vis-a-vi's government' channels from the South, a serious impasse 
was unavoidable even in delivering the 150,000 tons of rice the Kim Young Sam regime 
had already pledged (Dong-A Ilbo, June 22 th , 1995). Critics pointed out that 
Kim Young 
Sam's firm attitude of not allowing more efficient aid channel both in domestic and 
international arenas reflected his intention of hoping to monopolize any accomplishment 
and parade it in inter-Korean matters (Choi W. K. 1997). Kim Young Sam had a belief 
that inter-Korean bargaining even over the humanitarian aid issue could and should be 
undertaken on the basis of acknowledging the sovereign authority of each party. The 
emphasis on sovereign authority in his foreign policy, as supreme and unitary 
negotiating power, was deepened as a result of the crisis of national security caused by 
the nuclear crisis in the 1990s. 
When comparing the Kim Young Sam administration's policy line with his 
predecessors, it showed a regressive approach when it came to the inter-Korean 
economic interactions. Roh Tae Woo's foreign policy could be assessed that he took 
advantage of the demise of the Cold War and the disintegration of the communist bloc. 
Kim Young Sam however underestimated the pattern of change in international politics 
which signalled the emergence of new actors and dynamics. 
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Lack ofpolitical consideration 
Despite several points that showed the difference between Roh Tae Woo and Kim 
Young Sam, both administrations exposed similar pattern of limitations in that their 
policy failed to appreciate the extent to which economic cooperation could further 
political dimensions of inter-Korean relations. As Yoon pointed out, inter-Korean 
economic cooperation had a potential to be developed into a main axis which could 
resolve more comprehensive issues that the two Koreas had been facing (Yoon Y. K. 
2003). Inter-Korean economic cooperation should have been considered, in other words, 
not only as a tool to seek economic benefit based on the comparative advantage logic. 
Rather it should have been treated as an instrumental method which could bring about 
political reconfiguration in the Korean Peninsula. 
The Roh Tae, Woo and the Kim Young Sam administrations showed limitations on 
how to relate the political and the economic interactions between the two Koreas. The 
new pattern of joint manufacturing system by the POC offered an opportunity to 
institutionalize the inter-Korean economic exchange programs. Both administrations 
however failed to use this opportunity to create an institutionalized environment for the 
sustainable development of the inter-Korean trade. 
Three factors should be pointed out to explain this failure. Firstly, the 
administrations failed to capture the role of transnational interaction in the inter-Korean 
relations in the 1990s. Keohane and Nye defined transnational interaction as 'a 
movement of items across the state boundaries when at least one actor is not an agent of 
a government or an intergovernmental organization' (Keohane and Nye 1972, ix-xii). 
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Neither administration however allowed any kind of mutual engagement outside 
intergovernmental contacts. The then ROK government defined itself as the planner and 
enforcer of all kinds of economic interactions between the two Koreas. South Korean 
firms, the actual players in the inter-Korean trade, remained in a secondary role. 
SecondlY, the two administrations underestimated the participation of the SMEs in 
promoting inter-Korean trade relations. The significance of SMEs in inter-Korean trade 
was convincing on two points. The greater business actors' engagement was likely to 
stabilize and institutionalize inter-Korean economic exchange. One success story at the 
same time was likely to attract a number of SMEs by providing them with alternative 
production sites replacing China or Vietnam. The administrations however did not 
provide sufficient incentives for South Korean SMEs that had substantial economic 
interests in inter-Korean trade. 
Thirdly, their tough posture demanding rigid reciprocity remained unchanged in 
terms of the correlation between the political environment and the economic 
interactions. The demand for reciprocity by the South in inter-Korean negotiations 
worked relatively well in the Roh Tae Woo administration. One of the reasons was 
because the DPRK showed a more accommodative attitude in debatable issues between 
the two Koreas. The issues included the joint accession to the United Nations and the 
signing of the Basic Agreement with the ROK (Song M. H. 2008). 15 This attitude change 
came from the fact that the North felt a disadvantaged climate in regional politics as the 
former North Korean allies, upon which Pyongyang heavily relied for oil supply, lost 
their power. Under the Kim Young Sam administration however the requirement of 
" The DPRK had not agreed to the UN joint accession for the reason that it would perpetuate the national 
division in the Korean Peninsula until it changed the position in the early 1990s. 
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rigid reciprocity faced an obstacle. The Clinton administration, unlike Kim Young Sam, 
exploited direct dialogue with Pyongyang and rewarded its diplomatic course of actions 
to dismantle the nuclear program. As a result the ROK government that kept insisting on 
rigid reciprocity was sidelined in the negotiations (Choi W. K. 1997,203-4). 
All these three factors meant that the two governments failed to realize the 
complex nature of inter-Korean economic exchanges. They did not pay attention to how 
the inter-Korean economic exchanges should relate to the political future of the two 
Koreas. They were not prepared to grasp the fact that the inter-Korean economic 
exchanges were not incompatible with each other's clashing political interests. The lack 
of perception on this intertwined nature of the inter-Korean economic and political 
interaction caused a lack of policy continuity. The implementation of the government 
level economic agreement was paralyzed whenever there was mounting military tension 
in the Peninsula. The main concern about inter-Korean economic exchange in the next 
government therefore became how to insulate inter-Korean trade from political 
turbulence. 
Theoretical interpretation 
In the 1990s, despite a set of agreements to defuse the likelihood of a military 
clash in the Korean peninsula (Jeong S. H. 1992, Lee G. 2005), inter-Korean relations 
could be better explained in essence by the realist perspective. A shared assumption of 
realism was, although it was not monolithic, the conflictual nature of international 
politics. Realist thinking also required the primacy of power and security in political life 
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(Gilpin 1986,304-5). Classical realists believed that the most powerful actors in 
international politics are those with the greatest military strength (Morgenthau 1985, 
29) 
Emphasis on national security by defensive realists in particular provided Korea 
analysts with useful guidance in understanding inter-Korean cooperation and conflict in 
the 1990s. The defensive realists identified the ultimate goal of states as their pursuit of 
security rather than maximizing and expanding their power (Waltz 1989,40). Power 
maximizing behavior of states the classical realists assumed, according to the defensive 
realists, did not come from universal attributes of states but come from states' particular 
ambitions that aimed to become a global hegemon (Snyder 1991,10-13). Power 
maximizing theory had significant flaws when attempting to predict a weak state's 
behaviour such as the DPRK. 
When it came to interactions between states, the 'zero-sum' nature of international 
politics was still useful for neorealists. According to the neorealists, so long as each 
actor fears how the other will use its increased capabilities, interstate cooperation is 
highly unlikely. Despite the existence of a range of institutions as well as internationally 
cooperative organizations, 'self-help' was the only means to guarantee the survival of 
states (Waltz 1979,105-111). 16 Only limited cooperation was possible in neorealist 
thinking where a state stands to gain more than other states. Grieco (1988), for example, 
had warned of the danger of a weak state's 'unilateral act' that could be triggered when 
"' The definition of an institution in this chapter follows that of Keohane et al. (I 993,4-5). It therefore includes agreements and treaties between states, which bind their behavior toward each other, as well as 
organizations and bureaucratic agencies. 
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realizing its 'relative loss'. Based mainly on this argument, he dismissed the possibility 
of interstate cooperation under the anarchical situation. 
Inter-Korean relations in the 1990s were understood in accordance with the logic 
of neorealist tradition, that is, security/military-dominated issue areas. Security fears that 
came from the increasingly asymmetrical military balance between the two Koreas 
made the DPRK leadership take a more unyielding attitude in its military line (Kang 
2003). Under this situation, taking advantage of the other's weakness was regarded by 
both sides as the most appropriate policy option to achieve their goals. Diplomatic 
dialogue or cooperative behavior was underestimated. Both parties perceived, if at all, 
that the intermittent dialogues and negotiations were continued efforts to 'manage' 
conflict or to maintain 'conflictive', not 'peaceful' coexistence (Huh M. Y. 2006,199). 
Before the Kim Dae Jung administration, it was not easy to discover scholarly 
attempts in which the DPRK was analyzed as a cooperative partner in foreign affairs. 
The DPRK was still the object of countering and confrontation. The analysis of North 
Korean foreign policy behavior did not fit well into the interdependence model 
developed by the neoliberals. As the nuclear confrontation in the 1990s implied, most 
scholarly works in international relations focused on the DPRK's non-compliance with 
the nuclear non-proliferation regime and its unilateral acts (Lee C. K. 1995, Wit et al. 
2004). The DPRK's position on the nuclear issues in the 1990s, on the contrary, showed 
that the DPRK leadership regarded the nuclear disarmament deal as an issue of political 
survival. This also meant that Pyongyang perceived that any kind of denuclearization 
attempts by external powers would incur relative loss in US-DPRK relations. 
Pyongyang viewed the relative gains obtained either by Washington or by Seoul as a 
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threat to its own survival. There was little evidence, on the other hand, that any political 
institutions between South and North Korea contributed to create their sustainable 
reciprocal relationship. Several inter-Korean political agreements were successfully 
made in the early 1990s. They were built on both parties' consensus to end antagonism 
and to ensure peaceful coexistence. But they were fragile when it came to the 
implementation plans. They were insufficient to ease each other's suspicion of military 
provocation by the other side (Lee G. 2005). 
For more than a decade after the Roh Tae Woo government legitimized inter- 
Korean trade, economic issues in inter-Korean relations were largely overshadowed due 
to the destabilized security environment. As shown in the nuclear deal in the 1990s, 
escalation of tension in the security area seriously hampered the progress of economic 
interdependence between the two Koreas. Thus analytical insight built upon political 
realism was dominantly required to interpret the ROK government's North Korea policy 
in the 1990s. The influential power of state actors was the only and legitimized avenue 
of inter-Korean negotiations and no alternative contact channel was allowed either to 
complement or to replace inter-governmental channels. Functionalist theorization that 
paid attention to the role of specified economic exchanges in dismantling a situation of 
military tension (Mitrany 1969) was dismissed. As realists earlier formulated it, the role 
of international institutions in the inter-Korean relations was marginal in this period 
(Waltz 1979,115-116). 
The security concern in inter-Korean relations was the more pivotal factor in the 
DPRK foreign policy. From the North Korean point of view, unrelenting struggle for 
survival upheld by strong sovereign power was even more crucial in the 1990s. As its 
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national slogan known as 'arduous marching', which was rampant during the famine, 
implied, the need of a strong system for mobilization of resources and workers based on 
state authority was indispensible to avoid a likely collapse of its socioeconomic system. 
As a response to the implosion of the old Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the North 
promulgated 'socialism of our style' to overcome its legitimization crisis (Armstrong 
1997). Priority in the DPRK foreign policy was securing capability for nuclear 
deterrence against the United States and building up political power not to become 
embroiled in the move for 'reunification by absorption', which would mean extinction 
of the Kim Jong 11 regime. To the North Korean leadership, nuclear disarming, 
especially by means of conciliatory and cooperative action with the South, meant 
abandoning the most effective tool for survival against external threats which hoped for 
the collapse of the regime. The argument of defensive realists that a state seeks the 
requisite amount of power to ensure its own survival, not domination of other states, 
offers a reasonable tool for explaining the DPRK's nuclear ambition (Grieco 1997). To 
the DPRK in the 1990s, maintaining conditions for the balance of power in the 
Peninsula was a primary objective and efforts to pursue 'self-help' were the most 
important means to achieve it. Smith pointed out that the DPRK foreign policy showed a 
shift from classical revolutionism to political realism (Smith 1997,109-110). Mutual 
gains, balance of power through an international system, and limited exercise of state 
sovereignty for an integrated community etc., stressed by neoliberal international 
relations scholars, were not on the DPRK's foreign policy agenda at all during this 
period. 
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The only exception to such bilateral statism-led inter-Korean relations in the 1990s 
was the proposal for a four-power conference jointly announced by Kim Young Sam 
and the U. S. President Bill Clinton in April 1996. After the U. S. -ROK summit held that 
year, they proposed the conference by inviting China and the DPRK 'to initiate a 
process aimed at achieving a permanent peace agreement'. As far as international 
relations theory is concerned, it could be interpreted as an attempt to create 'a regional 
peace regime' which had been preferred by many scholars as an efficient vehicle to 
facilitate cooperation between states (Ruggie 1975, Krasner 1983, Keohane 1989). The 
proposal for the four-party conference, emerged two years after the successful 
agreement in the nuclear talks in 1994, could be viewed as the first attempt to establish a 
cooperative institution to discuss how to initiate the peace-building process in the 
denuclearized Korean Peninsula. It further heightened the expectation for a new peace 
treaty in the Korean Peninsula to replace the 1953 armistice. 
However, the proposal did not see any fruitful outcome not only within Kim 
Young Sam era but even under the next administration led by Kim Dae Jung who leaned 
toward neoliberal prescriptions in the North Korea policy establishment. After repeated 
briefings demanded by Pyongyang and the several preliminary talks over agendas and 
dates, the first meeting in which all four members on board was held in Geneva in 
December 1997. But 17 months had already passed since the proposal was initially 
made in 1996 and it was immediately before Kim Young Sam left office. With 
continued standoffs and impasses between the parties, the conference finally came to an 
end in 1999 without any visible progress on the declared peace regime building. 
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Three misguided North Korea policies by Kim Young Sam could be pointed out to 
explain this failure of building up a cooperative regime in the Northeast Asia. Firstly, 
the two Koreas envisioned a different objective to be achieved through the four-party 
talks. While the South argued transition from armistice status to that of a permanent 
peace arrangement, the North revealed its indifference to the proposed multilateral peace 
regime. Withdrawal of the US army from the ROK territory and the bilateral peace 
arrangement between the DPRK and the United States were the primary issues 
Pyongyang wanted to deal with in the talks (Shin S. J. 1998). Secondly, whether rice aid 
toward the North Korean population should be delivered created a hurdle blocking 
advancement of the talks. While the DPRK insisted that without a guarantee of rice aid 
from the ROK they were not willing to consider its participation in the four-party 
conference, the Kim Young Sam administration made clear it had no intention to send 
the North relief rice for the purpose of bringing Pyongyang to the negotiation table. Kim 
further persuaded Washington not to give Pyongyang relief aid as a reward for seating 
on the negotiation table (Dong-A Ilbo 30th March 1997). He also prohibited South 
Korean civil organizations from contacting North Korean people to discuss the rice aid 
issue even though there were a number of requests by the South Korean humanitarian 
agencies. He disliked any kind of non-governmental level (track 11) diplomacy between 
Seoul and Pyongyang, which previously had defused the nuclear crisis when the U. S. 
former president Jimmy Carter met Kim 11 Sung in 1994 on the verge of military clash 
(Oberdorfer 2001,326-36). Thirdly and more importantly, Kim Young Sam was 
seriously doubtful about cooperating with Pyongyang. He was keen to show Pyongyang 
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a firm lead in inter-Korean relations and was reluctant to be a participant in a 
multilateral institution in which the ROK's leadership was limited. The idea of a four- 
party conference was originally proposed not by Seoul but by Washington. The 
agreement of Kim Young Sam to the initiative of the conference was his reluctant 
response to the Clinton team's pressure requiring more substantive moves toward peace 
building in the Korean Peninsula as a precondition for the summit talks proposed by 
Kim, toward which Washington had previously maintained a lukewarm attitude. Kim 
was so eager to take advantage of the summit in view of the imminent general election 
that he accepted the U. S. request in an attempt to produce surprising news before the 
election (Oberdorfer 2001,382-87). 
The abortive four-party conference proved that the effort to establish a multilateral 
institution in the Peninsula in the 1990s was no more than an attempt to strengthen the 
statecraft of the South government. Such an episode offers grounds for realists' 
arguments that an institution can be established only if states seek the goals that the 
institution will help them reach (Jervis 1999,54). All in all, the realists' perspective 
arguing cooperation through institutions between rival nations was improbable offered a 
useful guide to understand the inter-Korean relations under the Kim Young Sam 
administration. His North Korea policy resulted in the dominance of statism in the 
Korean Peninsula. 
Z4 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the background of American rhetoric that portrayed the 
DPRK as one of the rogue states' under the Clinton administration. The chapter 
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concluded that the applicability of this rhetoric to the case of the inter-Korean relations 
was not considerable. However, the attempts to label Pyongyang as an evil power 
illustrated that the key nature of the relationship between the DPRK and the surrounding 
powers in the 1990s. This relationship based on highly state-centric military dynamics 
could be explained by the typical realism model in IR theories. The foreign policy in 
dealing with the DPRK was still dominated by strict issue hierarchy centered on nuclear 
disarmament. The intergovernmental channel between Foreign Affairs Department of 
Washington and Pyongyang was the only route on which their interactions relied. There 
was no sign, if not evidence, that military confrontation between the United States and 
the DPRK lost the position as the foremost negotiation issue. This relationship was also 
true when it came to inter-Korean relations before 2000. The security concern was a 
dominant factor defining the relations outweighing other issue areas like economic 
cooperation. Inter-Korean contact channels at the subnational level were not permitted 
under the Kim Young Sam administration. The Kim administration's hard line attitude 
toward Pyongyang as a result consolidated the features of inter-Korean relations 
characterized by political realism. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Inter-Korean relations after 2000 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter will argue that the exchanges and cooperation projects 
implemented as a result of the Inter-Korean Joint Declaration in 2000 undermined the 
state/military-centric foundation of the inter-Korean relations since the 1980s. The 
chapter will demonstrate how this changed security environment in the Korean 
Peninsula engendered new actors and issues in inter-Korean interactions with 
exploring the development of the inter-Korean relations under the Kim Dae Jung 
(1998-2002) and Roh Moo Hyun (2002-2007) leaderships. The chapter will argue 
that the viewpoint of political realism, which had dominated the interpretation of 
inter-Korean relations since the Korean War, no longer provided an appropriate 
perspective as an analytical tool in the wake of the new development of various non- 
security issues and actors after 2000. It will then propose the complex 
interdependence model, formulated by Keohane and Nye, as a new analytical 
framework to interpret this substantial change. 
3.2 U. S. -DPRK relations under the Bush administration 2000-2002 
This section will explore two main points. Firstly, it will investigate the 
background that generated the Bush administration's 'war on terrorism' and 'axis of evil' 
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discourse. This will demonstrate that, in global terms, the Bush administration's anti- 
terrorism strategy further consolidated its perception of the DPRK constituting an 
international terrorist group. Secondly, it will analyze how President Bush viewed and 
described the DPRK. His remarks will contrast with the DPRK's attempts to resume 
engagement with its Northeast Asian counterparts such as the ROK and Japan. This 
tense relationship between Washington and Pyongyang will offer one causal variable in 
the 2002 nuclear crisis that will be elaborated in chapter 4. 
'War on terrorism'and 'Axis of evil' 
The Bush administration took office in January 2001 and announced the outcome 
of its policy review toward the DPRK in June of the same year. President Bush stated 
that he was determined that 'serious discussions' on a 'broad agenda' should be resumed 
with Pyongyang. Bush was believed to register his desire to conduct 'comprehensive' 
negotiations including 'improved implementation' without any precondition (Niksch 
2002). It was also believed, at least at this point, that a part of the new administration's 
foreign policy team had an intention to handle North Korean issues by diplomatic 
dialogue rather than armed deterrence. 17 
However, the terrorist attack on the New York Trade Towers in September 2001 
drastically reinforced the U. S. stance against any kind of nuclear proliferation attempts. 
Rhetoric by high ranking officials in the Administration spelled out a more intransigent 
17 Intensive debates on how to deal with the DPRK were conducted within the Department of State and later resulted in retreat of the officials that had preferred a resumption of dialogue and negotiation 
opposing a coercive approach. For more illuminating anecdotes, see Quinones (2003) and Pritchard (2007). 
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approach against the rogue states identified by the Clinton administration. Bush's 
Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfelt (2002,21) proclaimed, in response to the terrorist 
attack, the arrival of 'new ways of thinking and new ways of fighting' in waging its 
foreign policy. Stephen Walt (2001/2,56) also heralded 'the most rapid and dramatic 
change in the history of U. S. foreign policy' immediately after the September II 
terrorist attack. 
The United States Congress passed its joint resolution, a week after the attack, 
authorizing the use of United States armed forces against those responsible for the attack 
(U. S. Congress 200 1). The resolution offered a momentum to the term 'war on terrorism' 
and gained widespread currency within academia as well as in foreign policy. The rogue 
state discourse that had dominated the U. S. foreign policy in the previous administration 
acquired supplementary logic through the term 'war on terrorism'. After the emergence 
of the term 'war on terrorism', the U. S. government literature (Bush 2002b) began to 
link the idea of terrorism with the notion of the rogue states. 
In the State of the Union address in January 2002, President Bush also designated 
the DPRK as a member of the 'axis of evil' (Bush 2002a). State-centric analyses of the 
Korean security environment built upon the likelihood of ensuing military conflict 
identified the DPRK along with Iraq and Iran in the 'axis of evil'. These made the 
nuclear issue within the Korean Peninsula broader and more complex. Documentary 
evidence in Afghanistan that al Qaeda sought WMDs, including nuclear weapons, also 
influenced the Bush administration to broaden the definition of the war against 
terrorism. President Bush regarded states like the DPRK as a potential supplier of 
WMDs to al Qaeda (Niksch 2002). 
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Critics of the 'axis of evil' language regarded the inclusion of the DPRK within its 
framework with suspicion. They argued that its inclusion diluted the expected antipathy 
from the Islamic community that might be derived from linking Islamic states such as 
Iran and Iraq under the same banner of the 'axis of evil' (Applebaum 2002). This was 
particularly so given the fact that the animosity from Islamic nations had been fuelled 
when the majority of states under the rogue states rubric turned out to be Islamic 
(Litwak 2000,8). 
The addition of the DPRK within the 'axis of evil' thereby located this potentially 
dangerous player in the Bush administration's global anti-terrorist strategy. This made 
the implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework more difficult. The U. S. Department 
of Defence released its 'Nuclear Posture Review' in January 2002. The Bush 
administration in this review adopted a more aggressive line toward potential 
proliferators. The basis of American nuclear strategy shifted from a long standing 
nuclear rivalry with another superpower to unstable relationships with 'rogue state 
proliferators' (Preez 2002, Payne 2005, McDonough 2006). This implied the DPRK 
issue would also be dealt with under the strategy countering international terrorist 
groups. They did not take into account the fact that the DPRK was not involved in any 
terrorist attack after the 1980s (Smith 2005a, 48-49). Bush's new strategy aiming to 
introduce as strong a containment policy toward the DPRK as that against Saddam, 
Hussein has been criticized in that he failed to appreciate the great difference between 
Pyongyang and Iraq (O'Hanlon 2002). 
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Prelude to another crisis 
The facilitator that broke the stalemate between the DPRK and the United states 
was the ROK government. President Kim Dae Jung dispatched Lim Dong Won as a 
special envoy to the DPRK three months after Bush's 'axis of evil' remarks. Lim Dong 
Won was one of the key architects of the 'Sunshine Policy' who had accompanied the 
president at the Pyongyang summit in 2000. Lim Dong Won arranged a joint 
announcement between the two Korean authorities pledging resumption of inter-Korean 
cooperative projects that had already been agreed. They included the inter-Korean 
railways link and the revitalization of the Mount Kumkang tourism project. The Lim 
Dong Won - Kim Jong it meeting in Pyongyang also contributed to the subsequent 
change in Washington's attitude toward Pyongyang (New York Times 6 th April 2002). 
The DPRK leadership at the same time resumed high level talks with Japan to 
normalize their diplomatic relationship. Pyongyang admitted in the middle of the talks 
that they had abducted Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 80s. It also allowed the 
surviving abductees to visit their home country. The resumption of the dialogue between 
the DPRK and Japan led to the summit of Kim Jong 11 and Junichiro Koizurni, the 
Japanese Prime Minister, in September 2002 (Rozman 2002). The DPRK leadership, 
moreover, decided to send more than 600 participants and representatives to join the 
Asian Games held in Pusan in September 2002. This also marked the North's first-ever 
participation in an international sporting event in the South (Laney and Shaplen 2003). 
All these events occurred simultaneously one or two months before the eruption of 
the second nuclear crisis in 2002, signalling a decreased hostility of Pyongyang toward 
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the external powers. It was the first time that the DPRK participated in this brief d6tente 
(Lee J. H. and Moon C. I. 2003,136). North Korea tried to actively engage with all three 
nations at this time, the United States, Japan and the ROK (Laney and Shaplen 2003,17). 
Kim Jong 11, most of all, demonstrated sufficient interest in engaging with the outside 
world, evidence for which was the creation of special economic zones and the limited 
liberalization of commodity prices (O'Hanion and Mochizuki 2003,12). 
Bush, in the meantime, expressed his personal abhorrence toward Kim Jong 11 in a 
non-diplomatic manner. This did not help the mood of reconciliation in the Northeast 
Asian region. Bob Woodward quoted, for example, that President Bush stated "I loathe 
Kim Jong 11, I've got a visceral reaction to this guy because he is starving his people. " 
(Woodward 2002,340). Literature on U. S. foreign policy began to reinterpret the term 
'engagement' under which the Clinton administration pursued the 1994 Agreed 
Framework. Victor Cha argued that the term 'engagement' should be understood as a 
way to strengthen the inter-state, exclusive alliance in the U. S, the ROK, and Japan 
triangle (Cha 2002). This argument attracted the attention of the Bush administration 
that had been seeking further punitive actions against the DPRK. Despite the 
engagement signal from Pyongyang, Washington's neglect of the Kim Jong 11 regime 
escalated the tense relationship in the Korean Peninsula. 
3.3 Inter-Korean relations under the Kim Dae Jung administration (199 7-2002) 
This section will show how the Kim Dae Jung administration strove to continue to 
pursue engagement attempts with the DPRK despite Pyongyang's growing 
confrontation with Washington. The section will particularly stress a crucial role that the 
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so-called 'Jongkyong BuIlP principle and 'multiple channel policy' by Kim Dae Jung 
played in making the coexistence of economic cooperation and political confrontation 
possible. It will then highlight the two policy initiatives by which Kim Dae Jung 
engendered deregulation of South Korean firms' investment in the DPRK. After 
critically reviewing the existing attempts to formulate the relationship of security and 
economic interdependence, this section will conclude that the complex interdependence 
model offered an analytical insight in understanding Kim Dae Jung's 'Sunshine Policy' 
and its key initiatives. 
'Axis ofevil'and 'Sunshine Policy' 
The reconciliation mood in the Korean Peninsula created by the first-ever inter- 
Korean summit was significantly overshadowed by Bush's 'axis of evil' remark. The 
simmering U. S. -DPRK relationship under the Bush administration created an apparent 
obstacle in further developing inter-Korean relations. The Kim Dae Jung administration 
were concerned that Bush's remark toward Pyongyang was too provocative and 
unnecessary. China and Japan were equally concerned that the U. S. strategy might cause 
a second Korean War although they shared Bush's determination for a nuclear disarmed 
North Korea. Nevertheless, armed confrontation was likely to be inevitable given the 
strong animosity of Bush's foreign policy team toward Pyongyang. Some observers 
depicted such a situation as an 'incompatible marriage of sunshine and axis of evil' 
(Washington Post 16 th February 2002). 
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The Kim Dae Jung administration's endeavor to sustain a driving force of the 
planned progress of inter-Korean relation after the 2000 summit was made in two 
dimensions. Firstly, the administration employed a direct persuasion strategy to 
Washington by engineering Kim's early visit to the White House before Bush's foreign 
policy team concluded their policy review on the DPRK. But Kim Dae Jung returned 
home empty handed failing to win Bush's public affirmation of support of his 'Sunshine 
Policy' toward the DPRK. Bush was not reluctant at all in revealing his skepticism on 
the North Korean leader and the future of its regime. This hasty attempt for the summit 
talks in the White House resulted in widening the gap between Seoul and Washington 
(Quinones 2003). The Kim Dae Jung administration however managed to neutralize 
Washington's stiff attitude during the second summit held in Seoul in February 2002. 
As a result of Kim Dae Jung's efforts to mitigate the growing tension in the Korean 
Peninsula after Bush's 'axis of evil' remark, President Bush in this summit confirmed 
that he had no intention either to attack or to invade the DPRK. By engineering the 
reiteration of the two presidents on the importance of diplomatic dialogue in resolving 
the growing U. S. -DPRK confrontation, Seoul created a momentum to deter 
Washington's aggressive line likely to hinder the progress of inter-Korean relations 
since the new Republican government took power (Lim D. W. 2008,582-604). Secondly, 
Seoul embarked on more direct contact with Pyongyang to restore halted inter-Korean 
cooperative projects by dispatching the President's special envoy. Lim Dong Won, one 
of the top aides for the president and former chief of the National Intelligence Service, 
visited Pyongyang amid the growing tension triggered by the 'axis of evil' remark. He 
hammered out a joint communiqu6 with his North Korean counterpart after more than 2 
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hours of talks with Kim Jong 11 to discuss conditions to resume inter-Korean joint 
projects proposed in the 2000 summit. Both parties agreed to resume the joint projects 
such as inter-Korean railway reconnection and family reunion events as well as the 
resumption of military talks between the South and the North. Lim's successful visit to 
Pyongyang offered a critical moment that enabled the Kim Dae Jung administration to 
consistently push forward his pro-engagement policy toward Pyongyang which had once 
been snubbed by its key ally in Washington. As a consequence, Kim Dae Jung was able 
to grasp an opportunity to realize his lifelong initiative to forge inter-Korean 
reconciliation through economic cooperation (Lim D. W. 2008,592-620). 
'Jongkyong Bulli' 
The key guideline that constituted the foreign economic policy toward the DPRK 
by the Kim Dae Jung administration was the principle of so-called 'Jongkyong Bulli'. 
The principle was proclaimed in Kim Dae Jung's inaugural speech as one of the key 
tenets of his 'Sunshine Policy' (MOU 2003). This meant, by definition, the separation of 
politics and economy. It implied, as a policy dealing with a hostile nation, that cross- 
border economic activities should consistently be carried out regardless of, and in spite 
of, political confrontation. 
His 'Jongkyong Bulli' initiative was a great challenge to the conventional 
formulation of issue linkage as a foreign policy tool under asymmetrical international 
relations. As Mastanduno (1998) argued, stronger nations in the post-Cold War 
international politics tended to link security and economy issues to preserve their 
80 
hegemonic standing. As the predominance of security concern faded out along with the 
collapse of the bipolar Cold War structure, the growing significance of economic 
interests opened a greater room in which the stronger nation can acquire more powerful 
bargaining leverage than before. The stronger nation could expand its security influence 
by providing a quid pro quo to more or less fulfil the weaker nation's economic 
requirement. Issue linkage in this respect was one of the most useful vehicles for a 
stronger nation in discharging foreign policy to easily adopt in an effort to consolidate 
its preponderance. ' 9 
In contrast, Kim Dae Jung's pursuit of separation of security and economy was an 
effort to overcome the previous attempts, particularly under the Kim Young Sam 
administration, which had maintained strong linkage tactics in dealing with the DPRK. 
Kim Dae Jung rather made every effort to diminish the likely ramification of the two 
Koreas' widening gap both in economic and military capability which might force the 
Kim Jong 11 regime to deepen its isolation for fear of possible extinction or absorption 
by external power (Kim D. J. 2004). 
Taking this backdrop into account, the principle of 'Jongkyong Bulli' can 
accordingly be defined as follows. Firstly, inter-Korean political and military issues 
should not be directly linked with economic exchange and cooperation between two 
parties. Secondly, government regulation of the South Korean firms to inhibit the free 
flow of the inter-Korean exchange of goods should be mitigated. Thirdly, inter-Korean 
'8 On the other hand, it is also worth noting that the earlier proponents of 'issue-linkage' tended to shed 
more light on the linkage attempts and its consequences by weaker actors or outsiders to put their own 
concern into the existing negotiation frame shaped by advanced players This suggested the linkage 
attempt by stronger actor was not necessarily the only efficient way to guarantee their victory in the whole 
cluster of interests. See Branislav and Ruggie (1979) and Haas (1980). 
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economic cooperation should be pursued on the basis of non-governmental actors' own 
interests and commercial considerations (Kim Y. Y. 2005). 
The pursuit of 'Jongkyong BuIlP implied a more permanent approach for the 
sustainability of inter-Korean relations. It did so in that the policy was unlikely to be 
affected by unpredictable change in the political environment. The 'Jongkyong Bulli' 
principle, based on the thinking of 'give first, take later', substantially eschewed the 
tight issue-linkage attempts especially by the Kim Young Sam administration. It was 
highly contrary to the previous administration's logic on inter-Korean economic 
engagement, which was 'no dismantlement of nuclear weapons, no economic aid at any 
levels'. The new administration was not unduly obsessed with the purpose of creating a 
rigidly reciprocal relationship between the South and the North. It rather opened a wider 
way to strengthen inter-Korean interdependence even under political deadlock. Even if 
the chosen project was likely to politically benefit the DPRK regime, the administration 
did not put it aside for the anticipated advantage of the DPRK. The project would 
continue as long as it resulted in constructive contribution to the promotion of inter- 
Korean economic engagement. The ROK business community could make its own 
judgement on inter-Korean trade with the help of the 'Jongkyong BuIR' policy as a 
result. The policy helped sustain inter-Korean trade from the influence of the 
unpredictable political situation. Political scientists, furthermore, forecasted a longer 
term contribution of the 'Jongkyong BuIX to the reunification policy of the ROK 
government. They envisioned a circular structure such as the progress of inter-Korean 
economic cooperation --) wider trust building 4 reduction of defence cost --) reduction 
of reunification cost (Lee J. S. 1998,11). 
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By consistently pursuing the 'Jongkyong BulIP principle, the Kim Dae Jung 
administration sent the DPRK consistent and repeated messages. They implied that if 
Pyongyang opened the door to South Korean economic engagement endeavor at both 
governmental and non-governmental levels it would lay a firm foundation to revive its 
economy. The Kim administration indicated that the benefit would not only come from 
an economic aid program but also from a wider security guarantee for the DPRK. But 
the administration pursued it not by urging political transformation of the Kim Jong 11 
regime but by letting it have sufficient motives by which the North could initiate its own 
program for economic openness. In this sense, Kim Dae Jung did not exploit a firm 
linkage politics with the purpose of gaining Pareto-optimal benefits from inter-Korean 
negotiations. He rather believed that an improvement in the position of the weaker party 
as a result of negotiations could forge more desirable inter-Korean economic relations in 
the long run. The belief laid the foundation for the development of inter-Korean trade 
even under political turbulence. 
The implementation of the 'Jongkyong Bulli'principle also made a contribution to 
deterring further development of the North Korean nuclear crisis. Kim Dae Jung's 
attempts to safely manage the inter-Korean relations by employing economic leverage 
made a contribution to preventing small scale conflict from developing into a serious 
clash. For instance, inter-Korean ministerial talks arranged as a follow-up step to 
implement the details of the joint declaration of the Kim Dae Jung - Kim Jong II summit 
proved to be a useful channel in which the South persuaded or urged the North to 
respond to the six-party denuclearization talks. The two Koreas agreed to cooperate with 
each other for the peaceful resolution of military conflict through 9 rounds of inter- 
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Korean ministerial talks under the Kim Dae Jung administration. As James Kelly, the 
head of the U. S. delegation of denuclearization talks, commented, inter-Korean 
ministerial talks strongly backed the resolution of North Korean nuclear issue 
(Hankyoreh 3rd February 2004). A further nuclear crisis did not erupt until the DPRK 
admitted its uranium-based nuclear enrichment program just before Kim Dae Jung left 
office. 
Permissionfor multiple channels 
The policy initiative, coupled with 'Jongkyong Bulli', that encouraged inter- 
Korean trade was what Kim Dae Jung called the multiple channel policy'. His 
predecessor, Kim Young Sam had either banned or rigidly screened inter-Korean 
exchanges at the non-goverrunentat level (Choi W. K. 1997). Kim Dae Jung, on the 
contrary, permitted civic groups and businessmen to get in touch with the DPRK entities 
with minimum guidelines. Kim Dae Jung announced in February 1999 that he would 
permit South Korean civic groups and NGOs to contact North Korean individuals and 
organizations for the purpose of humanitarian aid. His new initiative showed a sharp 
contrast to Kim Young Sam's policy. Kim Young Sam had banned even fund raising 
campaigns by South Korean NGOs to assist the food shortage in the DPRK. The Korean 
Red Cross was the only exception in his prohibition of campaigns by non-governmental 
agencies (Lee K. S. 2000,9-34). 
The DPRK's response to the ROK government's policy change was positive. The 
DPRK had been proposing, until the mid-1990s, large scale North-South conferences. 
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Pyongyang had insisted on proposing the conferences where ROK representation should 
include not only government officials but a wide variety of citizen groups. The citizen 
groups in Pyongyang's statement in effect referred to ones sympathetic or neutral 
toward themselves (Harrison 2002,95). The DPRK accepted Kim Dae Jung's 'multiple 
channel policy' in this vein as a desirable response to its consistent position. It assessed 
the policy as a way to create a breakthrough in the stalled relationship under the 
previous administrations. As shown in the examples in Table 3.1, the Kim Dae Jung 
administration allowed inter-Korean dialogue not only by pro-Sunshine Policy civil 
organizations but also by the opposition party leader, who had previously condemned 
the Policy. 
Table 3.1 The inter-Korean exchanges at a non-governmental level in the Kim Dae Jung administration (1998-2002) 
Date Non-governmental exchange between the two Koreas 
February 1999 Announcement of'multiple channel policy' 
Septemberl, 998 Establishment of the Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation (KCRC) 
July 1999 KCRC proposed a conference allended by political parties and social organizations 
October 2000 An ROK delegation participated in the 55th anniversary event of the Korean Workers' Party 
December 2000 
The Korean Confederation of Trade Unions participated in a unification conference in 
Pyongyang 
June 2001 The joint hosting of the first anniversary event of the inter-Korean summit by civic groups 
May 2002 Park Keun Hye, the opposition party leader, held talks with Kim Jong 11 
June 2002 IT professors in the ROK gave lectures in Kim Chaek University of Technology, Pyongyang 
Source: MOU (2003) 
Deregulation 
On the basis of the 'multiple channel policy' and the 'Jongkyong Bulli' principle, 
the Kim Dae Jung administration announced a set of policy packages to liberalize the 
existing regulations in 1998 and 2001. It was mainly aimed at making it easier for South 
Korean companies to engage in business transactions with the DPRK. The 
administration announced in April 1998 that it would completely remove the ceiling on 
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investment by South Korean companies in the DPRK. The administration also 
eliminated the one million dollars ceiling for the export of machinery to the North and 
decided to give all South Koreans permission for multiple visits with one-off 
government approval. Before this newly revised regulation, multiple visits were only 
allowed for those working at the Shinpo site of the KEDO light water reactor project 
and Daewoo's Nampo factory (Korea Times I" May 1998). This drastic measure to 
boost the scale and pace of investment toward the North offered Chung Ju Yung, the 
pioneering president of Hyundai Group, a critical momentum to kick-start the Mount 
Kumkang tourism project for which he had already signed a contract with the DPRK 
authority in 1989 (Song M. H. 2008). The South government at the same time expanded 
the number of industries allowed to invest directly in the North. Under the new 
regulations, South Korean investment in the North was mostly allowed with only a few 
exceptions such as electronic equipment, aeronautics, computer science and other 
defense-related industries. The government announced it would cut other administrative 
red tape governing inter-Korean trade. Under the new rules, smaller inter-Korean 
projects worth three million dollars or less, employment of North Koreans by South 
Korean companies in third countries and government projects could begin with one-step 
permission. The previous law had required all inter-Korean joint ventures or projects to 
undergo a two-step process to obtain government permission (Korea Times I't May 
1998). After the inter-Korean summit that pledged 'balanced' development of the 
national economy, the Kim Dae Jung administration announced some additional 
deregulation measures in 2001. It included an increase of maximum loan allowance 
from the government fund for South Korean investors planning business in the North, 
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relaxation of the repayment conditions, and widening of import and export items with 
the DPRK (MOU 2002). 
The more significant progress in terms of how to further facilitate and safeguard 
inter-Korean commercial transactions from the likely uncertainty came from a series of 
crucial agreements with the DPRK authorities. The two Koreas reached an agreement in 
December 2000 with regard to some outstanding agendas governing inter-Korean trade 
such as double taxation avoidance, commercial dispute settlement, clearing settlement 
system, and investment guarantees (Je S. H. et al. 2004). These agreements removed a 
great obstacle to large-scale investment in the North. As a consequence, high 
expectations were aroused that these instrumental agreements would bring about longer- 
term, large-scale inter-Korean trade and investment projects with greater sustainability 
by strengthening a structural foundation of economic transactions between the two 
parties. 
Theoretical interpretation 
The main question under this premise was which factor took priority : security or 
economy? Kim Dae Jung however acknowledged the likelihood of a simultaneous 
coexistence of the two issues in framing his foreign policy. He tried to substantiate his 
assumption by dealing with the two issues separately. His focus was how to remove the 
danger of the likely contradiction between the two issues. He pursued the 'Jongkyong 
Bulli' policy by involving multiple actors to show that military conflict and economic 
engagement could coexist at the same time. He placed greater emphasis on how to 
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ultimately minimize the influence of the conflict in order to continue to put forward 
economic engagement. His policy consequently became a building block to ensure the 
continuity of inter-Korean trade in the next administration, who largely inherited the 
core spirit of the 'Sunshine Policy'. 
There has been a great deal of research on the nexus between security and 
economy. However, the scholarly efforts in the IR discipline to understand security and 
economy in an interconnected fashion did not provide an adequate analytical framework 
to explain the Kim Dae Jung administration's economic engagement policy with the 
DPRK by the 'Jongkyong Buili'and 'multiple channel policy'. 
The origin of the scholarship that tackled how the economic interactions affect the 
inter-state conflict dates back to the notion of Kantian Peace. The key logic of the 
Kantian Peace conception was encapsulated in Kant's assertion that 'the spirit of 
commerce cannot coexist with war' (Bohman and Lutz-Bachmann 1997). It formed one 
of the philosophical foundations for the liberal tradition in the international political 
economy (IPE) theory. The descendants of the Kantian Peace theory attempted to 
formulate the role of inter-state economic interactions in building and promoting 
peaceful relations between nations. The majority of the earlier theoretical attempts to 
explain the relationship were built on one solid hypothesis inspired by the Kantian Peace 
School. Their key assumption was that constant compatibility of these two elements was 
largely unthinkable. The only possibility that could be substantiated by the history of 
foreign policy was when and under what conditions a state employed either integration 
or a separation strategy of security and economy in its statecraft (Mastanduno 1998). 
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As the reality of international interactions became more complex, scholars turned 
their attention to how independent actors with clashing interests made efforts to enhance 
individual economic prosperity while avoiding military confrontation. Scholars in IR 
and IPE paid continued attention to the relationship between trade, among other 
economic interactions, and peace building processes. They produced contending 
arguments reflecting the dichotomy between realism and liberalism. Liberals argued that 
heightened economic exchanges inhibited international conflict and that, as a result, 
commercial openness contributed to peace-building (Rosecrance 1986, Kaysen 1990). 
One shared conclusion of this set of studies among liberals was that a nation whose 
economic interests are deeply entangled with the other could not use military force to 
resolve likely conflict. Even during the Cold War, it was evident that the intertwined 
economic interests rendered military force unusable (Art 1980,16-17). However, the 
liberal view has been criticized by many realists who insisted that uninhibited economic 
exchange can undermine national security (Buzan 1984, Holsti 1986). Realists rather 
argued that increased trade flows in the end led states to take military actions in an 
attempt to reduce their economic vulnerability (Gilpin 1981,140-4 1). 
Transcending the liberal-realist division, many scholars shared their view on the 
need to combine security studies and IPE in this increasingly interconnected sub-field 
(Knorr 1977a, Baldwin 1985, Kapstein 1992, Carporaso 1995, Moran 1996). 
Understanding trade and security in an interconnected fashion as a consequence became 
one of the most significant tasks for IR scholars as well as IPE scholars. Another scholar 
went further when he argued that a common framework would be needed in 
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international politics to synthesize the diplomatic, the economic, and the military 
agendas (Baldwin 1985). 
Keohane later inherited liberals' theoretical tradition by labelling it as commercial 
liberalism (Keohane 1990,177-79). The fundamental assumption of commercial 
liberalism was built on the classical economists' optimistic view over cross-border 
economic exchanges and their welfare effects earlier coined as 'comparative advantage' 
by David Ricardo. It was however institutional aspects of the interstate economic 
exchanges that Keohane prioritized by the labelling. It was, in his belief, the regularized 
patterns of economic exchange and orderly rules that would bring peace in international 
politics. In the meantime, economic analyses employing the quantitative statistical 
method were also attempted to measure a relationship between war and trade. There 
were, for example, positivist attempts and subsequent debates to substantiate whether a 
war diminishes trade volumes between enemies or not (Barbieri and Levy 1999,2001, 
Anderton and Carter 200 1). 
It should be noted that what scholars like Keohane, Barbieri and Levy, Anderton 
and Carter tried to find was a causal relationship between trade and military clash 
directed by state. However, viewing trade simply as one of many causal variables 
determining states' diplomatic or military behavior lost its analytical effectiveness. The 
assumption in which trade has been observed as an element either to inhibit or to trigger 
a 'military' collision was no longer persuasive. It rather resulted in neglecting, when 
tackling the influence of trade on international politics, an extremely broad spectrum of 
interstate conflict behavior ranging from verbal condemnation to use of armed forces 
and full-blown wars. This viewpoint could not provide an answer to explain economic 
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rationality which could not be controlled by government dictation. The focus in this 
subfield was being shifted to the growing transnational economic relations led by new 
actors which had previously been underestimated (Gilpin 1981). The growth of 
economic interdependence by newly-emerged actors and dynamics thus required a new 
analytical framework. The old framework failed to capture the essence of change 
facilitated by transnational actors. In this vein, two points should be stressed in 
evaluating the changed reality of international politics in general and the Kim Dae Jung 
policy in particular. 
Firstly, the existing literature showed the propensity to analyze the security- 
economy nexus within an unchanged framework dealing with 'war and peace' primarily 
conducted by state actors. The literature placed a greater emphasis on interstate political 
negotiation. The literature that explored the nexus focused largely on how to enhance a 
state's capability by pursuing a nexus of the two policy tools against its potential 
adversaries (Mantanduno 2000). It did not pay sufficient attention to how to improve the 
economic potential of the national community which could be obtained by actively 
engaging even with hostile counterparts. Security concerns still prevailed in viewing 
interstate relationships in terms of foreign economic policy as long as they were 
undertaken in the situation of military tension. It thus underestimated the role of firms 
and business organizations as key actors in the newly-emerged transnational economic 
relations. 
The increased attention to economic interest in the transnational environment 
required a different approach from the mercantilist assumptions in the past. Yet it was 
hard to deny that the security agenda subordinated economic issues in tackling the 
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nexus. It meant that the main research agenda was formed surrounding political 
decisions by state actors. One example was to mobilize economic means such as 
sanctions against the adversary nation (Knorr and Trager 1977). Economic requirements 
still remained in a secondary role. Non-state, economic entities such as firms and 
business organizations, which actually engaged in the exchange of resources and goods, 
were largely sidelined. Non-state actors were not treated properly in the scholarly arena 
dealing with the security-economy nexus. What motivated their participation in the 
transnational economic exchanges under the particular security dynamics did not attract 
sufficient interest in this subfield. 
The literature, in turn, failed to provide a pertinent tool to explain the situation in 
the Korean Peninsula. Most of all, as non-aggression became the key agenda in the 
inter-Korean dialogues, 19 the possibility of an all-out war was considerably diminished 
in the Peninsula. The full-scale mobilization of the retained military capability in the 
two parties became highly unlikely from the 1990s (Kang 1998,2003). The spirit of 
mutual accommodation began to burgeon instead at least in a limited sense. This 
changed military dynamic in the Peninsula weakened the explanatory power of the 
existing security-dominated discourse. The decline of the explanatory utility of the 
security-trade nexus approach was also valid in explaining Kim Dae Jung's policy 
initiative which pursued a 'delinking' of the two issues. His pursuit of the separation of 
security and economy was an effort to overcome the numerous previous attempts that 
had linked them. Kim Dae Jung rather made every effort to diminish the impact of the 
" The mood of the inter-Korean non-aggression culminated when the two Koreas agreed to sign the 'Basic agreement for reconciliation, non-aggression, exchange, and cooperation' in 1992. See MOU (1992). 
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politically hostile relationship which was likely to hamper inter-Korean economic 
engagement (Kim D. J. 2004). The main vehicle that helped make the separation 
sustainable throughout his presidency was what he called the 'Jongkyong BulIP and the 
6multiple channel policy'. 
He particularly emphasized the role of subnational actors in the transnational 
economic relations between the two Koreas. He made more efforts to encourage the 
participation of non-state actors such as private firms and civil organizations in the inter- 
Korean economic engagement (Kim Y. Y. 2005). Given the pattern of changes in the 
international relations that Kim Dae Jung's 'Sunshine Policy' captured, the existing 
literature on the security-economy nexus showed limitations in explaining his foreign 
economic policy toward the DPRK. 
Secondly, the security-trade nexus literature did not consider, with sufficient care, 
the increasing asymmetrical interdependence between states and between actors. The 
international politics portrayed by the security-trade nexus literature still reflected the 
political climate that required immediate actions and counteractions. The most viable 
option for a state to guarantee its sustainable prosperity was to select one of two choices. 
They were either to attack its adversarial power or to take defensive action against a 
given external threat as immediately as possible. The most significant task for a state 
commonly argued in the literature was to create a driving force to enhance its prosperity, 
removing the likelihood of military clash. The key logic of game theory (Snidal 1985, 
Morrow 1994) and prisoner's dilemma literature (Oskamp 1971, Wilson 1980, Alker Jr, 
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198 1) was built on the necessity and inevitability of strictly 'conditional' exchanges on a 
quidpro quo basis. 20 
As a variety of non-state actors emerged, however, the reality in international 
politics began to change. New actors such as multinational corporations (MNCs) and 
civil organizations began to take an indispensible role in international politics. This 
phenomenon engendered and fostered 'transnational interactions' (Keohane and Nye 
1972) among them. It provided a bigger space in which state and non-state actors' 
actions and counteractions could be interchanged and swapped. Changed world politics 
did not necessarily require bilateral balancing and strict equivalence between actors at 
the same level. Immediate repayment of political and economic debts by state actors in a 
strictly bilateral context was becoming less essential. The more realistic pattern of 
interactions between actors began to be disputed. It was an 'overall' balance 'within a 
group' argued mainly by neoliberat school scholars (Keohane 1986,15-18). 
One of the closest approximations to the changes of world politics was the 
conceptual formulation of 'diffuse reciprocity' by Keohane (Keohane 1986,19-24). 21 
He stressed the asymmetry of reciprocity which still enabled actors to cooperate with 
one another without immediate compensation. He wrote that less strict and less clearly 
specified equivalence could safeguard the continuity of cooperation. He insisted that a 
state's action could be compensated in a different sequence. The major factors in his 
formulation that made the continued cooperation possible were shared commitments and 
values and upgraded mutual trust and so on. 
" The concept of conditional action constitutes one of the classical defining characteristics of reciprocity. 
For discussion, see Gouldner (1960). 
" The distinction of 'balanced reciprocity' and 'generalized reciprocity' by Sahlins was also useful to 
understand the asymmetry of reciprocity. See Sahlins (1972,194). 
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The notion of 'diffuse reciprocity' however could not fully explain the inter- 
Korean engagement in the Kim Dae Jung administration. Kim Dae Jung's 'Sunshine 
Policy' apparently had a significant similarity to the notion. The 'Sunshine Policy' most 
of all was built on the premise that the outcome of inter-Korean negotiations does not 
necessarily have to guarantee 'equivalent' value exchanges and 'immediate' actions and 
reactions. He rather preferred 'sequential exchange' (a key element of diffuse 
reciprocity, Keohane 1986,22) to elicit an obligation from a counterpart at any given 
time rather than a simultaneous one. 
The 'Sunshine Policy' however aimed at forming a relationship of mutual 
engagement on a longer-term basis than diffuse reciprocity. One example was the 
asymmetrical holding of the two inter-Korean summits. After the first summit in 2000, 
Kim Dae Jung did not immediately urge Kim Jong 11 'to offer a quick lunch in return for 
his formal dinner'. The next inter-Korean summit plan already agreed in 2000 between 
the two top leaders was not implemented until 2007. It moreover was not between Kim 
Jong 11 and Kim Dae Jung but between Kim Jong 11 and Roh Moo Hyun, the next 
president of the ROK. 22 
Kim Dae Jung believed, regarding economic relations, that strengthening the 
DPRK's 'infrastructural capacity' in association with its economic institutions ought to 
be a policy focus in dealing with the ailing North Korean econorny. 
23 He stressed it 
22 The Inter-Korean Joint Declaration announced in June 2000 reads that "Kim Dae Jung cordially invited 
Kim Jong Il to visit Seoul and Kim Jong 11 agreed to visit Seoul at an 'appropriate' time" (Chosun 11bo 
16'h June 2000). But the second summit talk also took place in Pyongyang. 
" The definition of 'infrastructural capacity' was borrowed from the distinction between 'infrastructural' 
capacity and 'despotic' capability of Thomas. Whereas 'despotic' capability focuses on governing people, 
'infrastructural' capacity put centrality on pursuing the effectiveness and legitimacy of the state's 
institutions. According to this distinction, the DPRK can be classified as a state which has strong 
, despotic' capability and weak 'infrastructural' capacity. for the detailed discussion, see Thomas (1987). 
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would bring a more beneficial trade relationship between the two Koreas. His approach 
contrasted sharply with the longstanding perception on which the previous 
administrations' North Korea policy was based. The perception was that any efforts by 
the South to remedy the decay of the North's economic institutions would result in 
strengthening the military capacity of its adversary. Kim Dae Jung, unlike this long- 
running belief, encouraged the participation of ROK business actors in an effort to 
strengthen the DPRK's infrastructural capacity. Providing those who have prepared 
inter-Korean business with more discretion and autonomy made a great contribution to 
elicit the engagement of the ROK firms. This circular process of ROK business 
involvement 4 development of inter-Korean economic engagement 4 strengthening of 
infrastructural capacity to further support the accomplished engagement suggested a 
more flexible assumption than that of diffuse reciprocity. His belief on the positive 
contribution of business actors in creating politically cooperative relations was based 
upon the assumption of many liberals. Classical liberals demonstrated in many different 
ways that commercial intercourse increased contact and promoted reciprocal 
communication between private actors in different countries as well as between 
governments. Rising contacts and communications, in turn, were expected to foster 
cooperative political relations (Hirschman 1977,56-63, Stein 1993, Doyle 1997,251- 
300). In other words, they thought subriational actors such as consumers and firms had 
vested interests in commerce that led them to restrain the state when conflict is on the 
horizon lest the rising hostilities rupture important economic ties. It was especially the 
case under lack of supranational organization around the country-pair involved that 
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subnational actors have influence on security policy through their own commercial 
interests (Mansfield and Pollins 2001). 
Kim Dae Jung's policy based on more liberal and flexible thinking in this sense 
demonstrated the fact that compensatory action toward each other could take place by a 
different actor in a different group. This meant the Kim Dae, Jung policy initiative was 
not consistent with Keohane's assertion on the need for compensation 'within a group'. 
The compensation behavior based on diffuse reciprocity, in addition, should be 
understood as the means to promote the production of public goods in international 
politics. Keohane stressed the importance to adopt a diffuse reciprocity-style standard of 
behavior in creating a more cooperative environment in the international regime 
(Keohane 1986,20). What Kim Dae Jung sought to improve through his 'Sunshine 
Policy' did not lie within the realm of public goods, and did not place the ROK' state's 
material and realistic interest at the top of the agenda. Kim Dae, Jung aimed to inter- 
relate and harmonize the private interests of South Korean firms with the political 
reconciliation (public goods) of the two Koreas. 
Kim Dae Jung's flexible approach on how to apply the notion of reciprocity to the 
reality of the inter-Korean relations did not ignore the need for conditional action (or 
contingency). The conditional action was a key principle of reciprocity since Gouldner 
suggested it (1960,161). The distinctive point shown by his 'Sunshine Policy' was his 
emphasis on an even more flexible equivalence in defining the conditional action. His 
approach to adopt a different track from his predecessors thus adequately reflected the 
key pattern of change on which the complex interdependence model was predicated. It 
was the increasingly asymmetrical relationship of reciprocity. 
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To summarize, Figure 3.1 illustrates how to understand the theoretical background 
of the 'Sunshine Policy' in association with the complex interdependence model and 
shows a channel by which the Policy ultimately promoted inter-Korean trade. In this 
formulation, the upper part of Sunshine Policy shows the theoretical elements that 
generated the Policy in comparison with complex interdependence model, while the 
lower part explains its impact on the promotion of inter-Korean trade through its 
methodological initiatives. 
Figure 3.1. Explanatory structure of the 'Sunshine Policy' and its influence on inter-Korean trade 
Transactional interaction Asymmetrical reciprocity 
engender 
Complex interdependence model 
I explain 
Sunshine policy 
j engender 
Jongkyong Bulh Multiple channel policy 
fadlitate 
Inter-Korean trade 
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3.4 Inter-Korean relations under the Roh Moo Hyun administration (2002-2007) 
This section will focus on the Roh Moo Hyun administration's dealing with the 
nuclear crisis in connection with the economic cooperation with the DPRK that was 
inherited from the achievement of the Kim Dae Jung government. The section will shed 
light on Roh Moo Hyun's efforts to use economic incentives in inducing the DPRK to 
participate in multilateral talks for denuclearization. The development of the joint 
production project in the KIC will also be discussed focusing on how the nuclear crisis 
affected this project. This section will emphasize the similarity of Roh Moo Hyun's 
North Korea policy to the complex interdependence model in the light of his efforts to 
maintain economic engagement with the DPRK at the various levels. 
Nuclear crisis and economic incentives 
North Korea policy initiatives devised and implemented by Roh Moo Hyun, who 
was elected as South Korean new president in December 2002, seemed largely to inherit 
the Kim Dae Jung policy. One South Korean scholar dubbed Roh's North Korean policy 
as an 'Evolved Sunshine Policy' (Kim K. S. 2008,13-23). As this suggested, his 
initiatives were built broadly on the continued pursuit of inter-Korean reconciliation, 
strengthening of economic ties, and dissolution of nuclear confrontation by means of 
dialogues and economic incentives (Roh M. H. 2003). A series of inter-Korean economic 
agreements such as railroad reconnections and successful launch of the KIC continued 
under the Roh Moo Hyun administration. The volume of inter-Korean trade under his 
leadership exceeded a billion USD for the first time since the two Koreas began bilateral 
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trade in 1988 (MOU 2006). 
On the other hand, the revelation of the North Korean uranium-based nuclear 
program, which erupted just two months before his election victory, was a new 
challenge for the Roh government. The alleged North Korean nuclear program seriously 
constrained his policy choices in dealing with the arguably 'nuclear-armed' DPRK. His 
first guideline on such a crisis, most of all, was zero-tolerance of North Korean nuclear 
provocation. His administration nevertheless made every effort to maintain the existing 
course of inter-Korean cooperation. He outlined this combination of policy in his 
inaugural speech in February 2003. 
The North should give up its nuclear development plan ....... The North 
should decide on whether to possess nuclear weapons or to be assured of 
regime security and economic assistance (Roh M. H. 2003). 
A key vehicle that sought and brought about North Korean denuclearization 
during his term was a multilateral security arrangement better known as the so-called 
six-party talks. The six relevant nations including the DPRK adopted the so-called 
'September 19'h Joint Statement' in the fourth round of talks in Beijing. The statement, 
regarded as the most remarkable diplomatic achievement in the Roh Moo Hyun 
administration, outlined a range of compensation packages in return for the DPRK's 
abandonment of 'all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear program' (MOU 2006). The 
underlying formula of this multilateral agreement was to swap the proposed economic 
engagement program - i. e. five parties' commitment for trade, investment as well as 
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energy aid - and the denuclearization of the DPRK. The expression of willingness of the 
five parties to play significant roles in rebuilding the North Korean economy sent an 
auspicious signal which consequently induced Pyongyang to choose the peaceful option 
instead of the existing nuclear plan. 
It should be noted that the Roh Moo Hyun administration utilized inter-Korean 
channels to reinvigorate the stalled multilateral talks by giving a full commitment to 
provide the DPRK with additional economic incentives. One of the key leverages that 
led to Pyongyang's return to the negotiation table after being dormant for over one year 
was the ROK's bold proposal made in June 2005. The Roh Moo Hyun government 
pledged in this proposal a provision of 2 million kilowatts of electric power through 
direct transmission from the South to the North, if Pyongyang reached denuclearization 
agreement in the six-party talks. The proposal made by Chung Dong Young, the then 
Unification Minister and special envoy to the DPRK, in direct talks with Kim Jong 11 
played a crucial role in bringing North Korea back to the six-party negotiation table 
(MOU 2006). 
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The Roh Moo Hyun administration also made intensive efforts to institutionalize 
domestic and international actions to maintain improvements in inter-Korean relations. 
Domestically, the administration endeavored to institutionalize the accomplishments of 
inter-Korean rapprochement made by his predecessor to ensure the maintenance of 
inter-Korean economic projects regardless of political and military crisis. The Roh Moo 
2,4 It was not clear that this proposal was the most crucial leverage to extract Pyongyang's decision to 
resume the talks. For example, Charles Pritchard, a former U. S. ambassador and special envoy for 
negotiations with the DPRK, stated that Pyongyang seemed to have already decided to rejoin the six-party 
talks and was simply looking for a justifiable momentum to announce it (Pritchard 2007,109). But it was 
certain that such an economic incentive, along with China's continued efforts to persuade Pyongyang, 
created a key momentum to make multilateral talks jump-start. 
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Hyun administration enacted the 'Inter-Korean Relations Development Law' in 2005 
and obtained the approval of the National Assembly for 13 documents on inter-Korean 
economic agreement signed by then (MOU 2008,33-34). As a result, inter-Korean trade 
kept its momentum despite the heightening tension and security concerns triggered by 
the North Korean uranium-based nuclear program in 2002. Internationally, the Roh Moo 
Hyun administration gave up its central role in dealing with the DPRK by allowing the 
United States and China, and later Japan and Russia, to enter into multilateral talks with 
Pyongyang. Roh's endorsement of three-party talks (United States, China, and the 
DPRK, April 2003) in particular held without the ROK's participation was an 
expression of his government's practical approach favoring any pattern of dialogue 
without being obsessed by the modality per se of talks (Presidential Commission on 
Policy Planning 2008). Although the three-party talks ended up identifying a large gulf 
between Washington and Pyongyang, it laid a foundation on which the DPRK and the 
United States worked out a new six-party formula. 
The new institutionalized multilateral body in which regional players involved 
cooperate with one another to defuse the North Korean nuclear program and to forge a 
peace regime in Northeast Asia became a main vehicle in resolving the nuclear issues 
and beyond (Funabashi 2007, Kurata 2007, Hong H. I. 2008). Although the six-party 
frame was designed to address ways to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, the Roh 
government made efforts to effectively exploit it as a venue for building peace on the 
Korean Peninsula and shaping a new multilateral security architecture in Northeast Asia. 
For example, Roh Moo Hyun pushed the agenda of a peace regime in the Korean 
*? eninsula, based on a South-North Korean peace treaty which aimed to replace the 1953 
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armistice and induced Pyongyang and Washington to join the regime (Moon C. I. 2008, 
99-10 - 
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The Roh administration might well have believed that the increased 
interdependence between South and North Korea would play an integral role in 
repainting the overall picture of security environment in the proposed regime. The 
administration envisioned that deepening economic, social, and cultural interdependence 
between the two Koreas would enhance South Korea's influence on the North. The 
ROK's role, in this respect, could be defined as a leading diplomatic leverage to 
transform the isolated North Korean political and economic system. The ROK has also 
been believed to play a crucial role to help relieve mounting confrontation between the 
DPRK and the United States under the Bush administration. 
However, Roh Moo Hyun's efforts to play the role of an 'honest broker' bridging 
Washington and Pyongyang in the proposed security regime was a real challenge to the 
conventional U. S. -ROK alliance (Brooke 2003). The challenge might result in 
cacophony between the two allies and in preventing them from closely coordinating 
their North Korea policy. For some conservatives in Washington, Roh's position was 
interpreted as conniving of North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons. The Bush 
administration, in addition, harboured a 'strategic suspicion' about the end of inter- 
Korean reconciliation in the broader context of Northeast Asia where China's role in 
this region was growing bigger (Park H. J. 2007). How to fill the gap between his 
obligations to the bilateral alliance partner in Washington and the realistic requirement 
25 It is worth noting that the consensus on the idea of multilateral peace regime already existed in the 
'September Wh Joint Statement'. The six-parties established five working groups one of which was for building a Northeast Asia peace and security mechanism. 
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for improved inter-Korean relations with Pyongyang became one of the biggest 
obstacles his foreign policy had to overcome. 
Kaeseong Industrial Complex (KIC) 
The successful launch of the KIC project was the most salient achievement in the 
Roh Moo Hyun administration's engagement policy toward the DPRK. The DPRK 
designated Kaeseong in 2002, located around 4km north from the Military Demarcation 
Line (MDL) between the South and the North, as a special economic zone (SEZ). The 
North Korean Standing Committee of the Supreme Council of the People in November 
2002 promulgated the 'Kaeseong Industrial Complex Act'. On the ROK side, Hyundai, 
as a key developer of the SEZ, sold factory lots in the complex to South Korean small 
and medium sized enterprises looking for low labor and land costs (Lim K. T. and Lim 
S. H 2003, Jung 2004). More than 41,000 workers, who belonged to 116 tenant 
companies, as of October 2009, were producing goods ranging from footwear to 
cooking utensils (MOU 2009). This remarkable progress of the Kaeseong project in his 
administration showed that military tension caused by the nuclear crisis did not 
undermine the need of South Korean business for a more interdependent economic 
structure with the DPRK. 
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Table 3.2 Key agreements in inter-Korean economic issues (2003-2007) 
Accord Date agreed 
Establishment of the dispute settlement body in inter-Korean trade November2003 
Joint irrigation investigation on the lm-jin river to prevent flooding March 2004 
Agreement on swapping light industry material (South) and mineral resources July 2004 
Inter-Korean maritime agreement May 2005 
opening of the inter-Korean economic cooperation liaison office October 2005 
Source: Headquarter for Inter-Korean Dialogue, MOU (2008) 
It was on the 31" October 2006 that al I fifteen South Korean manufacturers, as the 
first tenant firms of the first phase (pilot complex) of the Kaeseong project, began to 
operate their production facilities in DPRK territory. The DPRK carried out an 
underground nuclear test just several days before this operation. The ROK and the US 
goverm, nents regarded the test as a rebuff to their repeated warnings on provocative 
actions. The nuclear test however did not create a serious obstacle to the planned 
timetable for the KIC operation. Further, South Korean businessman Park Nam So who 
had been running his company in the KIC depicted Kaeseong as 'the most peaceful 
place in the Korean Peninsula' even while the nuclear crisis continued to develop. His 
experience showed that under the already established governing order in this joint 
industrial complex there were few things to be discussed as a consequence of the 
exacerbating political mood. He stated in an interview (2008) that as long as his factory 
manager and the North Korean workers maintain a normal communication channel to 
meet production targets, there was no room for political variables to fit in this 
mechanism. He insisted that it was unfounded concern from suppliers, bankers, and 
consumer groups heavily influenced by irresponsible and exaggerated press reports on 
the future of the KIC, not the political variable per se that caused a problem. 
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The year 2006 marked ever-growing military tension. The DPRK launched 
missiles (July) and detonated nuclear material at its underground facility (October) in 
this year. Yet the South Korean SMEs in Kaeseong produced 74 million US dollars of 
goods in the same year. It marked nearly five times growth in comparison with the 
previous year's production. The number of the North Korean factory workers in the KIC 
rose over 10,000 in November 2006 for the first time (MOU 2006,122-141, MOU 
2007,56-78). 
The growing involvement of ROK business actors in the DPRK's territory 
engendered the need to have a freer business climate. It was more or less incompatible 
with the unfinished nuclear confrontation. The industrial infrastructure in the Complex 
however was equipped to mainly meet the South tenant firms' commercial requirements. 
it included power supply, telecommunications, banking and sewage disposal and so on. 
Agreements were also made on entry clearance to ensure freer and easier access to 
DPRK territory (Government Information Agency 2008,354-357). All these follow-up 
agreements and their implementations aimed to form a more profitable and 
commercialized production environment in the DPRK. They contributed as a result to 
strengthening the asymmetrical interdependence between state and non-state actors in 
the two Koreas. Commercial production in the KIC, in addition, contributed to the 
growing inter-Korean trade. The volatile security environment in the Korean Peninsula 
did not undermine the growing economic engagement. The production in the KIC 
reached 16.7% (as of 2005) of the whole inter-Korean trade (MOU 2006,122-14 1). 
Another flagship achievement with regard to the inter-Korean economic 
engagement under the Roh Moo Hyun leadership (2003-2007) was the so-called 'light 
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industry cooperation agreement'. The ROK and the DPRK made an agreement in July 
2004 to swap the material for the light industry production from the South with mineral 
resources such as zinc and magnesite from the North (Government Information Agency 
2008,354-357). The agreement created a new dimension of inter-Korean trade. It 
enabled a number of light industry manufacturers in the ROK to acquire a new 
consumer market in a very adjacent country. Along with this agreement, his 
administration also produced inter-Korean agreements on maritime issues (May 2004) 
and South-North railway connections (June 2004) as follow-up measures to implement 
the Kim Dae Jung - Kim Jong 11 agreements in 2000. 
Theoretical interpretation 
Roh Moo Hyun's North Korea policy could be interpreted as being shaped in 
accordance with the neoliberal thesis. His policy was built on the belief that economic 
cooperation and military confrontation can coexist under certain conditions. Unlike 
neorealist assumptions that security concerns always take precedence over economic 
matters (Grieco 1988), Roh's policy suggested that economic interdependency was 
sufficiently likely to pacify confrontation and unrest in international relations. He was 
an advocate of such neoliberal thinking that economic collaboration outweighs political 
division. 
With regard to how to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, he further believed 
that the DPRK is likely to sacrifice the existing course of nuclear development, under 
the condition that external economic engagement reaches a sufficient level, to overcome 
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its chronic economic insecurity. His policy line could be interpreted as challenging the 
realist formula arguing 'preventing other countries from going nuclear, if they were 
determined to do it, is unlikely' (Sagan and Waltz 1995,37). A series of policy 
initiatives by Roh Moo Hyun showed that he perceived the underlying causes of the 
North's attempts for nuclear armament were in fact to extract more economic 
concessions from its diplomatic counterparts. Whereas Kim Young Sam, in the similar 
pattern of nuclear crisis in the 1990s, insisted that the ROK government should take an 
unrivalled leading role in any level of negotiation with the DPRK, Roh maintained a 
more flexible approach. He rather focused on making favorable conditions upon which 
the United States and the DPRK could avoid a clash. In the light of such a perception, it 
was not surprising that Roh Moo Hyun used drastic economic means - additional energy 
aid provided by the ROK out of six-party talks - to make a breakthrough in the stalled 
nuclear negotiation. 
He did not entirely dismiss the importance of military security in managing inter- 
Korean relations under nuclear confrontation. But he was fully aware, despite the fact 
that the South had maintained even more superior military capability than the North, 
how much the use of military force would be costly to South Korean economy and 
society. 
"The spectre of war comes immediately to the minds of the Korean people 
when they hear talk of using force. As a nation that has built the Korea of today 
from the ashes of yesterday, we simply cannot be asked to relive that traumatic 
experience" (cited in Moon C. I. 2008,75) 
108 
The proponents of the complex interdependence model did not claim that 
interdependence makes military power obsolete. They instead paid more attention to the 
costly effect of employing military means in a changing context of international 
relations (Keohane and Nye 1987,727). The model offered insights for policy 
development of the Roh Moo Hyun administration when it tried to combine economic 
incentives with constant increases in the defence budget (Naeil Shinmun 27 th September 
2006) to deter North Korean nuclear development. As Roh Moo Hyun showed his belief 
that diffusion of economic collaboration could strengthen interdependence and 
subsequently alleviate military tension, his policy model had close parallels with the 
complex interdependence model. 
His emphasis on the need for peace regime creation by negotiation in Northeast 
Asia constitutes another similarity to the complex interdependence model. Being able to 
comprehend how the regime is established and maintained was central to understanding 
the politics of interdependence not only for the proponents of complex interdependence 
model but for broadly defined neoliberals. They stressed the usefulness of cooperative 
multilateralism by showing a preference for hammering out a governing arrangement in 
a specified issue area. They disagreed with the realist theory that claimed only dominant 
players such as the United States are able to frame the rules in international agenda 
(Young 1982, Nye 1988, Powell 1994). Likewise, Roh Moo Hyun aimed to create a 
multilateral peace regime in the Korean Peninsula, subject to the successful progress of 
the six-party talks, to perpetuate denuclearization agreement among the powers involved. 
All in all, the continuation of inter-Korean economic collaboration in various issue areas, 
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coupled with the effort to replace military force as the key driving force of inter-Korean 
relations with economic means offered grounds to interpret his policy as aiming to 
create complex interdependence in the context of the Korean Peninsula. 
3.5 Changed nature of the inter-Korean relations : complex interdependence model 
This section will offer the complex interdependence model as the main conceptual 
framework to interpret the structural change of inter-Korean relations under the Kim 
Dae Jung and the Roh Moo Hyun administration. Such a theoretical attempt will suggest 
one of the fundamental explanatory tools by which one can understand a backdrop of the 
increased inter-Korean trade during the nuclear crisis. In doing so, this section will focus 
on the process of inter-Korean interdependence rather than the consequence of it. In 
other words, the main point of the section is going to be how they consolidated their 
interdependence rather than why they strove to achieve it. The formulation of the key 
characteristics of the complex interdependence model - lack of issue hierarchy, 
existence of multiple channels, and decreasing role of military - was the product of 
observation on how actors engage in cooperative endeavour in international politics. As 
the proponents spelled out, it was an explanation on the pattern of change during the 
1970s and 1980s (Keohane and Nye 1989, xi). Thus, before tackling inter-Korean 
relations by the key characteristics of the complex interdependence model, these 
features of the change will be addressed first. This section will sum up the features upon 
which the complex interdependence model has been developed with two notions : 
asymmetrical reciprocity and transnational interactions. 
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The section will start by providing explanations on how these notions have been 
developed in association with IR theory and to what extent the key features of the 
notions have been found in inter-Korean cases. The section will then demonstrate three 
points to substantiate the applicability of the complex interdependence model to inter- 
Korean affairs after 2000. Firstly, it will show the increased exchange programs between 
South and North Korea after the inter-Korean summit talks in 2000. Secondly, it will 
argue that economic, cultural, and political interactions between the two Koreas 
consolidated its interdependence at the sub-state level. Thirdly, it will show that 
deepened interdependence between the two Koreas contributed to the transformation of 
the security environment in the Korean Peninsula. 
Asymmetrical reciprocity 
Reciprocity was one of the most frequently quoted notions when tackling 
cooperative behavior between states . 
26 According to Keohane (1986,5-8), the concept 
of reciprocity in international politics was characterized by two common features : 
contingency and equivalence. He defined it as 'exchanges of roughly equivalent values 
in which the actions of each party are contingent on the prior actions of the others in 
such a way that good is returned for good, and bad for bad'. It meant, if two states want 
to forge reciprocal relationship in international politics, they ought to respond to each 
other's political actions with equivalent values of reward. One actor's immediate 
2' The concept of reciprocity was originally devised in establishing the post-War trade regime, and 
enriched through the debate on American trade policy. See Culbertson (1937) and Hay and Sulzenko (1982) respectively. 
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response to the other's actions and affinnative consideration of what the other desires to 
gain could be the main factors to strengthen reciprocity in a given bilateral relation. 
The notion of reciprocity as one of the conceptual elements that engendered the 
complex interdependence model did not necessarily focus on dealing with mutually 
beneficial effects of equal weight between actors in terms of their political, economic or 
military capability. What needed to be more emphasized to explore international power 
politics was the asymmetrical aspect of reciprocity as one of the most influential 
elements in shaping one actor's behavior toward another. 
The South Korean president Kim Dae Jung and his successor Roh Moo Hyun 
made a bold approach by proposing a more flexible type of reciprocity than what 
Keohane originally defined in the 1980s. In his inaugural speech, Kim Dae Jung made 
clear that his government unequivocally opposed the way of reunification by absorbing 
weaker North Korea despite the ever-expanding, overwhelming superiority that the 
ROK had been enjoying in economic and military capability (Kim D. J. 2004). Roh Moo 
Hyun's position in dealing with would-be nuclear North Korea has been seen as more 
amicable to Pyongyang when he emphasized the importance of so-called 'yoki Saji' 
(AWRI, inter-subjective understanding, or placing oneself in the other's shoes) on 
how to assess the real intention of nuclear possession of the DPRK (Moon C. I. 2008, 
77). He openly stated in his official visit to the United States immediately after U. S. 
president Bush started his second term. 
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North Korea professes that nuclear capabilities are a deterrent for defending 
itself from external aggression to protect itself from external threats. In 
many cases, it is true that North Korea's claims and allegations are quite 
hard to believe, and to credit. However, in this particular case it is true and 
undeniable that there is a considerable element of rationality in North 
Korea's claims (Roh M. H. 2004). 
Although such controversial remarks were aimed at sending a message to the Bush 
administration to refrain from military or economic blockade toward the DPRK, they 
also signalled that he would take more flexible action in dealing with the North Korean 
nuclear program. 
Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun's initiative that stressed 'flexible reciprocity' 
became the main factor which could replace the neorealist understanding of inter- 
Korean relations in the previous administrations. Under the situation where South and 
North Korea had asymmetrical preferences with regard to their gains, the South's 
insistence on reciprocity might be perceived, for the North, as a disguised type of 
unilateralism (Park K. Y. 2007,103). This political situation reduced the efficiency and 
usefulness of what Axelord called 'tit-for-tat' strategy (Axelrod 1984). Regarding the 
evolution of inter-Korean relations, it meant an even more accommodative attitude 
toward the DPRK. The new approach on how to create reciprocal relations with 
Pyongyang was at variance with the Kim Young Sam administration (1993-1998), 
which had remained rigid in insisting on immediate give-and-take style reciprocity 
(Choi W. K. 1998). Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun nevertheless made clear that their 
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governments would not stick to the logic of a 'zero-sum' game in dealing with the 
DPRK. This implied the South Korean government would not oppose relative gains by 
North Korea as long as inter-Korean cooperation enhanced its absolute gains in 
economic interest like trade expansion. This initiative produced more active engagement 
by South Korean firms and civil society that were willing either to invest or to provide 
humanitarian aid to the DPRK. Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun's approach based on 
the notion of 'flexible reciprocity' consequently broadened the issue areas and 
diversified the relevant actors in the inter-Korean relations. 
Transnational interaction 
The notion of transnational interactions proposed in 1971 by Keohane and Nye 
constituted one of the two sources, along with asymmetrical reciprocity, that led to later 
formulation of the complex interdependence model. They stressed, by this notion, the 
changing nature of international politics that one could hardly capture through the 
conventional analytical framework focusing on diplomatic negotiations between states. 
Their key interest was cross-border transactions by actors not controlled by central 
foreign policy organs of government. This engendered the following definition of 
transnational interactions : 'movement of tangible or intangible items across state 
boundaries when at least one actor is not an agent of a government or an 
intergovernmental organization' (Keohane and Nye 1972, ix-xii). The key aspect, in this 
formulation, was the interactions between state and non-state actors. Figure 3.2 provides 
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another way looking at the direct interactions between a government in state A and a 
non-state actor in state B. 
Figure 3.2 Transnational interactions and interstate politics 
IGO 
GI 
sl 
G2 
S2 
GI-G2 : Classic interstate politics 
GI-SI : Domestic politics 
GI-S2/G2-SI/SI-IGO/S2-IGO 
Transnational interactions 
G Government 
S Society 
IGO = Intergovernmental organization 
Source : Nye and Keohane (1972) 'Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction', p. xiv 
The interactions between state and non-state actors implied that, for non-state 
actors, they could bypass their own governments when they tried to make a new channel 
with their counterparts. Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun allowed, unlike their 
predecessors, South Korean firms and civil society groups greater room to maneuvre in 
contacting their North Korean counterparts by relaxing various types of red tape and 
simplifying administrative procedures (Jeong S. H. 2001,29). As a consequence, greater 
involvement of the South Korean non-state actors in inter-Korean affairs resulted in a 
more constructive pattern of economic engagement with the North. 
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Coupled with the rising demand of South Korean small business looking for lower 
cost production in the North Korean territory, the growing level of transnational 
interactions in the post-summit inter-Korean relations paved the way for the more stable 
development of a comprehensive pattern of interdependence between the two Koreas. 
Comprehensive and structural inter-Korean economic relations were supported by 
involvement of the South Korean business community that had strong reasons to press 
the government not to jeopardize their gains from inter-Korean trade. 
Kim Dae Jung made clear in 2000, just before his summit with Kim Jong 11, that 
his government would aggressively encourage private sector cooperation and exchanges 
in inter-Korean relations (Kim 2000, cited in Son K. Y. 2006,194). What he particularly 
stressed were the inter-Korea trade and the Mount Kumkang tourism projects. His 
emphasis on private sector cooperation and exchange further broadened and diversified 
the actors involved in inter-Korean engagement. He also made an effort to insulate inter- 
Korean economic exchanges by private sectors from the anticipated political unrest in 
the Korean Peninsula by introducing the principle of 'Jongkyong Bulli' in his North 
Korea policy (Kim Y. Y. 2005). 
Roh Moo Hyun by and large followed in the footsteps of the previous 
administration in terms of the actors and pattern of inter-Korean economic cooperation. 
A set of new cooperative agendas and subfields were exploited to elevate the quality of 
joint economic projects under his leadership. Among many accords and agreements 
made during his term, were joint irrigation investigation to prevent flooding (March, 
2004), light industry cooperation (July 2004), and maritime affairs (May 2005). As the 
scope of cooperation expanded, it became essential to involve many other non-state 
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actors that had previously not been part of inter-Korean interactions. It included local 
governments, a variety of quasi -governmental agencies not necessarily belonging to the 
Foreign Office / Ministry of Unification, and many other subnational organizations. 
Increased exchange programs: No issue hierarchy 
Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun abandoned an obsession with the negotiation 
agendas resulting from the Cold-War legacy, in dealing with the DPRK, such as 
legitimacy rivalry, military build-up, and ideological confrontation. By making a 
commitment not to pursue the downfall of the increasingly unstable communist regime, 
they achieved a remarkable expansion of inter-Korean economic, political, and cultural 
ties (Moon and Steinberg 1999, Hong S. Y. 1999, Moon C. I. 2008). 
Kim Dae Jung suggested a 'comprehensive engagement' as a means to dissuade 
the DPRK from taking military action to counter perceived threats from external 
powers. Comprehensive engagement was understood as a process mobilizing all 
possible means that a status quo power could employ to induce its enemy state to change 
its behavior (Son K. Y. 2006,46). He spelled out in the Inter-Korean Joint Declaration, 
as a result of the summit with Kim Jong 11, that he would pursue even more practical 
steps than the previous administrations toward enhanced inter-Korean economic, social, 
and cultural exchanges and cooperation (Chosun Ilbo 10h June 2000, Snyder 2005,95). 
In the wake of the summit agreement, the military dynamic, building on 'zero sum' 
logic, no longer exclusively dominated the negotiation agenda in the inter-Korean 
political dialogue. Kim Dae Jung instead paid special attention to the growing necessity 
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for non-political, non-military and economic exchanges between South and North Korea 
in an attempt to expand the scope and scale of engagement. For example, the ambitious 
tourism project to develop Mount Kumkang into an attractive resort park initiated by 
Hyundai Group, although the ROK business community was skeptical about the project 
from the beginning, was an effective showcase to expose the administration's 
determination for comprehensive engagement. 
The Roh Moo Hyun administration further developed a variety of ideas leading to 
non-political and non-economic cooperative events even amid nuclear confrontation. 
Socio-cultural exchanges began to take equal rank with political and economic 
dialogues between the South and the North. Inter-Korean socio-cultural joint projects in 
the Roh Moo Hyun administration underwent a significant growth - more than four 
times those in the Kim Dae Jung era - resulting in forming a mood of inter-Korean 
reconciliation in spite of nuclear tension. The joint projects included friendly football 
matches, restoration of the Buddhist heritage in the North, charity hospital construction, 
a South Korean pop singer's recital in Pyongyang, publication of a Korean language 
dictionary, and production of television programs (MOU 2007,2008). As a result, the 
number of South Korean people who visited the North with the purpose of taking part in 
socio-cultural exchanges reached 12,217 in 2007 when Roh Moo Hyun was in power. It 
showed a dramatic increase in comparison with the 330 people who visited the North 
with the same purpose in 1999 in the Kim Dae Jung administration. 
What was more striking was that these exchange programs were planned and 
enforced through not only intergovernmental channels but also various avenues at the 
sub-state level. At the same time, as socio-cultural joint projects came to receive 
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sustained attention not only by the relevant organizations but also by the individual 
government agencies, the clear hierarchy on what needed constant priority in inter- 
Korean relations has considerably diminished. The dividing line between conventional 
political issues and newly emerged cooperative agendas was becoming blurred 
generating a more structurally entangled cooperative mechanism between the two 
Koreas. Increased exchanges and cooperation at the socio-cultural level showed the 
diminishing issue hierarchy in inter-Korean relations. 
Interdependence at substate level: Multiple channels 
Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun allowed and encouraged South Korean private 
firms and civic group leaders to engage with their counterparts in North Korea through 
various contact channels. This was a great policy reversal from his predecessor Kim 
Young Sam who largely prohibited inter-Korean contact at the subnational level outside 
inter-governmental channels. This new approach implied that the ROK government was 
likely to take a more accommodative attitude toward the DPRK, which had rejected 
intergovernmental dialogue with the democratically elected South Korean government 
and aiming to embrace, as negotiation partners, pro-North Korean campaign groups in 
the South instead (Park Y. K. 2003,30). It also meant that the South Korean non-state 
actors could enjoy a higher level of autonomy in getting involved in joint projects with 
their North Korean counterparts. The consistent implementation of a series of 
deregulation measures based on the initiative of 'multiple channels' and the Vongkyong 
Bulli' by Kim Dae Jung was signalled by the key pattern of change - i. e. flexible 
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reciprocity and transnational actors' involvement in inter-Korean relations - on which 
the complex interdependence model was built. More diversified contact channels 
between the two Koreas showed the applicability of what Keohane termed transnational 
relations. This meant domestic actors in state A could deal politically with their 
counterparts of state B in their own issue area without necessarily involving diplomatic 
negotiation for the particular project (Keohane 1972, xii-xv). 
However, the notion of trarisnational relations provided an insufficient tool in 
explaining the changed modality of inter-Korean contacts. This was because the key 
issue areas in the new phase of the inter-Korean relations did not reflect the emergence 
of new issues areas resulting from globalization, such as transnational banking activities 
and cross-border ecological/environmental issues. To understand the key features of the 
inter-Korean relations under the Kim Dae Jung government, it required a different 
analytical view not assuming supranational issues and actors closely associated with the 
notion of transnational interactions. By ruling out supranational approaches, revealing 
how intergovernmental bargaining at various levels worked in inter-Korean relations 
became the main task for the relevant research. 27 
A joint research project that analyzed the governance of inter-Korean economic 
cooperation, led by the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), showed how 
various actors formed a network through multiple channels, in pursuing inter-Korean 
projects for economic cooperation. The authors adopted a new approach, in explicating 
inter-Korean economic engagement after 2000, by stressing various actors' cooperation 
2' The difference between supranational and intergovernmental approach in part derived from the result of theoretical observation on European integration process. For example, see Haas and Schmitter (1964) and Moravcsik (1993,1998) respectively. 
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and coordination rather than intergovernmental political negotiations. They particularly 
shed light on the emergence of the various actors' autonomous coordination through a 
horizontal network structure (Kim K. R. et al 2007,6-8). 
Individual actors which had been overlooked in the state-centric analyses 
developed into equally significant objects of exploration in dealing with inter-Korean 
relations. Jonsson (2006), for example, analyzed the role and influences of inter-Korean 
socio-cultural exchanges, by focusing on a functionalist perspective, on inter-Korean 
political reconciliation. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international financial 
institutions, and international humanitarian agencies received more attention in terms of 
the economic and social engagement in the DPRK (Weingartner 200 1, Babson 2002, 
Beck and Reader 2005). 
When it came to the non-state actors' contribution to the promotion of inter- 
Korean reconciliation in South Korea, more examples could be provided. Local 
governments in the ROK created their own contact channels in order to launch 
cooperative projects to fulfil their own people's industrial needs. The projects included 
orchard development, forest conservation support, and medical support for North 
Korean vulnerable groups (MOU 2008,195-197). Many of the South Korean local 
governments that took part in these joint projects were under the control of the 
opposition party that was at odds with the Roh Moo Hyun administration over its North 
Korean policy line. Although the opposition party politically condemned the Roh 
administration's 'appeasement' approaches toward the DPRK, the local governments' 
industrial interest in inter-Korean economic cooperation was not outweighed by the 
party policy line. 
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More direct involvement of business channels in inter-Korean political affairs was 
shown when Hyundai played a crucial role in engineering the inter-Korean summit 
between Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong 11. According to Kim Dae Jung's top aide group 
members who were secretly involved in the preparation of the first inter-Korean summit, 
it was the Hyundai Group that initially bridged the South and the North in order to make 
it happen (Son K. Y. 2006,106, Lim D. W. 2008,25-30). Such an impact of the business 
channel on interstate political deals showed that non-governmental elites were taking 
over the role of transmission belt between governments. Individual exchanges by non- 
govemmental sectors could catalyze intergovernmental negotiation for state actors to 
achieve political goals. It demonstrated the possibility for concerted collaboration 
between state and non-state actors by making use of multiple channels in engaging with 
its potential adversary. 
It was not only on the South Korean side that multiple channels efficiently worked 
to establish the implementation strategy of engagement driven by the ROK government. 
Civic group leaders in both Koreas established a 'Joint Committee for the 
Implementation of the inter-Korean Joint Declaration (JCKJD)' in 2005. More than 
twenty individual organizations from both sides participated in the Committee. On the 
North's side, it ranged from the Youth League and the Women's Union to the Farmers' 
League and the Religious Associations. The JCKJD hosted in June 2005 a 'National 
Unification Grand Festival' in Pyongyang to commemorate the fifth anniversary of the 
2000 summit. The Committee also hosted in August 2005 another National Festival in 
Seoul to commemorate the 60t' anniversary of Korean liberation from Japanese colonial 
rule in 1945. More than three thousand participants gathered for both joint events 
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(JCKJD 2005). 
The DPRK also began to understand how international organizations and NGOs 
worked to engage in famine and poverty issues in international politics. Pyongyang 
made an unprecedented appeal for humanitarian assistance in 1995 after a series of 
natural disasters that devastated its economy. it allowed the international humanitarian 
agencies and their practitioners physical access to over two-thirds of its geographical 
area (Smith 1999,453-54). Pyongyang, on the other hand, also decided in 1995 to 
accept the offer of unconditional food assistance from the then Kim Young Sam 
government in South Korea (Kim W. K. et al. 1998,519). Given that there were no such 
things as NGOs or independent actors free from governmental control in the DPRK's 
language in the 1990s, this move implied a significant change in terms of how 
Pyongyang acknowledged the role of multiple channels in its foreign policy (Smith 
2005b). 
With regard to the DPRK's increased foreign engagement and inter-Korean 
economic cooperation after 2000, the Chosun Asia-Pacific Peace Committee (CAPPC), 
a quasi-govemmental organization, played a crucial role. The CAPPC was in effect 
under the control of the Korean Workers' Party although it did not belong to the Party's 
official subunit (Kim K. S. 2002,105). 28 According to the National Intelligence Service 
(NIS) in the ROK, the CAPPC, established in 1994, had three functions. Firstly, the 
Committee was a channel for improving relations with Western countries including the 
U. S. and Japan. Secondly, it planned and coordinated inter-Korean dialogues and overall 
28 It should be noted that the North Korean main negotiators involved in inter-Korean economic and social 
exchanges were agencies belonging to mostly government authorities whereas the South Korean 
counterparts were non-governmental actors in private sector. 
123 
exchanges at the sub-state level. Thirdly, the CAPPC acted as an avenue to invite 
influential foreign figures to the DPRK (Son K. Y. 2006). The CAPPC, most of all, was 
the main counterpart of the Hyundai Group that had promoted the largest scale inter- 
Korean economic cooperation and exchanges since the 1990s. Business talks at the 
corporate level between Hyundai and the CAPPC developed into political dialogue at 
the governmental level in the two Koreas. 
The coexistence and interaction of state and non-state or sub-state channels such 
as the JCKJD and the CAPPC as well as private firms like Hyundai showed the 
theoretical adequacy of the complex interdependence model in understanding the 
transformation of inter-Korean relations after the summit. The emergence of multiple 
channels was not necessarily to dismiss the role of diplomatic negotiation and military 
capability highlighted by the political realists. It was worth noting that the proponents of 
the complex interdependence model accepted that state behavior was dominated by the 
constant danger of military conflict. They however paid equal attention to the newly 
emerged multidimensional economic and social interdependence (Keohane and Nye 
1987,727). Inter-Korean relations after 2000 likewise did not imply the retreat of the 
state as the supreme political actor. It rather demonstrated that the state did not 
monopolize agenda setting and instead formed a network with alternative actors which 
had previously been sidelined. The non-governmental elites, as one axis of this network, 
began to be treated as equally important actors in producing and developing the agendas 
and issues of inter-Korean negotiations. It would be misleading to argue that non- 
governmental elites were becoming competitors of the nation state. Quite to the contrary, 
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the inter-Korean engagement by non-governmental actors was largely supported and 
consolidated by intergovernmental bargaining. 
One of the most illuminating pictures showing to what extent the 'multiple 
channel' policy actually reorganized the practice of inter-Korean contact came from the 
survey results of the South Korean businessmen who have conducted inter-Korean 
business. 54 percent of the South Korean businessmen who took part in the survey 
answered that the ROK government allowed direct contact between South and North 
firms apart from the inter-govemmental channel. This result showed that the ROK 
government made an effort after 2000 to insulate trade negotiations and transactions 
from the negative influence of the volatile military dynamics. The inter-company direct 
contact as a consequence became a main avenue for inter-Korean trade deals after 2000 
(42%), according to the relevant question. The role of the direct channel between 
companies surpassed i nter- governmental negotiations (12%) and indirect contacts 
through third parties (19%) in creating a sustainable dialogue route for future 
transactions. 
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Figure 3.3 Did the ROK government permit non-governmental level contact with the DPRK entities after the 2000 
summit talk? 
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Figure 3.4 Which was the key contact channel with your North Korean business partners after the inter-Korean 
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In sum, the political agreement in 2000 to invigorate cooperation and exchanges in 
various non-political areas promoted the role of sub-state actors on both sides. As a 
result, increased socio-cultural exchanges and sustained economic cooperation after 
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2000 further strengthened the interdependence between the two Koreas through various 
channels. The emergence of the new dialogue channel in the inter-Korean interactions 
ultimately affected the security environment in the Korean Peninsula. 
Change of the security environment : Decreasing role of military 
The examples of inter-Korean economic cooperation after the 2000 summit 
showed how politically hostile states could share their self-interest through institutional 
agreements. The case of the KIC, above all, provided a compelling example of 
neoliberal thinking on inter-state cooperation through institutional arrangement. 
The Kaeseong Industrial District Management Committee (KIDMAC), as a 
governing body to run this joint industrial complex, was established as a corporation 
belonging to the DPRK government based on article 21 of the Kaeseong Industrial 
Complex Act. On the other hand, the Committee however was staffed by South Korean 
quasi-government officials. The Committee operated through a conference with a North 
Korean government agency, the Central Special Zone Development General Bureau 
(KIDMAC 2008). In addition, bilateral written agreements between the two Koreas 
were made through KIDMAC on various issues such as customs clearance, quarantine, 
telecommunications and entry/departure. 
The joint organization, KIDMAC and a variety of written agreements between the 
two Koreas became the key vehicles that embodied and coordinated their joint stake 
regarding the management of the industrial complex. Although both governments 
played key roles in designing and launching the organization, they shifted more or less 
their power to the joint organization to achieve mutual benefit. KIDMAC had the status 
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of an independent legislative body which had a distance from hierarchical order of the 
North Korean central authority. Due to the dissimilar legislative procedures between 
South and North Korea, however, they chose a way to divert likely clashes in legislation. 
The South Korean government in many cases arranged the first draft of the relevant bills 
and then sent them to the North through KIDMAC. After the North examined them by 
consulting with the tenant companies, they were made public as key laws and bylaws to 
govern the Complex (Kim K. R. et al. 2007,102-104). As Keohane and Nye illustrated, 
states can broaden their perception of self-interest as they comply with the rules of 
cooperative institutions. Inter-state cooperation, without the presence of a hegemonic 
player, could be enhanced through institutional agreements. In other words, states could 
shift loyalty and resources to institutions if these were mutually beneficial (Keohane and 
Nye 1977). The establishment and operation of KIDMAC demonstrated this 
fundamental assumption of neoliberal institutionalism could be applied to the case of 
inter-Korean relations. 
From this procedure, one could discover two main features which undermined the 
logic of the neorealists. Firstly, the issue of relative loss emphasized by neorealists did 
not constitute the main agenda in establishing and expanding the Complex. Each other's 
economic stability, in contrast, became the most important factor which guaranteed the 
continued supply of capital and labor from both sides (Kim K. R. et al. 2007,102-104). 
Secondly, neither party had a dominant power in drawing up the universal rules under 
which the interdependency expanded. There were a few cases where one side made an 
official complaint against the other regarding unevenly distributed power in every phase 
of legislation. The most frequently debated issues were about the procedure of 
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entry/departure, the use of telecommunications including the internet, and customs 
clearance (Kim K. R. et al. 2007,14). All these issues raised by the South Korean tenant 
companies, however, were to do with promoting more production and providing more 
convenience for the companies. The issues were discussed, even from the North Korea's 
perspective, not based on the logic of a zero-sum game but based on how to adjust the 
pace of change for economic reconfiguration in this particular area. 
Once KIDMAC began operation it contributed to diminishing the security tension 
in the bordering area between the two Koreas. The sign of reconciliation formed through 
economic collaboration culminated when the DPRK military, which formerly had been 
stationed in the vicinity of Kaeseong, showed no objection to the influx of South Korean 
government officials and workers as well as information technology devices. The North 
Korean armed forces that had been stationed in or around the Complex furthermore 
handed over a part of this strategic point to newly built industrial facilities (Hwang I. D. 
2004). 
According to Rosecrance (1986), growing economic interdependence and the 
benefit from it changed the state's attitude to its territorial control against past 
adversaries. Similarly, the KIC project undermined military control in this situation over 
North Korea's own territory for the first time since the armistice in 1953. The 
redeployment of the North Korean army out of Kaeseong demonstrated that 
institutionalized economic collaboration could transform the security environment that 
had been dominated by the long military confrontation. This became a symbolic episode 
that showed the declining efficacy of military force as a too] acquiring material benefit 
in the inter-Korean relationship. There was no reason, in this sense, for the DPRK to 
129 
militarily threaten its commercial partners, whose hard currency influx and capital 
investment was essential to maintaining its own economy. The DPRK's dependence on 
the South for economic assistance and investment precluded military attack or 
subversion attempts against the South (Smith 2005a, 49). 
The diluted hostility through various exchanges and joint events at the sub-state 
level promoted a national mood of reconciliation and coexistence in the Korean 
Peninsula after 2000. One exception was a naval skirmish in the Yellow Sea in 2002, in 
which six South Korean seamen were killed. The North's unexpectedly rapid expression 
of regret, however, eased the tension which might have resulted in a broader military 
standoff (New York Times 26h July 2002). The changed security environment in the 
Korean Peninsula undermined the conventional security discourse framing inter-Korean 
relations. For example, the notion of 'hawk engagement' suggested by Victor Cha (2002) 
rested on the assumption that the DPRK had an unchanged intention to overthrow the 
Seoul regime to reunify Korea under communist rule. Unlike his underlying assumption, 
however, the deepened interdependence between the South and the North decreased 
North Korea's need and desire to replace the South Korean government with a pro- 
communist regime. This also illustrated that the complex interdependence model which 
paid heed to the retreat of military force in an interdependent relationship could provide 
the analytical tool in understanding the changed nature of inter-Korean relations after 
2000. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the changed nature of the security environment of the Korean 
Peninsula after 2000 was contrasted with the conventional security perception building 
on the tense military relationship explored in chapter 2. The nuclear crisis between 2002 
and 2006, derived from North Korea's nuclear ambition combined with the Bush 
administration's policy shift from the Clinton government, further escalated security 
instability in the Peninsula. Unlike the US-DPRK relations, however, inter-Korean 
relations after 2000 could be explained by a different theoretical model. The complex 
interdependence model which Keohane and Nye (1977,1989) formulated to challenge 
realist assumption could provide a useful analytical tool for understanding the changed 
inter-Korean relations after 2000. 
Despite the increasing tension between the United States and the DPRK, the 
increased inter-Korean interactions revitalized the mood of reconciliation between the 
two Koreas. The multiple dialogue channels at the sub-state level, created as a result of 
the 2000 inter-Korean summit, promoted this change. The inter-Korean mutual 
engagements in the various issue areas such as socio-cultural joint projects as well as 
economic cooperation contributed to the change of the Korean security environment. 
The consolidation of the inter-Korean relationship after 2000 demonstrated elements of 
the key characteristics of the complex interdependence model formulated by Keohane 
and Nye. The complex interdependence model was able to explain the emergence of 
multiple channels of inter-Korean interactions in various subfields outside the political 
and military security agenda. The model also helped explain the involvement of South 
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Korean small and medium sized enterprises in inter-Korean trade despite increased 
security instability caused by the nuclear crisis. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Nuclear crisis and inter-Korean trade 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter will show how and why the second nuclear crisis erupted and 
heightened from 2002 onward and contrast the crisis with the ongoing development of 
inter-Korean trade. Thus this chapter is divided largely into two parts : the nuclear crisis 
and inter-Korean trade. In the first part, the outbreak of the nuclear crisis and its 
development will be examined by focusing on the relevant players' intentions. This part 
will reveal the diplomatic rift between the ROK and the United States surrounding how 
strong bilateral or multilateral pressure upon Pyongyang should be exerted to achieve 
denuclearization of the DPRK. This chapter will argue that the ROK government's 
policy line of keeping a certain degree of distance from Washington's coercive 
diplomacy laid the foundation for a stable growth of inter-Korean trade during the 
nuclear crisis. The second part will explore the dynamics and development of inter- 
Korean trade particularly from 2002 onward. This part will shed light on commercial 
basis trade led by the South Korean business community rather than non-commercial 
trade such as the transfer of South Korean relief material for humanitarian aid for the 
North Korean people. It will argue that the increased commercial trade and large 
investment projects in the KIC was inspired and facilitated by the Vongkyong BuIlP and 
'multiple channel policy' proposed by Kim Dae Jung and supported by Roh Moo Hyun. 
To further explain the South Korean entrepreneurs' behavior during the nuclear crisis, 
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practical business conditions such as the profitability of inter-Korean trade and 
accessibility to North Korea will also be examined along with how they responded to 
such a reality. This chapter will conclude that the security tensions in the Korean 
Peninsula did not damage the economic interaction between the two politically 
adversarial countries. 
4.2 Outbreak of the second nuclear crisis in 2002 
This section will assess how the second nuclear crisis erupted in 2002 and how the 
involved parties - the United States, the ROK, and the DPRK - reacted to the initial 
phase. The section will critically assess the background of the Bush administration's 
coercive nuclear diplomacy toward the DPRK and contrast it with the ROK 
government's position on how to relate its alliance partnership with the United States 
and inter-Korean relations. 
The US government perspective 
James Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific affairs, visited 
the DPRK between 3 rd and 5h October 2002. He was the highest-ranking administration 
official to visit Pyongyang after President Bush took office in 2001. Assistant Secretary 
Kelly had a talk with Kang Sok Ju, the DPRK's First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs 
during his visit. Neither side stated what they had discussed until the U. S. State 
Department made a formal announcement about the DPRK's nuclear program. The State 
Department announced on 16th October 2002 that the DPRK had been conducting a 
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major clandestine nuclear weapons development program. The Department made a 
statement that the DPRK admitted the existence of a high enrichment program of 
uranium (HEU) as fissile material for a nuclear bomb. According to the State 
Department, the DPRK officials' nuclear admission was the response to the American 
intelligence data suggesting a secret project was under way. Richard Boucher, State 
Department spokesman, said that "North Korea's secret nuclear weapons program is a 
serious violation of North Korea's commitments under the Agreed Framework as well 
as under the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), its International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement, and the joint North-South Declaration of the 
Korean Peninsula. " (U. S. Department of State 2002). 
Assistant Secretary Kelly, in his speech of December 2002, stated that the United 
States now had a 'precondition' in resuming talks with the DPRK. He attributed this to 
the DPRK's HEU program (Kelly 2002). It superseded President Bush's earlier 
commitment to "resuming talks with Pyongyang in any time any place without 
precondition" (Niksch 2002). The U. S. announcement that it was halting talks with 
Pyongyang resulted in freezing the DPRK's relations with the regional powers. It 
overshadowed the move toward improvement of relations, attempted in September 
2002, between the DPRK and Japan as well as between the two Koreas. Inter-Korean 
joint efforts to develop a non-political exchange through international sports events like 
the Asian Games faced difficulties. The North Korean economic reform program 
announced in July 2002 drew less attention due to the resumption of the U. S. - DPRK 
confrontation. A continued political standoff at the interstate level precluded the 
possibility of promoting non-political exchanges. 
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Being faced with the sudden collapse of the reconciliatory mood, critics had 
suspicions, in two key areas, about the manner of the Bush administration's approach in 
handling the North Korean HEU program. They pointed out the imprecision of the 
intelligence assessment with regard to the HEU program and the timing of its revelation 
by the State Department. Regarding whether and to what extent the U. S. intelligence 
entailed precise data, one of the most reliable documents was the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) report assessing the DPRK's nuclear capability, submitted to the U-S 
Congress on 19"' November 2002. The CIA concluded in this report that "the DPRK 
embarked on the effort to develop a centrifuge-based uranium enrichment program 
about two years ago" (CIA 2002). The CIA however spelled out that there was no 
evidence indicating that Pyongyang had begun constructing a centrifuge facility by then. 
The CIA's assessment as reported to Congress covered only three things. Firstly, the 
CIA concluded that the DPRK had begun seeking centrifuge-related materials in large 
quantities in 2001. Secondly, the CIA concluded that the DPRK had obtained equipment 
suitable for use in a uranium feed and withdrawal system. Thirdly, the CIA concluded 
that the DPRK was constructing a plant that could produce enough weapons-grade 
uranium for two or more nuclear weapons per year when fully operational. Of these 
three claims made by the CIA, the only activity the DPRK had completed toward 
developing nuclear weapons as of October 2002, when Kelly visited Pyongyang, was 
the purchase of equipment for uranium feed and withdrawal. When it came to the 
material and the plant that could make the DPRK's aim at developing uranium-based 
nuclear weapons viable, the CIA did not provide any reliable intelligence by the time of 
Kelly's visit. 
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The CIA did not specify in its 2002 Congress report what kind of equipment the 
DPRK had purchased. As Mozley (1998) wrote, the enrichment of 0.7 percent content of 
uranium-235 isotope to 93 percent content required a complex and sophisticated 
technological process. Such processes also needed a number of mechanical devices and 
parts. They included, for example, electrical-frequency converters, high-purity cobalt 
powder for magnetic-top bearing assemblies, and high-strength aluminium tubes 
(Harrison 2005,104). The CIA provided no intelligence on which of these devices the 
DPRK had actually acquired. It instead merely asserted the existence of a poorly defined 
HEU 'program' with scant evidence. 
The imprecise intelligence on the DPRK's nuclear-related activities supplied by 
the U. S. intelligence agency produced different and non-verifiable presumptions about 
the North's nuclear capability. The U. S. presumptions about the DPRK's capability to 
develop nuclear weapons ranged from 'the possession of one or possibly two nuclear 
weapons so far' (CIA 2002) to 'the capability to produce dozens of nuclear weapons 
annually in case it follows its current course' (Allison 2004,72). Newman (2004,77) 
argued that the DPRK was capable of producing enough material for five to eight more 
nuclear weapons within a year if it reprocessed spent fuel rods. What he cited as 
evidence was the unclassified report to Congress made by the Director of Central 
Intelligence (DCI). In short, the unclear and inadequate explanation of the evidence that 
Kelly provided to the DPRK negotiators during his visit undermined the reliability of 
the U. S. claim that the North had violated the 1994 Agreed Framework. The evidence 
provided therefore could not justify the U. S. decision to halt all bilateral dialogues to 
implement the 1994 agreement. 
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The second point the critics raised was the timing of the Bush administration when 
it unveiled the alleged existence of the DPRK's HEU program. Kelly stated that the 
Bush administration received conclusive information about the DPRK's pursuit of the 
HEU in summer 2002 (Kelly 2002). The critics, however, pointed out that Washington 
deliberately postponed the revelation of the HEU intelligence it had already obtained in 
the Clinton years. For example, McCormack argued that Washington probably received 
intelligence in 1999 about Pakistan's transfer of an unwanted gas centrifuge for uranium 
enrichment to the DPRK (McCormack 2004,161). It was evident, as Kelly himself 
acknowledged, that the North's HEU program began well before the Bush 
administration (Kelly 2002). The critics, on this basis, argued that the Bush 
administration's revelation of the HEU program they have long been holding at that 
particular time was an attempt to seek a pretext to torpedo the 1994 Agreed Framework. 
McCormack asserted that Kelly did not go to Pyongyang to negotiate but to confront the 
DPRK with proof of its past nuclear activities (McCormack 2004,160)29. 
According to the critics, the Bush administration broached the imperfect evidence 
on the HEU program for the purpose of scaring Japan and the ROK into reversing their 
North Korea policies (Harrison 2005). Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro 
pushed strongly forward his plan to normalize diplomatic relations with the DPRK in 
2002. The plan culminated when Koizumi met Kim Jong 11 in Pyongyang in September 
2002, just weeks before Kelly's visit to Pyongyang. Japan's speedy drive toward 
Pyongyang, however, was made without sufficient consensus with Washington 
(Rozman 2003, Laney and Shaplen 2003). The Bush administration felt the need to warn 
" There were a series of reports and debates on when the United States intelligence community detected 
the existence of the HEU program. For further discussion, see Son K. Y. (2006,208). 
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its key East Asian ally to adjust its pace in establishing diplomatic relations with the 
DPRK. 
The Bush administration, according to this theory, made use of the imperfect proof 
of the HEU program in pushing forward the goal it had envisioned since its 
inauguration. That goal comprised three objectives : the termination of the 1994 
agreement, no reward to the DPRK before visible measures to dismantle the nuclear 
program, and a multilateral alliance to diplomatically press Pyongyang (Park H. J. 2007, 
13-14). 
The review of the inception of the 2002 nuclear crisis demonstrated the recurrence 
of inter-state confrontation in the Korean Peninsula. The Bush administration concluded 
in this sense that the coercive policy line toward Pyongyang was an effective tool to 
strengthen the state-centric, conventional security environment in the Peninsula. 
The DPRK government perspective 
After the Bush administration announced in October 2002 that the DPRK had 
admitted its uranium-based nuclear program, the first response by the DPRK authority 
was a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman. The DPRK made this 
statement ten days after the statement by the U. S. State Department. The DPRK still 
maintained an ambiguous attitude regarding the existence of the HEU program. The first 
point they emphasized was the lack of evidence. 
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Producing no evidence, he [Kelly] asserted that the DPRK has been actively 
engaged in the enriched uranium program in pursuit of possessing nuclear 
weapons in violation of the DPRK-U. S. Agreed Framework. He even 
intimidated the DPRK side by saying that there would be no dialogue with 
the U. S. unless the DPRK halted it, and the DPRK-Japan, the North-South 
relations would be jeopardized (Chosun Shinbo 26h October 2002). 
Pyongyang maintained a 'neither confirm nor deny' attitude regarding the 
existence of any uranium enrichment activity aiming at nuclear weapon development by 
saying, 
Nobody would be so naive as to think that the DPRK would sit idle under 
such a situation. That was why the DPRK made itself very clear to the 
special envoy of the U. S. President that the DPRK was entitled to possess 
not only nuclear weapons but any type of weapons more powerful than that 
so as to defend its sovereignty and right to existence from the ever-growing 
nuclear threat by the U. S. (Chosun Shinbo 26h October 2002). 
The Foreign Ministry statement demonstrated an ambiguity. It was not easy to 
discern whether Kang Sok Ju was stressing the 'possession' of the HEU program or 
their 'right' as a sovereign state to possess a nuclear program. Their tactical ambiguity 
continued in the following paragraph ; 
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The DPRK, which values sovereignty more than life, was left with no other 
proper answer to the U. S. behaving so arrogantly and impertinently. The 
DPRK has neither need nor duty to explain something to the U. S. which 
seeks to attack it if it refuses to disarm itself (Chosun Shinbo 26 th October 
2002). 
0 Song Chol, bureau director of the DPRK Foreign Ministry, however, clearly 
denied in January 2003 that his government had admitted either enrichment activities or 
an active nuclear weapons program, saying it was a 'sheer lie'. His statement was 
released when the DPRK made its decision to withdraw from the NPT in response to the 
halted reward program that had previously been promised in the 1994 Agreed 
Framework. 
I must make it clear here that we flatly denied at the early stage of the talks 
the U. S. accusations of our 'plan to produce nuclear weapons using enriched 
uranium'..... Washington's announcement as such was intended to mislead 
public opinion by fabricating a fiction (Kim J. Y. 2003). 
Diametrically opposed explanations from Pyongyang and Washington 
surrounding what they had discussed in the Kelly - Kang Sok Ju meeting continued. 
The U. S. delegation reiterated their point. 
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At first, my counterpart angrily denied that the DPRK had an HEU program. 
He dismissed my statement, claiming it was a fabrication, but later, of 
course, the North Koreans took another line (Kelly 2002). 
Don Oberdorfer had interviews with the DPRK negotiators to identify what was 
happening within the Pyongyang leadership. He wrote that Pyongyang's official 
response to the Kelly team's unexpectedly coercive attitude was presented as a result of 
an all-night meeting of its top officials (Oberdorfer 2002)30 . 
This episode implied that 
there was an intensive internal debate within the DPRK top decision makers group on 
how to interpret Washington's unexpected message delivered by Kelly and what sort of 
tactics would be effective to cope with the particular situation. The outcome was a 
decision to seek an even more integrated approach rather than keeping the existing track 
to pursue a marginal advantage in specific conditions of its planned denuclearization 
road map. For the Kim Jong 11 regime, the 1994 reward package, that had been 
established eight years ago and showed significant and unacceptable delay in 
implementation, required too patient an approach. They chose to risk a reversal of the 
existing game plan cautiously assuming a larger scale 'buy-out' option would still be 
available in the nuclear deal with Washington even if it would take more time than the 
original one. This decision suggested Pyongyang's preference for a broader deal and its 
desperation for a bigger compensation package on a long-term basis at the same time. 
As the studies of the DPRK negotiating behavior suggested 31a broader deal including 
30 On the day-to-day schedules of the three day talks between the Kelly team and the DPRK negotiators, 
see Cha and Kang (2003,132-33). 
3' For example, see Sigal (1998,52-65,78) and Snyder (1999,58-60). 
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security and economy issues were likely to work better than narrow proposals on 
specific issues. In this sense, the DPRK negotiators' decision implied that they had an 
intention to seek a greater goal in the future negotiations, if the Bush administration 
turned out to be clearly opposed to any compensation action for the DPRK. Pyongyang, 
in short, attempted to maximize its future leverage to acquire economic and security 
assurance by letting Washington reinforce its suspicion about the existence of the 
clandestine nuclear program. 
As O'Hanlon and Mochizuki (2003b, 9) asserted, the economic atrophy that the 
DPRK has been facing was a fundamental motivation for its admission of the nuclear 
program. There were two written documents, jointly signed by the DPRK and the 
United States as an official agreement to finalize the two rounds of the nuclear 
negotiations. These were the Agreed Framework signed in October 1994 (U. S. 
Department of State 1994) and the DPRK denuclearization action plan agreed in 
February 2007 (U. S. Department of State 2007). Both agreements demonstrated that 
Pyongyang's aim was to secure economic resources to revive its economy as well as to 
gain an assurance of the survival of the regime. 
The two parties made clear, in the 1994 Agreed Framework, that the top priority 
should be a cooperative role in constructing the promised light water reactor (LWR). 
The LWR was the main vehicle that would enable the DPRK authority to resolve the 
country's chronic shortage of electricity. Pyongyang, through the DPRK 
denuclearization action plan announced on 13th February 2007, also secured an even 
larger supply of heavy fuel oil from other members in the six-party talks. This was the 
first visible implementation measure at the initial phase of the second nuclear 
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agreement. Pyongyang might well conclude that the only way to get more economic 
assistance was to capture the greater attention of Washington. In this sense, restarting 
the Yongbyon nuclear reactor which had been frozen as a result of the 1994 Agreed 
Framework, as a response to Kelly's coercion, could be interpreted as a method to 
achieve that objective (McCormack 2004,164). 
The DPRK began to broach at the same time the issue of security from the threat 
posed by the United States armed forces. The spokesman for the DPRK Foreign 
Ministry insisted, on 25 th October 2002, on the need for a non-aggression treaty with the 
United States. He argued that a non-aggression treaty had become a top priority of the 
diplomatic agenda between the two countries because the Agreed Framework had been 
killed (Chosun Shinbo 26 th October 2002). Pyongyang also made a 'new bold proposal', 
at the first three-party talks that took place in April 2003, which implied the Clinton- 
style 'package deal' swapping diplomatic normalization and security assurance (Chosun 
Shinbo 24h April 2003). The three-party talks were the first inter-state attempt to listen 
to each other's arguments as a way of trying to settle the nuclear dispute that had arisen 
since the Kelly - Kang Sok Ju meeting. This initial response by the DPRK implied that 
its acute desire was the assurance of security, since Pyongyang's first requirement was a 
non-aggression guarantee from the United States. 
The DPRK perspective on the 2002 nuclear crisis centred on the responsibility of 
the United States for causing another round of nuclear confrontation. Pyongyang judged 
that the Bush administration was the only party responsible for the cessation of the 
implementing process of the 1994 Agreed Framework. But at the same time, it did not 
rule out a possibility to cooperate with the ROK in the various subfields such as energy, 
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fertilizer, and rice. In the meantime, there was no critical incident or event which 
indicated deterioration in inter-Korean bilateral relations. After its arguable admission of 
the HEU program, it sought economic assistance and security assurance through an 
inter-state deal with the United States. Whereas the nuclear stalemate between the U. S 
and the DPRK strengthened hostile relations between the two nations, inter-Korean 
relations maintained a momentum at an appropriate level to gear up for post-crisis 
rapprochement. The ROK was the only party, from the perspective of the DPRK, which 
was prepared to give them economic assistance amid the mounting nuclear row. 
The ROK government perspective 
The Kim Dae Jung administration showed different policy initiatives from that of 
the Bush administration during the escalating military tension between Washington and 
Pyongyang. Kim Dae Jung had been a reluctant participant in the concerted pressure to 
confront the DPRK led by the United States since the outset of the crisis. He, for 
example, agreed to announce a joint statement with the United States and Japan 
deploring the DPRK in October 2002 at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
meeting held in Mexico (New York Times 27 th October 2002). However, he preferred in 
practice a more cautious stance toward the DPRK. As outgoing president, Kim urged the 
Bush administration to use patience and dialogue in dealing with its northern neighbor. 
He at the same time made an effort to maintain the momentum of the ever-growing 
reconciliatory mood created after the 2000 summit by describing Kim Jong 11 as an 
intelligent and reliable negotiation partner (New York Times 25 th January 2003). 
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Many policyrnakers in Seoul actually felt that Washington might have 
'misunderstood', perhaps even deliberately distorted, what had been said in Pyongyang 
in terms of its secret nuclear program (McCormack 2004,163). Also from the 
perspective of Roh Moo Hyun, who was elected as new South Korean president on I gth 
December 2002, the U. S. approach toward the DPRK was excessively coercive. It 
contradicted Roh Moo Hyun's North Korea policy based broadly on the 'Sunshine 
Policy' of his predecessor (Park H. J. 2007,14). In response to the admission of the 
North Korean HEU program, the hawkish group in the Bush administration began to 
examine the applicability of a 'tailored containment' strategy to enhance the isolation of 
the DPRK (New York Times 29h December 2002). But Roh Moo Hyun, the then 
president-elect, did not align himself with them. Instead, he was not hesitant to 
acknowledge that there existed differences of interest between traditional allies in 
dealing with Pyongyang (Munhwa Ilbo I" January 2003). 
Such diplomatic strains within the U. S. - ROK alliance after the outset of 2002 
nuclear crisis deepened the perception gap between Washington and Seoul. In contrast 
to the U. S. skepticism on the effect of economic engagement with the Kim Jong 11 
regime, the ROK might well have believed that the increased inter-Korean 
interdependence would change the security environment in the Korean Peninsula. What 
Seoul envisioned was that the deepening economic, political, and cultural 
interdependence between the two Koreas would enhance in the end its leading role in 
dealing with Pyongyang. The DPRK however turned out to be unwilling to tackle the 
nuclear issue talking with the ROK. In fact, the North was not willing to accept the 
South as an influential negotiating counterpart in the nuclear deal. This suggested that 
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Seoul's increased interaction with the North had not contributed to ameliorating the 
security environment in the Korean Peninsula (Snyder 2005,97). The stance of the ROK 
government, as a consequence, was in a dilemma over hammering out an appropriate 
option to simultaneously satisfy Washington and Pyongyang. At the same time, the 
ROK faced a growing concern that the future of inter-Korean economic cooperation 
might become bleak as a result of the increasing political and military tensions caused 
by the nuclear crisis. Even though the ROK was the closest neighbour of the DPRK with 
the most to lose if military tensions escalated to a physical conflict, it was not able to 
secure its seat on the negotiating table dealing with the nuclear program at least until 
six-party talks were launched in August 2003. 
4.3 Increasing tension (2002-2006) 
This section will demonstrate the coexistence of the regional strain caused by the 
second nuclear crisis and the ongoing development of the cooperative projects at the 
inter-Korean level. Similar to the previous section, the positions of the individual parties 
involved will be examined to reveal the conflicts of interest between them. 
The US government perspective 
President Bush did not deem the DPRK a credible and legitimate interlocutor 
(Pollack 2003,28). The Bush administration imposed a series of retaliatory measures 
against the DPRK immediately after the admission of its HEU program. KEDO, of 
which the United States was a leading member, decided to suspend the supply of heavy 
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fuel oil to the DPRK in November 2002 (KEDO 2002). The decision meant a significant 
change in the framework of the 1994 Accord, which committed the parties to provide 
energy aid in return for the freezing of nuclear facilities in the DPRK. 
Since the terrorist attack of September 2001 in New York, the Bush administration 
has shown itself to be acutely concerned about the possibility of any WMD capabilities 
getting into terrorists' hands (Reese 2004,250). In tackling the second nuclear crisis 
which erupted in 2002, American literature produced after September 11, focused on the 
likelihood of cross-border trade of nuclear material. Allison (2004,73) argued that the 
United States should threaten to use all means, including military force, in case the 
DPRK did not declare verifiable abandonment of its nuclear weapons. Newman (2004, 
77) argued that more international support would be needed to disarm the Kim Jong 11 
regime, beyond the current non-proliferation regime. 
A military clash also became a possibility in dealing with this potential supplier or 
a trader of WMD in the highly turbulent Northeast Asia. The United States and two 
Spanish warships jointly intercepted and searched a cargo vessel flying no flag in the 
Gulf of Aden in December 2002. This vessel had been tracked by American intelligence 
all the way out from the DPRK. It was carrying North Korean Scud missiles to Yemen. 
American authorities however were forced to allow the weapons to be delivered to the 
planned destination because they lacked the necessary legal authority to seize the cargo 
by force (New York Times I Ith December 2002). The United States imposed sanctions 
on the Changgwang Shinyong Corporation of North Korea for transferring missile 
technology to the Khan Research Laboratories in Pakistan in March 2003 (New York 
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Times 4 th July 2003 ). 32 With a series of sanctions against the DPRK, the nuclear crisis in 
the Korean Peninsula escalated when it began to mesh with the broader U. S. foreign 
policy agenda aiming at the war on terrorism. 
The Bush administration resumed a direct dialogue with Pyongyang in the wake of 
mediation by China in April 2003. Beijing invited both Washington and Pyongyang and 
hosted the trilateral talks aiming at a diplomatic solution of the nuclear stalemate. The 
trilateral talks took place amid the post-September II cooperation mood in the war on 
terrorism between China and the United States (Wu 2005,35). 
Multilateral dialogue seeking a diplomatic solution of the Korean nuclear crisis 
developed into six-party talks including Russia, Japan, and the ROK. The first meeting 
of the six-party talks was held in August 2003. A conclusion was reached in September 
2005 that confirmed the DPRK's abandonment of all nuclear weapons and the existing 
nuclear programs. This 'September I 9th Joint Statement' by six parties however did not 
mention the timing of dismantlement of the North's nuclear program. In return for the 
DPRK's commitment to forgo its nuclear program, the United States and other parties 
agreed to discuss, at an appropriate time, the DPRK's demand to receive LWRs (U. S. 
Department of State 2005). This joint statement failed to be implemented as the United 
States took a decision, shortly after the relevant parties signed this statement, to freeze 
the DPRK's bank account of Banco Delta Asia in the Macau Special Administrative 
Region in China. The U. S. Department of Treasury designated the Banco Delta Asia as 
a 'primary money laundering concern'. The U. S. treasury stated that this bank was 
related to the counterfeit and circulation of U. S. currency in working with the DPRK 
" For a further discussion on the Pakistan-North Korea nuclear and missile relationship, see Karnpani (2002). 
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agency (U. S. Department of Treasury 2005). This U. S. action resulted in the DPRK's 
boycott of the six-party talks that had planned to discuss the implementation measures 
of the joint statement (Niksch 2006,5). The continuous multilateral negotiations amid 
the U. S. -DPRK confrontation over the financial sanctions against the Banco Delta Asia 
in Macau failed to make any progress. The unresolved nuclear tension was further 
heightened as the DPRK conducted the first underground nuclear test in October 2006. 
It marked the most critical incident with which Pyongyang crossed the 'nuclear 
threshold' (O'Neil 2005,317-18, Lee C. M. 2007,15). 
The United States pursued cooperative security stability in the Korean Peninsula 
with consent from China. The main vehicles in implementing this strategy were the 
three-party talks and the subsequent six-party talks. Intertwined vested and expected 
national interests, however, in a non-nuclear North Korea (Park 2005) caused more 
complicated and complex inter-state dynamics in Northeast Asia, 'one of the most 
volatile regions in the world' (Van Ness 2005). The target of analysis in scholarship was 
widened rather than deepened along the relevant state actors' interests and strategies 
surrounding the 2002 nuclear crisis (Laney and Shaplen 2003, Reese 2004). Scholarly 
analyses stressed the significance of multilateral engagement in ensuring military 
stability in the Korean Peninsula (Maull and Hamisch 2002, Koo B. H. 2005, Kurata 
2007, Funabashi 2007). This framework was useful in tackling the possibility of 
collective security assurance toward the DPRK. But it was also true that the 
overemphasis on multilateral negotiations militated against paying more attention to the 
internal dynamics, at various levels, between the two Koreas. 
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The DPRK government perspective 
The DPRK proclaimed that the 1994 Agreed Framework was in effect nullified 
after the Bush administration lifted the economic incentives committed in the 
Framework. As a result, Pyongyang carried out phased measures denying its obligation 
to implement the denuclearization stipulated in the Framework document. A month after 
KEDO's decision to suspend heavy oil supply to the DPRK (14 th November 2002), the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that it would reopen the nuclear facilities that 
had been frozen under the Framework (KCNA 12 th December 2002). The DPRK 
expelled the IAEA inspectors and removed the surveillance cameras monitoring its 
nuclear facilities. 
In October 2003, the spokesman in the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs made 
clear that the development of nuclear weapons was imminent by announcing the 
completion of the reprocessing procedure of the spent fuel rods. The DPRK officially 
declared its possession of nuclear weapons in February 2005. At the same time, the 
DPRK mission to the United Nations announced that they would no longer take part in 
the multilateral nuclear dialogues. 
The DPRK and the United States continued to maintain opposing positions in the 
six-party talks (4h round) resumed in Beijing in July 2005. The DPRK demanded visible 
actions to restore confidence from the United States and the ROK, implying a peace 
treaty with the United States and abrogation of the ROK-U. S alliance. Other issues such 
as the North's right to use nuclear energy for a non-weapon purpose still remained 
unsettled. Nonetheless China as the nation chairing the six-party talks continued to 
attempt to narrow the perception gap between the DPRK and the United States. As a 
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consequence, the six parties agreed on the 'September I 9th Joint Statement' in 2005. The 
DPRK committed in this declaration that it would abandon all nuclear weapons and 
existing nuclear programs. The United States, in response to the North's 
denuclearization plan, affirmed that it had no intention to attack or invade the North 
with nuclear or conventional weapons (Koo B. H. 2006,93). However, as the DPRK 
angrily reacted to the U. S. action to intervene in its money transfer in the Macau Bank, 
the six-party talks faced another obstacle. 
In July 2006, the United States intelligence confirmed that the DPRK had 
launched up to seven missiles including a Taepodong-2, three-stage intercontinental 
ballistic missile that had a range of 4,000 - 10,000 km (New York Times 5 
th July 2006). 
Although the Taepodong-2 failed within the first 40 seconds after launch, it was the first 
firing of a North Korean missile since the DPRK leadership declared the unilateral flight 
test moratorium in 1999.33 Unlike the two short-range missiles test in 2003, this missile 
launch signalled a significant change in the DPRK's foreign policy on WMD (Kang 
2003,321). 
The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) announced, three months after the 
missile launch, that the DPRK conducted its first nuclear test on gth October 2006 
(KCNA 9th October 2006). The repeated warnings from Washington failed to deter 
Pyongyang from enforcing its previously declared nuclear test (New York Times 5 th 
October 2006). The missile launch in July 2006 and the nuclear test three months later 
created a watershed in the inter-state standoff derived from the Kelly-Kang Sok Ju 
33 It was debatable to judge whether the North Korean launching of Taepodong-2 was a direct violation of 
this moratorium. North Korea agreed on unilateral suspension of ballistic missile firing in 1999 with the 
condition of 'as long as the US and the DPRK were engaged in negotiations' to improve bilateral 
relations. For more detailed discussion, see Pinkston (2008), 
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meeting in October 2002. As a consequence, despite several multilateral talks to settle 
the standoff, the security instability in the Korean Peninsula between 2002 and 2006 has 
been deepened and widened. 
The ROK government perspective 
The North Korean HEU program was revealed amid an increasing mood of inter- 
Korean reconciliation and cooperation. Reflecting this mood of thaw, the ROK's 
response to the revelation of the HEU program was ambivalent in terms of the issue of 
policy choice toward the DPRK. The ROK government, on the one hand, closely 
cooperated with the United States and Japan through the Trilateral Coordination and 
Oversight Group (TCOG) to dissuade the DPRK from restarting the Yongbyon nuclear 
reactor. Seoul echoed Washington's stance demanding a 'complete, verifiable, and 
irreversible' dismantlement of the North's nuclear facilities as a precondition for 
resuming talks with the DPRK (New York Times 8ýh January 2003). In domestic politics 
in Seoul, however, key South Korean policymakers voiced matters differently. President 
Kim Dae Jung consistently stressed the settlement of the nuclear confrontation only 
through a diplomatic and peaceful dialogue between the involved nations. The Kim Dae 
Jung administration made every effort to broker a dialogue between Washington and 
Pyongyang, persuading the two parties not to cross each other's red lines (Son K. Y. 
2005,155). 
The then president-elect Roh Moo Hyun also publicly opposed sanctions against 
the DPRK through the United Nations resolution (Chosun Ilbo I" February 2003). More 
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importantly, Roh Moo Hyun's continued economic engagement policy with the DPRK 
throughout his term and its achievements coincided with the Bush administration's 
unchanged coercive line toward Pyongyang in his second term. Although Roh Moo 
Hyun and Bush in their summit held in November 2005 declared that they would never 
tolerate a nuclear armed North Korea, the subtext of 'non-tolerance' was interpreted 
differently. One American observer wrote, 
In the weeks leading up to President Bush's arrival in South Korea, the Roh 
government engaged in a continuing debate about whether to double its aid 
to North Korea next year and pour nearly 2.5 billion USD into the country. 
The Bush administration is heading in exactly the opposite direction. For 
months, it has been working behind the scenes to cut off as many of North 
Korea's sources of revenue as it can (New York Times 18 th November 2005). 
One of the demanding tasks for the Roh Moo Hyun administration was to cope 
with the pressure from Washington that insisted on suspension of the joint production in 
the KIC and of the Mount Kumkang tourism project after the North Korean nuclear test 
(Park H. J. 2006,16-17). For example, President Bush's Special Envoy for Human 
Rights in North Korea, Jay Lefkowitz openly condemned that Kaeseong Project might 
simply end up providing funds propping up the North Korean regime and demanded it 
should be discontinued (Yonhapnews I Ph November 2006). 
However, the Roh Moo Hyun administration all along maintained a relatively 
conciliatory attitude toward the DPRK. Even during the rising confrontation between 
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Washington and Pyongyang, the administration dispatched a special envoy to the North 
(June 2005) soon after the DPRK Foreign Ministry officially declared its possession of 
nuclear weapons. As a result, despite the security instability caused by the nuclear 
standoff, inter-Korean meetings to discuss various cooperative projects continued 
between 2002 and 2006. Around twenty to thirty meetings per annum in this period took 
place in various subfields ranging from military affairs to inter-Korean railway 
reconnection projects (MOU 2006). The South Korean government did not want the 
situation in which the nuclear confrontation between the United States and the DPRK 
destroyed the achievements of the inter-Korean cooperative dialogue since 2000 (Levin 
and Han 2002). Seoul, on the other hand, believed that its continued engagement 
attempts with the North Korean actors, at both state and sub-state levels, promoted 
substantial changes in the security environment in the Korean Peninsula. In this sense, 
inter-Korean relations in this period were placed on a different track in terms of the 
actors and dynamics from that of the United States and the DPRK. 
4.4 Inter-Korean trade 
This section will discuss the contribution of commercial trade in deepening and 
widening interdependence between the two Koreas. It will then show that the POC- 
based inter-Korean trade including the KIC projects provided both parties with more 
beneficial conditions to strengthen economic interdependence. The majority of the ROK 
firms that took part in the trade with the DPRK did not show a surplus in their balance 
sheet. The survey result quoted in this section, however, showed that they did not accept 
their inter-Korean business as an utter failure. By providing a variety of statistics 
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showing a key feature of stable growth in inter-Korean trade during the nuclear crisis 
from 2002 to 2006, this section will argue two points. One is the fact that commercial 
trade became an increasingly dominant pattern in inter-Korean trade in the Roh Moo 
Hyun administration. The other is that short-term profitability was not the only variable 
for ROK business actors to make a decision whether to engage with the DPRK or not. 
Trend of inter-Korean trade 
The Roh Tae Woo administration (1988-1992) created a legal guideline on inter- 
Korean economic exchange for the first time after the end of the Cold War. The 
administration announced a set of subsequent policy initiatives to promote it. It was the 
first nuclear crisis to block the progress of any attempt for the inter-Korean economic 
exchange set up by the Roh administration. The DPRK declaration to withdraw from the 
NPT in 1992 triggered the first nuclear crisis. As table 4.2 shows, inter-Korean trade 
volumes marginally increased (4-8%) from 1992 to 1994 when the first nuclear crisis 
prevailed. The Agreed Framework between the DPRK and the United States in 1994 
eliminated the nuclear tension at least temporarily. The inter-Korean trade volume in 
1995 recorded a dramatic increase (48%) as a result of the removal of the political 
uncertainty and in turn the rice aid towards North Korea (150,000 ton) decided by Kim 
Young Sam. It consequently showed a considerable linkage between the political 
environment and the economic interaction. In other words, the economic interaction 
between the two hostile actors could not be viable without the backing of political 
stability. 
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Tabie4.1 Inter-Korean trade volume (1989-2007) 
(Unit for volume: 1,000 USD) 
North to South I South to North Sum 
Year Cases Items Volume Cases Items Volume Cases Items Volume 
1989 66 24 655 1 8 1 1 69 _ __ 67 25 18,724 
1990 79 23 1 2: 27 8 4 3 1,188 83 26 13,466 
1991 300 43 105,719 16 5,547 300 57 111,266 
1992 510 69 162,863 62 25 10,563 572 92 173,426 
1993 601 69 178J67 97 37 8,425 699 103 186,592 
1994 708 80 176,298 267 87 18,249 975 158 194,547 
1995 976 109 222,855 1,668 167 64,436 2,644 244 287,291 
1996 1,475 130 182,400 1,908 167 69,639 3,383 258 252,039 
1997 1,808 143 193,069 2,185 284 115,270 3,991 365 308,339 
1998 1,963 136 92,264 2,847 379 129,679 4,810 449 221,943 
1999 3,089 172 121,604 3,421 405 211,832 6,510 488 333,437 
2000 3,952 204 152,373 3,442 527 272,775 7,394 578 425,149 
2001 4,720 201 176,170 3,034 492 226,787 7,754 549 402,957 
2002 5,023 204 271,575 3,773 495 370,155 8,796 572 641,730 
2003 6,356 186 289,252 4,853 530 434,965 11,209 588 724,217 
2004 5,940 202 258,039 6,953 575 439,001 12,893 634 697,040 
2005 9,337 381 340,281 11,878 712 715,472 21,215 775 1,055,754 
2006 16,412 421 519,539 17,039 697 830,200 33,451 757 1,349,739 
2007 765,346 1,032,550 853 1,797.896 
2008 1 1 1 932,654 
- 
1 888,987 859 1,820,986 
Source: MOU (2008) 
Table 4.2 Number of participating companies in inter-Korean trade 
Year 91 92 93 
1 
94 95 96 97 98 99 
1 
00 
1 
01 02 03 
ý 
04 05 
ý 
06 07 
Tota 
POC 
56 77 
4 
121 
12 
136 
11 
236 
1 24 
319 
1 70 
356 
1 64 
. 
419 
66 
516 
131 
536 
157 
506 
147 
432 
1 108 
481 
109 
462 
118 
523 
1 136 
477 
153 
425 
130 
Source: MOU (2008) 
However, the overall trend in inter-Korean trade from 2002 to 2006 (second 
nuclear crisis) demonstrated a remarkably different picture from the first crisis. Inter- 
Korean trade during this period largely continued to grow without significant decline. In 
2002, for example, the total volume of inter-Korean trade was 641 million USD but it 
reached 1.3 billion USD in 2006 showing a big increase of 110%. Transaction items 
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were diversified involving a variety of manufacturers and traders. The number of items 
carried in and out in 2002 was 572 but it reached 757 in 2006. What is more, the overall 
growth of inter-Korean trade during the second nuclear crisis was also much faster than 
that of the first crisis in the 1990s. 
The trend of inter-Korean trade in 2006, as Pyongyang greatly heightened inter- 
Korean tension by firing a long-range missile and conducting a nuclear test, shows a 
clearer picture as to whether and how much the nuclear crisis affected inter-Korean 
trade. Although the degree of increase in inter-Korean trade in comparison with the 
previous year did not reach that of 2005 (52%), trade volume in 2006 saw a greater 
degree of increase in inter-Korean commercial trade (35%) than non-commercial trade 
(15%). The joint manufacturing projects in the KIC recorded a 69% increase and other 
economic cooperation projects were saw 149% up in comparison with 2005. The launch 
of the joint production projects and construction of manufacturing factories on North 
Korean soil especially led to great quantities of South Korean materials being moved 
into the North Korean territory. The materials mainly included heavy construction 
equipment, production facilities, parts and raw materials for on-site production in the 
KIC. Unlike the still vibrant commercial trade in 2006, non-commercial trade saw little 
progress especially in the second half of 2006 due to the nuclear confrontation (KITA 
2007). These meant that even though non-commercial trade (humanitarian aid, socio- 
cultural projects etc. ) was heavily affected by the nuclear crisis, its influence on 
commercial transactions was fairly limited. 
The only exception to increased inter-Korean trade between 2002 and 2006 was 
2004 when the imports from the DPRK decreased by 10.8% compared with the previous 
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year. But two non-political factors could explain this temporary decline. Firstly, it was 
the result of the ROK government's regulation to reduce the influx of agricultural and 
fishery products to protect domestic suppliers/producers. Secondly, the stagnation of 
domestic consumption in the ROK subsequently caused low demand for POC 
production in the DPRK (MOU 2005,86). All in all, it was clear that neither case 
provided any evidence to show a direct and specific impact of the nuclear crisis on inter- 
Korean trade. 
The result of the survey research conducted in the ROK also demonstrated a 
similar pattern of discrepancy between how the South Korean business actors perceived 
the influence of the nuclear crisis and how much they consequently reduced their trade 
volume with North Korea. Whereas 58% of the South Korean companies who took part 
in the survey answered that the military tension caused by the second nuclear crisis 
affected their business (Figure 4.1), only 27% of the total respondents turned out to 
decrease their inter-Korean trade volume from 2002 to 2006 as a result. On the other 
hand, 42% of the respondents increased their trade volume despite the unstable political 
environment during the crisis. 31% of them answered that they neither increased nor 
decreased the trade volume during the period (Figure 4.2). 
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Figure 4.1 To what extent, has your inter-Korean trade been affected by a series of security instabilities caused by the 
North Korean nuclear program which was revealed in 2002? 
Never been affected 
Not affected 
19% 
Affected 
Seriously affected 
0% 
Figure 4.2 Did the volume of your trade with the DPRK change between 2002 and 2006? 
Decreased 
Unchanged 
Increased 
50% 
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This result showed a consistency with the other survey results conducted in 
November 2002 and May 2003 respectively to see the change in perception of South 
Korean entrepreneurs viewing the influence of the second nuclear crisis. The Korea 
Development Institute (KDI), the ROK government-run research institute, separately 
asked the experts group on the North Korean issues and the entrepreneurs group actuaily 
involved in inter-Korean business how they perceived the influence of the second 
nuclear crisis. 34 In the 2002 survey conducted immediately after the North's admission 
of the alleged nuclear program, the overwhelming majority of the experts (88%) and 
entrepreneurs (72%) expressed great concern about the influence of the nuclear crisis on 
inter-Korean trade. In the subsequent 2003 survey conducted six months later, however, 
only 37% of the entrepreneurs responded with expressed concern about the negative 
influence of the nuclear crisis. In the wake of the removal of the anxiety, the majority of 
South Korean entrepreneurs (62%), according to the survey, did not adjust the volume 
of the inter-Korean business as a consequence of the outbreak of the second nuclear 
crisis. Given the fact that 82% of the experts group still had a negative view in the 2003 
survey, the entrepreneurs' changed perception implied that the initial anxiety was 
considerably eased. As these surveys illustrated, the nuclear crisis-driven security threat 
in the Peninsula did not undermine the continued economic engagement between the 
two Koreas. The tense political relationship, in other words, caused by the possibility of 
34 The Korea Development Institute (KDI) has conducted this periodical survey every six months since 
2001 to acquire data from the ROK business community involved in the inter-Korean trade. This shows 
the result of the time-series analyses on the various factors that affected the decision making surrounding 
the inter-Korean trade. 
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military conflict did not dampen the existing economic interdependence they had 
achieved over the previous decade. 
Observation focusing on commercial trade shows more active engagement of the 
South Korean business community in inter-Korean cooperation projects. Whereas non- 
commercial trade showed a modest growth (46%) from 2002 to 2006, commercial trade 
showed an even more significant increase (162%) in the same period. As Table 4.3 
shows, the continued growth of commercial trade from 2002 to 2006, led largely by the 
joint production projects in the KIC, resulted in making it the dominant pattern of inter- 
Korean trade in spite of the nuclear crisis. 
Table 4.3 Inter-Korean commercial transaction volume 
(Unit: million IJSD. Percent) 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 1 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009_ 
Commercial 256 244 355 425 437 690 930 1,431 1.712 1,643 
Transactions (60.2) (60.6) (55.3) (58.7) (62.7) (65.3) (68.9) (79.6) (94.0) (97.8) 
Non-commercial 169 159 287 299 260 366 420 367 108 37 
Transactions (39.8) (39.4) (44.7) (41.3) (37.3) (34.7) (31.1) (20.4) (6.0) (2.2) 
Total 425 403 642 724 
_697 
1,056 1,350 , 
1,798 
, 
1,820 
, 
1,679 
Note : Figures in brackets represent percentage snares in total inter-Korean iracie 
Source: KITA (2008) 
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Table 4.4 Commercial transactions b-, sub-category 
(I Init - million I JSD. Percent) 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007---'5 2008 2009 
General III 111 171 223 171 210 304 461 399 256 
Trade (43.4) (45.5) (48.2) (52.5) (39.1) (30.4) (32.8) (32.2) (21.9) (15.3) 
POC Trade 
129 125 171 185 176 210 253 330 408 410 
(50.4) (51.2) (48.2) (43.5) (40.3) (30.4) (27.3) (23.1) (22.4) (24.4) 
KIC 0 0 0 0 42 177 299 441 808 941 
Projects (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (9.6) (25.7) (32.3) (30.8) (44.4) (56.0) 
Other 
Economic 16 8 13 17 48 93 73 199 96 36 
Cooperation (6.3) (3.3) (3.7) (4.0) (11.0) (13.5) (7.9) (13.9) (5.3) (2.1) 
Projects 
Total 256 , 244 355 , 425 437 1 690 , 928 , 1,431 ý 1,712 , 
1.643 
Note : Figures in brackets represent percentage shares in total inter-Korean commercial trade 
Source: KITA (2008) 
Apart from these quantitative data, the real experience of South Korean 
entrepreneurs also suggested that no serious decline in inter-Korean trade was made 
after the eruption of the nuclear crisis. The case of the South Korean apparel 
manufacturer, Shinwon that has been running a POC production facility in Pyongyang 
(since 1994) and Kaescong (since 2004) shows that they maintained the same level 
capacity and volume of business in the DPRK during the second nuclear crisis all along. 
The chief executive Park Heung Shik (2008) stated, 
Counting the rising domestic consumer demand in South Korea with the 
recovery of the IMF crisis, we arranged a contingency plan in 2002 that 
could replace the volume that had been producing in Pyongyang in case of 
likely further exacerbation of security. But no action was taken from either 
35 The figures in 2007 and 2008 include another sub-category created by inter-Korean agreement to swap 
South Korean light industry material and North Korean minerals (zinc, magnesite). The ROK and the 
DPRK reached this agreement in July 2004 and the first export of the South Korean material commenced 
in July 2007. From that time on, result of light industry cooperation projects was separately complied 
within the commercial trade category. But, in table 4.4, this figure is simply included in the 'other 
economic cooperation projects' for consistency with the previous years. This can explain the dropping 
percentage share of the production in the KIC despite its continued growth in 2007, 
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side to affect the normal two-way shipment of production materials and 
completed goods. 
Although psychology and mood were affected by external security turbulence, as 
long as the supply-production-payment-sale chain in the POC process continues as it 
used to, entrepreneurs detected no perceptible danger to their business from the 
insecurity. Park Heung Shik pointed out competitive prices, quality of goods produced, 
and delivery date as key elements affecting their investment decisions regardless of 
external political conditions. Yet according to his experience there was no sign of North 
Korean trade officials neglecting these duties or putting existing inter-Korean trade into 
a political frame in the wake of the rising disputes between the South and North 
authorities. What he witnessed was rather the opposite. 
North Korean trade officials seemed fairly anxious about the possibility of 
decline or suspension of inter-Korean trade that might come from political 
instability after the nuclear crisis. They kept cautiously asking us about the 
outlook of inter-Korean trade as the security crisis had developed and 
refrained from mentioning North Korean state media's propaganda on the 
nuclear problem. They all along stressed that inter-Korean trade must be 
sustained and that they had no intention to suspend it even under the nuclear 
crisis. 
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South Korean businessmen who have been running POC factories in the DPRK 
actually felt the North Korean trade officials" attitude change while the nuclear crisis 
was being developed in comparison with the 1990s. According to Park Heung Shik. they 
showed South Korean counterparts greater power and capacity at each level of decisions 
making ranging from wages to quality control, which they could hardly obtain in the 
1990s. They became more cooperative and showed a more active approach in improving 
a variety of conditions surrounding the POC production. 
Another South Korean businessman Yu Wan Young (2008), who has been 
running a computer monitor factory in Pyongyang since 1998, stated that he could detect 
a more amenable attitude of the North Korean trade officials as the nuclear crisis 
heightened. 
In case the South Korean trade partners are about to make a decision to 
delay the planned investment, due mainly to the gloomy economic outlook 
under the nuclear crisis, the North Korean people tended to offer more 
favourable transaction conditions. They proposed, for example, to make a 
payment in cash instead of paying in kind and to reduce the processing cost 
in their factory. They tended to pay more attention to quality management 
and a strict delivery date under the crisis. The crisis made our voice stronger 
and their voice weaker. 
One needed to note that all these improvements and changes happened in parallel 
with mounting military tension caused by the second nuclear crisis. Figure 4.3 shows 
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these simultaneous events in a graph, suggesting the North Korean attempts to ratchet up 
pressure on its counterparts in the nuclear deal continued all along between 2002 and 
2006. As this graph shows, the heightening tension in terms of the nuclear crisis failed 
to reverse the growth of inter-Korean trade. 
Figure 4.3 Inter-Korean trade after the outbreak of the nuclear crisis (2002-2006) 
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As discussed in chapter 3, it was the Kim Dae Jung administration's new North 
Korea policy initiatives such as 'Jongkyong BulIP and 'multiple channel policy' that laid 
a foundation upon which the South Korean business community was able to constantly 
engage with North Korea during the crisis. His predecessor, Roh Moo Hyun 
subsequently made efforts to strengthen the infrastructure of inter-Korean economic 
relations. For one example, he made an agreement with the North on maritime issues by 
which the two Koreas opened new sea routes and the South allowed North Korean 
166 
vessels to transit through its own territorial waters. This maritime accord brought about 
a remarkable improvement in the logistics of inter-Korean trade. 
Ten years' continued pursuit of economic engagement policy consolidated the 
foundation of inter-Korean economic cooperation and created the most favorable 
conditions ever for inter-Korean trade as a result. However, apart from these external 
conditions, from South Korean individual entrepreneurs' point of view, more practical 
business conditions need to be addressed to more realistically explain their pattern of 
behavior. In this chapter, two conditions which had an influence on their investment 
decision-making surrounding whether to continue economic activities in the North 
Korean soil will be discussed. 
'Lock-in'effect 
The most salient change in the history of inter-Korea trade after 2000 was that 
shares of POC trade and economic cooperation projects dramatically increased in 
comparison with general trade. Excluding non-commercial trade such as humanitarian 
aid, the share of economic cooperation projects within the commercial trade category 
grew from 6.3% in 2000 to 44.7% in 2007. The volume of POC trade has also 
maintained a higher level than the general trade since 2000 (KITA 2008). General trade 
was largely contingent upon the industrial capacity of the DPRK. In the 1990s, the 
overwhelming majority of goods transported from the North to the South were minerals 
and nonferrous metals such as zinc nodules. Agricultural and marine products such as 
clams, dried fish products, and mushrooms formed the second largest element of total 
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exports from the North to the South. This export pattern clearly showed the North 
Korean domestic industrial structure still heavily dependent upon agriculture and the 
mining industry. 
The decline of general trade thus implied the fact that the DPRK industry failed to 
supply enough consumer goods to be exported. The shortage of DPRK industrial 
production caused stagnation in general trade. POC trade on the other hand was not 
necessarily affected by the lack of the supply capability of the DPRK domestic industry. 
POC trade was rather able to make a contribution to reinvigorate the old and non- 
operational production facilities in the DPRK (Lee J. K. 2002,43-48). 
On the ROK side, a number of firms particularly in light industry such as apparel 
and footwear manufacturing were looking for new production sites overseas. This was 
due to increasingly high costs in the domestic labor and land markets. The ROK 
entrepreneurs considered POC-based manufacturing in the DPRK a viable alternative 
36 
that could replace production in China and Vietnam. The geographical proximity and 
the use of common language were the main benefits for the ROK entrepreneurs to prefer 
economic activities in the DPRK. The ROK government, in addition, granted a set of 
extra preferential benefits to the participant firms in the POC trade. The primary 
measure was exemption from the 15% customs duty which otherwise they should have 
paid. This meant that POC trade could become the increasingly viable trade pattern 
which would bring mutual benefit to both Korean industries (Lee J. K. 2002,39-43). 
36 The chief manager of the one of the biggest tenant firms in the KIC, for example, stated that the labor 
cost in Kaeseong is twenty times lower than that of the ROK. The labor cost of the KIC was half that of Shenzhen in China, one of the popular production sites for South Korean SMEs, according to him (The Hankyoreh, 91h January 2005). 
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The more important feature of the POC trade in terms of the improvement of inter- 
Korean relations was the prior discussion and negotiation it essentially required before 
both parties embarked on actual joint production. POC trade, in nature, required more 
complex and complicated preparation procedures than general trade (Lee J. K. 2002,39). 
it needed a long period of mutual negotiation and face-to-face communication before 
and after launching the joint business. POC trade required the presence of a quality 
controller, for example, in order for the manufacturer to maintain a uniform level of 
product quality. The quality controller's paramount mission was to overhaul the quality 
standards the manufacturer has been required to meet. The DPRK authority responded 
to the necessity to promote POC trade by enacting the 'Processing Trade Act' in 2001 
(Chosun Ilbo 22 th November 2001). Pyongyang, under this new legislation, officially 
recognized a new pattern of trade and permitted on-site stationing of a quality controller 
from an external institution. This particular provision, however, was not applied to the 
trade with ROK counterparts (Lee J. K. 2002,54). The fact, nevertheless, should not be 
underestimated that the frequent prior negotiations between the two Koreas for the POC 
trade deepened their interdependence. It also showed the DPRK's more flexible attitude 
on the quality control of their products by external actors. 
The utilization of the non-operational facilities and the influx of hard currency 
were not the only benefit of POC trade that the DPRK received. POC trade also needed 
collaboration with South Korean technical experts. This opportunity brought about 
another contribution for the DPRK workforce through the enhancement of 
manufacturing technology and skill. Helper et al. (2000) and Whitford and Zeitlin 
(2004) called this process 'teaming by monitoring'. On the ROK side, POC trade 
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brought more benefit than general trade to the small and medium sized entrepreneurs. 
According to the Korea International Trade Association (KITA), average turnover per 
firm in POC trade (as of 2005) was three times higher than in general trade (KITA 
2006). From 1993 to 2004, POC trade showed rapid growth of 24.5 % every year on 
average (Kim Y. Y. 2005,17). 
Table 4.5 POC and general trade (2000-2006) 
(Unit -1 -000 
USD) 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Number of firms 386 369 333 380 364 379 
General 
T de Turnover 
_ 110,529 111,389 171,782 223,670 171,324 209,778 
ra 
Turnover per firm 
- 286 302 516 589 471 554 
Number of firms 157 147 108 109 117 136 123 
POC Turnover 129,190 124,924 171,177 185,009 175,959 209,729 
Turnover per firm 823 850 1,585 1,697 1,504 1,542 
Source: KITA (2006) MOU (2007) p. 43 
The relative preference for POC trade however could not completely remove the 
unforeseeable risk the inter-Korean trade faced. It was particularly true in the event the 
communication channel between the business partners became temporarily disconnected 
as a result of unexpected external conditions. As the second nuclear crisis erupted in 
2002, serious anxiety among ROK manufacturers began to spread. They were deeply 
concerned that they might have no more opportunities to continue their business in the 
DPRK in the wake of the recurrence of nuclear crisis in the Korean Peninsula. The result 
however showed that very little POC production was interrupted. The ROK government 
was extremely reluctant to take any action to suspend developing inter-Korean POC 
trade even under the growing military strain. This was because South Korean raw 
materials, intermediate goods, and parts already sent to the North were being kept in 
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North Korea. South Korean manufacturers were not allowed to access these assets 
without permission from the North Korean relevant authority. The lack of accessibility 
to South Korean material in the North Korean territory under the political instability, 
from the viewpoint of South Korean business, was likely to cause unavoidable economic 
cost (Lee J. K. 2002,33-38). Due to such a situation, the vast majority of South Korean 
enterprises that had sent North Korea semi-processed or raw materials, and intermediate 
goods were strongly motivated to continue their business in the North even during 
continued political instability. POC-type production in the North was also backed up by 
the South government. Having pointed out limitations of general trade being carried out 
without any presence of South Korean people in the North, the government signalled 
more incentives would be given to POC-type projects entailing cross-border move of 
resources, along with the joint production projects in the KIC (MOU 2005). As a result, 
the South Korean government as well as business community tended to treat such large 
scale, cross-border investment in the DPRK as an upgraded model of inter-Korean trade. 
The changed pattern of inter-Korean transactions after 2000, in this sense, created 
what this study will dub the 'lock-in' effect. The effect in this study refers to a 
consequence that was brought about by economic interdependence, built on production 
activities in each other's territory, between two hostile actors in which rising political 
clash failed to stop joint production. Mutually credible commitments for constant 
economic cooperation and subsequent legislation and its enforcement are the main 
factors that made the 'lock-in' effect workable. On the other hand, the effect provided a 
more stable condition for future cooperation between the two hostile actors by raising 
the cost of non-cooperation or non-compliance with the relevant legislation. This liberal 
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finding led states to the situation where the higher the interdependence that the states 
accomplished, the more they tended to avoid resorting to violent resolution of disputes. 
The effect as a result led to induce actors from both sides not to completely sever 
economic relationships that had developed over the last decade even though the political 
climate became confrontational again. This effect showed grounds for challenging the 
argument that the economic exchange had no bearing on the political relationship. 
The new pattern of inter-Korean trade in this period facilitated and further 
solidified the direct contact of the relevant actors between the South and the North. As a 
consequence of the 'lock-in' effect, any attempt to reverse the existing course of actions 
in inter-Korean trade was becoming either impossible or extremely costly. Under the 
Lee Myung-bak administration that took office in 2008, the nuclear negotiations faced a 
deadlock that resulted in the advent of Cold War-style confrontation. However, when it 
came to inter-Korean economic collaboration, the KIC projects that employed more than 
40,000 North Korean workers were not critically affected due to the catastrophic 
outcome that a shutdown of this complex was likely to bring about. Unlike these joint 
production projects, the Mount Kumkang tourism program has been suspended all along 
since one South Korean woman on tour to the mountain was shot to death by North 
Korean military guards in 2008. The continuity of the KIC project and the suspension of 
the tourism project offered examples of how the 'lock-in' effect was likely to contribute 
to maintaining the driving force of inter-Korean economic cooperation. 
The effect consequently resulted in the ROK transnational actors' continuous 
engagement with the DPRK despite the security instability at the state level. Keohane 
earlier commented that 'sequentially occurred' reciprocal exchanges promoted more 
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solid and sustainable cooperation rather than 4simultaneous' ones (Keohane 1986,21- 
22). The 'lock-in' effect in inter-Korean trade clearly supported his argument. The 
effect at the same time constituted one of the factors to insulate the inter-Korean 
economic engagement from the influence of the volatile and the fragile security situation 
in the Korean Peninsula. The other factor that ensured the continuity of inter-Korean 
trade under the military insecurity came from the perception of the South Korean traders 
on how to judge success or failure of the trade. The next section will discuss this issue. 
Success orfailure 
The net balance of the inter-Korean commercial trade showed that the ROK side 
recorded a continued and considerable deficit. However, the ROK business actors did 
not come to the conclusion that the trade with the DPRK was a total failure for this 
reason. The South Korean business community of SMEs rather paid more attention to 
the learning effect from inter-Korean trade they acquired and likely improvement of the 
situation in the future relationship. 
Although the ROK began to produce a surplus through trade with the DPRK from 
1998, it was true only when taking non-commercial trade into account. The nominal 
surplus in this statistics mainly came from the supply of humanitarian aid material to the 
DPRK and the KEDO projects including heavy fuel oil supplies and the support of 
construction materials for LWRs. For example, humanitarian assistance, LWR materials 
transfer to the DPRK accounted for 93% of total export volume from the South to the 
North in 2003. While the ROK side produced a 145 million USD surplus in total trade 
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balance in this year, the net balance in commercial trade recorded a deficit of 170 
million USD. Furthermore, the gap between the total inter-Korean trade balance and the 
balance in commercial trade has increased, showing a mounting flow of goods for 
humanitarian aid and infrastructure construction projects in the North, since 1998 (Kim 
Y. Y. 2005,8-9). 
The lack of profitability in inter-Korean trade provoked a skeptical view on the 
continuity of the inter-Korean economic engagements (Noland 2000, Cho D. H. 2003). 
Tait, for example, analyzed six South Korean trade firms' cases and concluded that the 
failure was structural and unavoidable. He then argued that the POC trade with the 
DPRK had a minuscule impact on the opening of the North Korean economy (Tait 2003, 
321-23). Others also pointed out the lack of stability and profitability as the main 
obstacles to the ROK SMEs' long-term engagement with the DPRK (Yoon D. K. and 
Yang M. S. 2005,15-16). 
The short-term loss or the insufficient profit, however, did not necessarily lead to a 
discontinuity in inter-Korean trade in the long run. The result of a survey conducted in 
2001 by the Korea Development Institute (KDI), a government-run research agency, 
showed this discrepancy. Half of those who responded in this survey acknowledged that 
their motivations to continue the business with DPRK were unrelated to profit 
generation (Tait 2003,312). Another survey titled 'The study of failure cases in the 
inter-Korean economic cooperation' by Kim Young Yoon (2004) raised significant 
implications for how to define 'success' and 'failure' in inter-Korean trade. He 
conducted a structured survey of about thirty South Korean SMEs involved in inter- 
Korean trade. According to this survey, 63.4% of the respondents recorded a financial 
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deficit through their trade with the DPRK counterparts. only 16.7% of the respondents 
answered that they reaped an economic profit from inter-Korean business. 20% 
answered that they were around a break-even point. Unlike the ROK SMEs' profit and 
loss assessment, however, their criterion dividing success and failure in inter-Korean 
trade showed a different perception. The respondents who assessed their inter-Korean 
trade as a failure were no more than 40%. Nearly half of the respondents concluded that 
the attempts for the inter-Korean economic engagement were successful despite low 
profit expectations. 
The conclusion of this survey was that the ROK business community showed a 
strong proclivity not to label inter-Korean business as a failure even if it failed to turn a 
profit. When asked why they defined inter-Korean trade as a success, less than half 
pointed out the profit they reaped through the trade. More than half, on the contrary, 
indicated either 'the expectation of a profit in the future' (28.6%) or 'the acquisition of 
lessons and experiences through inter-Korean trade' (28.6%). Kim Young Yoon stated 
that ; 
Inter-Korean trade, particularly the POC based trade, was carried out on the 
basis of an economic approach aiming at mutual benefit. Whereas the ROK 
business community needed a new production site overseas, the DPRK had 
no choice but to accept the offer from its Southern neighbour. The DPRK's 
action was a means to overcome the shortfall of foreign currency caused by 
the economic recession (Kim Y. Y. 2005,57-58). 
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It would be misleading, as shown above, to exclusively consider short-term 
profitability as the only variable in tackling the viability of the inter-Korean trade. The 
perception of the ROK business actors expecting the potential of the inter-Korean trade 
laid the groundwork to understand the stable growth of trade volumes from 2002 to 
2006 as the second nuclear crisis peaked. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrated heightened tension in the Korean Peninsula and beyond 
driven by the second nuclear crisis from 2002 to 2006 and contrasted it with the ongoing 
development of inter-Korean trade. The trade statistics, from 2002 to 2006 when the 
crisis peaked with the North Korean missile launch and nuclear test, showed stable 
growth despite the mounting security tension during this period. What was more salient 
was relatively rapid growth of commercial trade and large investment projects led by the 
South Korean business community. This particular sector of inter-Korean trade showed 
that the ROK business community was convinced to more actively engage with the 
DPRK expecting more vibrant development of inter-Korean trade during or after the 
nuclear crisis. 
Key factors that convinced the South Korean business community to have positive 
prospect regarding the future of inter-Korean trade were the South Korean government's 
policy line summarized by the 'Jongkyong BuIlP and 'multiple channel policy'. These 
two policy initiatives proposed by Kim Dae Jung and subsequently supported by Roh 
Moo Hyun offered a foundation upon which the ROK business actors increased 
economic engagement with the DPRK even under the nuclear crisis. 
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A strong issue hierarchy dominated by the DPRK nuclear program seemed to exist 
between 2002 and 2006 as the tit-for-tat style confrontation between the United States 
and the DPRK continued to grow. However, continued efforts by the ROK government 
to maintain inter-Korean exchanges at the non-security agenda made it possible for 
South Korean entrepreneurs to overcome the seemingly security-dominated environment 
of inter-Korean relations during the crisis. The stable growth of inter-Korean economic 
engagement expedited by the 'Jongkyong Bulli' also suggested the actual issue areas 
based on hierarchical order in the inter-Korean relations were significantly dampened by 
the growing interdependence. 
This meant that the security instability did not weaken the inter-Korean 
interdependence but strengthened it under the influence of growing inter-Korean 
exchanges at various levels. This chapter concluded that the ROK business actors' 
positive expectations for the future potential of inter-Korean trade offered a fundamental 
background for the growth of inter-Korean trade despite the low net profitability. 
The next three chapters will tackle the three actual factors that were more likely to 
support the ROK businessmen's behavior, with more direct causality, in terms of the 
inter-Korean trade under the security crisis. Chapter 5 will examine whether and to what 
extent the lKCF affected the inter-Korean trade. Chapter 6 will explore the likely 
influence of the North Korean move for economic reform on transforming the 
environment of inter-Korean trade. Chapter 7 will explore the South Korean business 
conditions that the SMEs have been facing as a key factor that promoted their trade with 
the DPRK. Chapter 5,6, and 7 will be presented based on the results of survey 
conducted in the ROK to test the respective hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund 
S. I Introduction 
This chapter will evaluate the effect of the ROK government's financial 
subsidization policy to promote inter-Korean trade and test whether and how much it 
affected the South Korean business community's decisions on inter-Korean trade. To do 
this, the chapter will investigate the establishment and use of the Inter-Korean 
Cooperation Fund (IKCF) and demonstrate the result of the survey conducted to show to 
what extent this Fund contributed to sustaining inter-Korean trade during the second 
nuclear crisis. 
This chapter is organized into three parts. The first section will examine the 
existing debates on government intervention in private business by market actors and 
how they could be applied to the case of the ROK government in handling inter-Korean 
trade. The second section will explain how the IKCF, as one of the significant policy 
tools of the ROK government intervention to boost inter-Korean economic transactions, 
was formed and operated from its establishment in 1990. The section will also 
demonstrate a series of concerted efforts of the ROK government and the SMEs to 
secure easier access to the Fund in the context of the evolved government - business 
relationship in the ROK. The third section will intensively analyze the results of the 
survey to show that the role of the lKCF had only a limited effect in inducing South 
Korean SMEs to carry on inter-Korean trade during the nuclear crisis. 
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5.2 Government intervention in inter-Korean trade 
The IKCF has long been tackled in the context of North Korea policy by the ROK 
government. Many South Korean analysts studied various aspects of the lKCF 
throughout the 1990s (Cho D. H. 1993, Choi S. Y. 1999, Ahn D. S. 1999). The main focus 
of these analyses was largely how either to raise (or increase) the Fund or to allocate it 
with greater efficiency in connection with how to deal with the DPRK. On the other 
hand, how to manage the Fund often became embroiled in foreign policy debates in 
terms of the ROK government's strategy toward the DPRK. Those who advocated the 
'Sunshine Policy' argued the volume of the Fund should be maintained so that more 
national and subnational organizations could plan and undertake inter-Korean exchange 
events. But the critics including the opposition party made efforts to slash the volume 
assuming the events funded by the South Korean taxpayers have in reality provided 
support to the Kim Jong 11 regime (Hankyoreh 23 th November 2005). 
However, such policy reports drawn up in a highly practical manner and the 
relevant debates obscured the substantial points that needed to be addressed in exploring 
whether the government intervention influenced and changed the non-governmental 
actors' behavior from the perspective of international relations as a discipline. Any 
attempt to identify the non-governmental actors' individual response to the government- 
led incentive program was largely underestimated. 
To fill this gap in explaining the role the lKCF carried out not only in foreign 
but also domestic policy, this section will outline the contending perspectives on 
whether government intervention in a market-led economy can be justifiable and will 
explore the pros and cons surrounding the ROK government's support for private firms 
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conducting inter-Korean trade. On this basis, this section will shed more light on the 
IKCF's contribution to attracting private firms in engaging with the DPRK. This means 
this section will interpret the ROK government's financial subsidization policy for them 
by legislation as part of its broader domestic industrial policy rather than foreign policy 
agenda dealing with the DPRK. In exploring the government subsidization toward inter- 
Korean economic exchange within the context of domestic industrial policy, it is 
essential to examine South Korean political economy within the context of government- 
business relationship. Examining the trajectory of govemment-business relationship in 
the ROK economy will offer a useful insight to justify the government intervention in 
particular industry and in turn its trade with the DPRK. 
Developmental state and economic crisis in the ROK 
There is a long list of works that have claimed an active contribution of 
government to national economic growth strategy. It was particularly true when 
observing the high economic growth strategy in Japan and the ROK after the end of the 
Second World War. Chalmers Johnson coined the term, 'developmental state' to explain 
the role of Japanese government in achieving its economic success (Johnson 198 1). 
Since his formulation of state intervention in a capitalist economy, many scholars have 
attempted to explain the case of the ROK by applying the 'developmental state' model 
(Cumings 1984, Amsden 1989, Wade 1990). Analysts of East Asian economies 
identified common features with regard to the role of government in achieving 
unprecedentedly rapid growth in the South Korean economy in the 1960s and 1970s. 
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Johnson shed light on the positive intervention of government that brought about 
economic success in the ROK as well as Japan and Taiwan (Johnson 1985,140). Wade 
stressed a close relationship between firms, banks and government in East Asian 
countries (Wade 1992). Prestowitz emphasized the significance of large-scale 
investment in strategic industries, in achieving high economic growth, mainly selected 
to realize government-led mercantilist aims (Prestowitz 1997). One of the common 
assumptions shown in that literature was that they viewed the state as a complementary 
entity with autonomy not incompatible with market-driven economy. 
State autonomy as a fundamental premise to explain state-market relations in East 
Asia did not remain unchanged throughout the 1990s. As Skocpol (1985,14) asserted, a 
crisis tended to transform state autonomy. This assumption became particularly evident 
in the ROK, unlike Japan and Taiwan, when it was hit by the financial crisis in 1997. As 
the Korean chaebol was blamed for causing economic meltdown by their uncontrolled 
and irresponsible expansion strategy, the crisis became a critical momentum to reveal 
undermined state autonomy in the Korean economy. Critics argued the state was 
captured, rather than properly disciplining it, by the growing power of chaebol within 
the mechanism of the so-called bureaucrats-chaebol alliance in the Korean economy 
(Yoon Y. K. 1999,72-78). Observers also called Korean-style developmentali SM37 into 
question, pointing to unregulated liberalization and inappropriateness of the 
government-business relationship as a deeper root of the crisis (Woo-Cumings 1999, 
37 For discussion, see Haggard and Moon (1983), Curnings (1984), Amsden (1989), Wade (1990), 
Woo (1991). Despite a variety of ways explaining the key path and pattern of economic growth in the ROK, they shared at least one point that placed the main emphasis on the government strategy to drive the 
achievement. 
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Heo U. and Kim S. W. 2000). As Krugman put it, the moral hazard of financial 
intermediaries, as a consequence of an inappropriate government-business relationship 
could be one of the key factors that caused the crisis in East Asia including the ROK 
(Krugman 1998). The government offered banks an implicit guarantee against a likely 
failure and the banks abandoned their responsibility to develop their capacity for risk 
management in an increasingly volatile global market according to this theory. The 
search for the political origin of the crisis from the internal contradiction in the ROK 
culminated when cronyism emerged at the heart of the debates. Those who advocated 
the cronyism-based explanation argued that the longstanding practice to exchange favors 
for bribes between government and business bred the economic vulnerability that 
resulted in sensitivity to external shocks (Kang 2002). 
On the other hand, counter-arguments were made to demonstrate that 
overemphasizing government-business collusion misrepresented the nature of the 
financial crisis in East Asia as a whole. Haggard (2002,38-45), for example, dismissed 
the downfall of East Asian developmentalism as a primary cause of the crisis. What was 
central in his argument was that corruption was so uneven between the individual crisis 
countries in East Asia that it could not be accepted as a consistent factor that triggered 
the crisis. 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that the dysfunction of the government - business 
relationship before the outbreak of the crisis resulted in drawing less attention to the 
constructive role of government in reshaping the Korean economic development 
strategy after the crisis. One exception from this propensity was government 
subsidization of a particular industry. This direct subsidization of a particular industry, 
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not a particular business conglomerate, remained less criticized even after the crisis. As 
Haggard put it (Haggard 2000,30), there was little ground for arguing that the crisis in 
the ROK resulted from governmental industrial policy. Rather, efforts were made to 
reaffirm a developmental i st strategy denying the so-called IMF prescriptions requiring 
unconditional disengagement of government from business (Chang H. J. 2002,2003). On 
this basis, the governmental subsidization policy targeting particular areas of domestic 
industry could offer an explanatory tool to understand the government funding scheme 
for inter-Korean trade not only before but aller the financial crisis. This was particularly 
the case as the main beneficiaries of the trade-funding for inter-Korean business were 
SMEs, which are more vulnerable than the chaebol that constituted the core of 
government-business collusion in the ROK. 
Pros and cons 
Government intervention in inter-Korean trade, likewise, generated an intensive 
debate surrounding its appropriateness. The main point was whether it could be 
justifiable for government to support private firms (Yoo S. H. 2000,76-82). Scholars and 
policyrnakers who advocated more active engagement by government insisted that it 
would ultimately result in lowering political and military costs in dealing with the 
DPRK in the future. They believed that government intervention could bring a more 
cost-effective option facilitating a likely inter-Korean reconciliation by improving the 
predictability of how and in what direction the future DPRK regime would proceed. 
This belief was built upon their expectation that inter-Korean economic exchanges 
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would ultimately contribute to creating a market-oriented economy in the DPRK. They 
viewed the efficacy of such an outcome - recovery of national homogeneity and 
improvement of military security - as invaluable and indispensable in North Korean 
economic transformation (Ko 1. D. 1999,9). 
Even those who anticipated an imminent collapse of the DRRK regime 
emphasized the need to mobilize all possible inducements toward the DPRK. Foster- 
Carter (1998,37), for example, insisted on ending all bans on civilian contact with the 
North since they were simply unenforceable and undemocratic. The advocates of 
government intervention in the inter-Korean economic engagement further insisted that 
the ROK government should be ready to consider the likely financial risk the ROK trade 
firms might face. They suggested two policy ideas which later led to stipulations in the 
ROK's relevant law. They were reimbursement of likely financial loss and debt surety 
by the govemment (Dong Y. S. 1999,26). 
Opponents of government intervention, on the other hand, argued that the pursuit 
of inter-Korean trade as a channel to acquire private gain ought to be conducted under 
the principle of self-responsibility. They refused to jeopardize taxpayers' money by 
investing it in a politically unstable country. They required a 'constructive 
disengagement' between government and business (Noland 2000,352). The opponents 
argued that there would be no motivation for the DPRK to learn how market principles 
work and how to trade with South Korean companies as long as the ROK government 
subsidized South Korean firms (Tait 2003,326). They found the key factor explaining 
the stagnant inter-Korean trade was not the lack of government intervention but the 
fragile infrastructure and low economic demand in the DPRK (Cho D. H. 1993,23). 
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Those who are concerned about the danger of the DPRK military armament 
claimed that inter-Korean trade will end up reinforcing its military capability. They 
argued, in contrast to the hopes of the ROK government, that the DPRK would attempt 
to form a closer relationship with Washington and Tokyo through using enhanced 
economic potential stemming from benefits from preferential inter-Korean trade. They 
warned that Seoul could have been sidelined if this scenario had come true (KIET 
1989). 
Domestic industrial policy 
It was right in principle for the ROK business community to commercially engage 
with the DPRK without recourse to taxpayers' money. Self-responsibility in inter- 
Korean trade however should not be understood as denying the government's role as a 
unitary actor empowered to establish and enforce the relevant guidelines. Setting up new 
guidelines was particularly essential for regulating or coordinating economic 
transactions between totally different economic systems. One of the most frequently 
cited criticism regarding the ROK government's intervention in inter-Korean trade was 
the argument that the South Korean companies granted the Northern counterparts 
excessively concessionary terms of trade through expecting the government's support in 
case of failure. The critics assumed that the ROK companies had a belief that the 
goverm-nent would indemnify them for losses that might be caused from the inter- 
Korean business on any occasion (Tait 2003,326). They however ignored the fact that 
the policy tool that already allowed the ROK government to make up private firms' loss 
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had not been implemented for 14 years since 1990 when the conservative Roh Tae Woo 
administration enacted the 'South-North Cooperation Fund Act'. Although the Roh Tae 
Woo administration arranged the provision in question in which the legal ground for 
such loss-subsidization was stipulated, it was not implemented until May 2004 (Dong-A 
Ilbo 14 Ih May 2004). This meant that the Kim Dae Jung administration (1998-2002), 
unlike the critics' untested assumption, did not permit the ROK companies to use 
taxpayers' money to make up their own losses that came from their misjudgement in 
inter-Korean trade. 
The criticism that claimed the ROK firms' irresponsibility could also not be 
accepted. The South Korean SMEs already faced a plight where they had to worry over 
their own danger of bankruptcy in the early years of the Kim Dae Jung administration. It 
was a result of the Korean financial crisis in which the banks already shrank credit flows 
in accordance with the conditions imposed by the IMF on the ROK economy (Sachs 
1997, Wade and Veneroso 1998). This changed business environment presspd ROK 
small and medium sized companies to prioritize profitability above everything else, 
whether long-term or short-term, as the primary and supreme factor in every level of 
decision-making simply for their survival. They had no resources left to sustain 
unaffordable inter-Korean business simply to take the credit for something that seemed 
to be 'patriotic' (Lee J. S. 1998,17). 
Government intervention could also be justified when considering the discrepancy 
between the South and the North in terms of a channel of mutual economic interactions. 
The DPRK established quasi-government organizations to cope with the need to develop 
foreign economic relations. Government agents such as the Koryo National Industry 
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Development Association (KNIDA), Chosun Kwangmyongsong Economy Association 
(CKEC), and Chosun Asia-Pacific Peace Committee (CAPPQ took the leading role in 
implementing the DPRK's trade policy. The roles of these defacto state agents were not 
confined to setting up overall guidelines for its dealings with trade partners in the South. 
These were in effect the only channels which the other party wanting to trade with the 
DPRK entities could and should contact. Although individual trade companies owned 
respectively by the Korean Workers' Party, the Cabinet and the Korean People's Army 
acted as contractual title-holders with Southern counterparts, all the companies were 
under the control of these quasi-govemment organizations (Lim K. T. 1998,45). On the 
ROK side, on the contrary, the role of the similar quasi-governmental organizations such 
as the Korea International Trade Association (KITA), Korea Trade and Investment 
Conference (KOTIC) and Small Business Corporation (SBC) was no more than 
information sharing and technical support for on-site production on the DPRK territory. 
Government intervention in inter-Korean trade in this sense should be understood as an 
unavoidable response to the need to monitor such asymmetric interactions between the 
quasi-governmental North Korean agencies and the private companies in the South and 
on this basis to prepare to resolve likely disputes, if necessary. 
5.3 Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund 
This section will explore the establishment and operation of the lKCF as a primary 
policy tool for government intervention in inter-Korean trade since the 1990s. The 
section will particularly focus on how the Fund was allocated and disbursed to the South 
Korean SMEs involved in inter-Korean trade. To highlight the fact that the lKCF was 
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connected to universal domestic industrial policy conducted by the government, three 
points will be discussed. They were the changed government-business relationship, the 
changed role of the state in the ROK, and diversified agendas and channels in inter- 
Korean relations. 
Establishment of the Fund 
The ROK government has established and run a number of funding schemes to 
fulfil specific demands needed to achieve its policy goals. The first fund of this kind was 
formed in 196 1. As of April 2009, the ROK government had sixty two funds to meet the 
individual ministries' industrial demands (MOSF 2010). Promoting information 
technology industry and supporting agricultural industry could be examples of such 
policy goals by the individual ministry. The Ministry of Information and 
Communication (MIC) and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MOAF), 
in this context, could have greater discretion in deciding where and when these funds 
should be disbursed. One of the merits for an individual ministry in this funding scheme 
was that it was relatively less regulated and controlled by the legislative body. A 
discretionary judgement was more likely to be accepted in managing this fund than the 
annual national budget that needed to thoroughly be ratified and audited by the Korean 
Assembly (Yoo S. H. 2000). 
Raising the lKCF in 1991 was likewise a part of these efforts to cope with the 
urgent need to promote inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. The ROK government 
established the legal basis of this fund in 1990 when it enacted the 'South-North 
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Exchange and Cooperation Law' and the 'South-North Cooperation Fund Act' under the 
Roh Tae Woo administration. The initial volume of the Fund was 25 billion KRW 
(some 28 million USD) in the first year, 1991. Among the total volume of the Fund, 
although there was a certain degree of fluctuation, the government's direct contribution 
always exceeded 90% of the total in subsequent years. This meant that most of the Fund 
came from the ROK taxpayers (Choi S. Y. 1999, Nam S. W. 2004) 
As the Fund by nature aimed to promote inter-Korean exchange and cooperative 
projects, the contribution of the Fund was inevitably affected by the political climate in 
overall inter-Korean relations in the particular period. For example, the amount of the 
Fund raised in 2001 and 2002 showed a sharp increase when inter-Korean relations had 
been undergoing a dramatic thaw after the summit between Kim Dae Jung and Kim 
Jong 11. In contrast, it tumbled when political tension arose again due to the 
confrontation between the two Koreas as a result of the eruption of the 2002 nuclear 
crisis in the Korean Peninsula (Nam S. W. 2003,40-41). In particular, the then 
opposition party led the campaign to slash the Fund in the Korean Assembly, especially 
in 2003-2004 in an attempt to smear the inter-Korean cooperative projects led by Kim 
Dae Jung. Figure 5.1 shows the fluctuation of the annual amount of money raised after 
2000 in relation to the change of political environment. 
The political turbulence in the Korean Peninsula not only affected the aggregate 
volume of the Fund but also constrained the occasions and the kind of projects for which 
the Fund could be disbursed. 
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Figure 5.1 The amount of annual fund-raising of the lKCF 
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Despite the fluctuation in the annual national budget allocated for the Fund 
depending on turbulence of inter-Korean relations, what was striking was the volume of 
the accumulated Fund between 2002 and 2006 which showed remarkable growth in 
comparison with the previous five years (1997-200 1). This suggests that the impact of 
the second nuclear crisis initially erupted in 2002 failed to reach a substantial level when 
it came to the size of the Fund. 
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Allocation of the Fund 
The expenditure of the Fund was strictly limited to several categories of stipulated 
use in the relevant law. They were aid, loans (for large-scale projects in North Korea), 
lending (for South Korean private firms), and compensation for business loss. The first 
category, aid, was established with the purpose of putting forward a range of events and 
activities to facilitate inter-Korean reconciliation. It included the support of family 
reunions, sports, and cultural events between the South and the North, let alone 
humanitarian aid projects, all of which were likely to contribute to restoring national 
homogeneity that had been seriously undermined since the division of the Korean 
Peninsula. The expenditure based on the aid category accounted for the vast majority of 
Fund. The second category, loans, was targeted to launch larger-scale national projects 
such as the establishment of the KEDO, large-scale food aid toward the DPRK 
population. The cost involved in supplying materials in implementing railway 
reconnection projects agreed in the inter-Korean summit was also disbursed within this 
category. The third category, lending, aimed to support South Korean businesses that 
planned or undertook business with the DPRK entities. The loss compensation provision 
was implemented relatively late in comparison with the others. The ROK government 
did not use the Fund until 2004 for the purpose of compensating South companies 
struggling from financial losses stemming from inter-Korean business. The ROK 
government laid down detailed guidance on how to operate the compensation scheme in 
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2004 after the two Koreas reached the investment guarantee agreement to ensure the 
safety of South Korean properties and assets in North Korea. 38 
As shown in this categorization, the Fund permitted expenditure for the purpose of 
lending money for private firms involved in the inter-Korean business. However, the 
ROK government did not authorize any expenditure to directly subsidize private firms 
by the Fund considering the fact that the source of the Fund came from taxpayers. Loans 
were only given for projects for humanitarian food aid and the LWR project agreed in 
the 1994 Agreed Framework (MOU 2000,49). The support for private firms in inter- 
Korean trade was the least acknowledged part of the Fund. As of 1999, for example, 
among 18 cases approved, 17 cases were implemented in order to offer the DPRK 
humanitarian aid and to organize joint events conducive to reconciliation of the two 
Koreas. The ROK private firms were by no means considered when allocating the Fund 
except in one case (Yoo S. H. 2000). 
The strict regulation and monitoring of Fund expenditure however did not 
necessarily imply that forming and consuming the Fund should be directed by the inter- 
Korean political situation. The volume of the Fund saw a dramatic increase in 2001, 
which nearly doubled the previous year's volume, for example, despite the stagnation in 
the inter-Korean dialogue at the governmental level. This showed that the inter-Korean 
exchanges and cooperation projects at the civil level grew despite a less reconciliatory 
"' The Agreement was one of the four major pacts arranged in accordance with the political agreement between Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong 11 in the 2000 summit confirming the 'balanced' development of Korean national economy. Four major pacts included, apart from the investment safety agreement, the double taxation avoidance agreement, the dispute settlement agreement, and the clearance of accounting transaction agreement. See MOU (2004). 
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political environment at the state level and it affected the size of the Fund (Nam S. W. 
2003,43). 
Whereas the inter-Korean exchange programs by civil organizations grew, the 
ROK firms planning and carrying out inter-Korean business were still omitted from the 
beneficiaries of the Fund. The share of the Fund allocated to the business sector on a 
private loan basis did not exceed 10%. The biggest obstacle to block the allocation of 
the Fund for an inter-Korean business purpose was the political disagreement over the 
subsidization towards private businesses using taxpayers' money. 
Domestic politics of inter-Korean economic exchanges 
The GNP, the opposition party, has been far less inclined toward engaging North 
Korea economically compared to the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administration. 
The conservative party believed that further inter-Korean economic exchanges, whether 
it was commercial or non-commercial, should hinge on North Korea's commitment to 
denuclearization. The GNP, in the same vein, insisted the Fund raised mostly by 
taxpayers' money should be strictly controlled not to be spent in a risk-taking manner. 
The political controversy over the lKCF shows that the inter-Korean economic 
cooperation in nature concerned domestic politics as well as foreign policy means 
towards North Korea. Whereas the Kim and Roh governments tried to help ease 
restrictions in disbursing the Fund stressing political necessity or urgency, the GNP 
attempted to tighten up the rules on cash flow to the communist regime. The 
governments and ruling party maintained that the Fund should be immediately 
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responsive to the demand, even unexpected ones, coming from the change of inter- 
Korean relations. Their claim was built on the assumption that the Fund operation 
should be heavily controlled by the government's own discretion. On the contrary, the 
GNP insisted that the management of the lKCF lacked transparency and the government 
should seek parliamentary endorsement before pushing ahead with allotting government 
funds to private businesses. 
As an example, a group of GNP lawmakers brought in a lawsuit against the 
government's plan to provide the Mount Kumkang tourism project with 9 billion KRW 
support from the lKCF (Kookmin Ilbo 5 th July 2001). Under the Kim Dae Jung and Roh 
Moo Hyun administration, the opposition party continuously sought to revise the 
relevant law in an attempt to reduce the government discretion in the Fund management. 
Right after the Roh Moo Hyun - Kim Jong 11 summit in 2007, the then GNP 
chairman, Kang Jae Seop reminded taxpayers that the increased economic investment in 
North Korea in the wake of the summit is going to cause serious deficit in national 
budget. 
Some estimations show that the South could end up supplying the North 
with up to 30 trillion won (USD 32 billion) due to the latest inter-Korean 
summit. This would be a major burden on the people (Dong-A Ilbo 12 th 
October 2010). 
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The dramatic change of the policy line with regard to the Fund management after 
the conservative GNP candidate Lee Myung-bak won the presidential election in 2007 
was another example that showed the political nature of the IKCF. In 2008, after Lee 
took office, the Ministry of Unification disapproved one in three applicants for the Fund 
and it showed a sharp difference from the previous governments' policy in which more 
than 90% of the projects proposed were generously approved every year (Munhwa Ilbo 
16 th May 2008). As a result, the overwhelming majority of the Fund remained unused 
since the inauguration of the Lee Myung-bak administration. Moreover, the Ministry of 
Unification of the Lee administration rigorously reviewed the Fund and condemned the 
previous administration's policy by describing it had lacked transparency and 
effectiveness (Dong-A Ilbo 16 th December 2008). 
Even though there were elements of government intervention in the ROK's 
industrial development, the highly debatable nature of the lKCF and the political reality 
derived from it made it more difficult to support private business by using the Fund. 
However, South Korean SMEs continued to make lobbying efforts to lower the barrier 
to access the Fund. They insisted that the exclusion of small business from the 
beneficiary group of the Fund was unfair treatment, given the long practice of ROK 
industrial policy that has exploited the discretionary fund held by individual ministries. 
Deregulationfor small business 
Although there were a series of efforts to offer private firms a more easily- 
accessible route to the Fund, in the absence of a consensus in the political controversy, 
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the consequence of the efforts was not as satisfactory as the businessmen hoped. One 
South Korean entrepreneur who claimed he had lost 1.7 billion KRW (some 1.9 million 
USD) through inter-Korean business since 1990 stated that ; 
The ROK government had offered preferential loans to those who were 
suffering from the credit crunch in most of the subfields in the domestic 
industry. The only exception however was inter-Korean business. 
Presumably the reason why the government turned us away might be the fact 
that we took part in business with a communist country. The lKCF of 300 
billion KRW (some 300 million USD) is of no use for small business. Even 
though the government recently announced a measure to reinvigorate inter- 
Korean economic cooperation, no financial support was given to small 
business nearly at risk after the IMF crisis. Who on earth will continue this 
task once SMEs accounting for 95% of the inter-Korean business collapse? 
(Kim Y. I. 1998,25) 
As shown in his statement, the SMEs in the ROK had a feeling of deprivation in 
comparison with other companies involved in international trade with a third country. 
Moreover, the necessity of financial support for the SMEs was acute given the fragile 
investment climate and weak institutional foundation in the North Korean economy 
(Lim B. C. 2002,24). It should also be noted that voices demanding governmental 
support for inter-Korean business by SMEs had already been raised since the early 
1990s (Lee K. H. 1999,17). Another ground for the need to support the SMEs came 
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from the vulnerable standing they faced after the economic crisis in 1997. The economic 
crisis was initially triggered by a currency crisis in the ROK and moved to a series of 
banking crises and in turn a credit crisis, which resulted in high credit crunch for 
domestic borrowers. In this chain of crisis, one of the weakest participants was small 
business that had maintained highly leveraged financial structures. 
However, inter-Korean business in the early years of the 1990s was not considered 
even in line with government's trade expansion policy that encouraged commercial 
banks to provide trade-related SMEs with preferential finance program. The common 
dissatisfaction of South Korean SMEs was that commercial loans from the lKCF 
required (a) too short repayment timescale (b) too much collateral (c) too complicated 
and time-consuming procedures (Kyunghyang Shinmun 14 th February 2000). The ROK 
business believed that these demerits prevented them from gaining access to the Fund. 
To unblock this bottleneck, from 1999 to 2007, the ROK government made a 
series of announcements about promoting more active engagement of SMEs in inter- 
Korean business. It ranged from the grant of a premium interest rate for the SMEs' loans 
to the measures to accept borrowers' investment assets in the DPRK as collateral 
security for loan arrangements. 
Table 5.1 Key features of deregulation in the lKCF 
Date I Actions taken 
October 1999 Private loans from the Fund permitted 
December 2001 Interest rate for loans decreased, credit facilities increased 
February 2003 Premium rate for SMEs introduced, loan procedures simplified 
January 2004 Assets in North Korea accepted as collateral for bank loans 
May 2004 Loss compensation scheme commenced 
February 2007 Scope of loss compensation expanded 
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But, in essence, it was concerted efforts between government and small business 
that substantially lower the barrier which had been blocking development of inter- 
Korean business. To understand the fundamental backdrop of this coordinated policy, 
the change in both the international and domestic landscape needed to be investigated. 
All these showed a changed relationship between government and non-governmental 
elites under the changed international politics that could be explained by way of the 
complex interdependence model. In an era of complex interdependence, non-state actors 
(e. g. business, civic organizations), to a greater or lesser extent, played the role of 
transmission belt that caused a bigger sensitivity to the government's foreign policy and 
domestic mechanism to efficiently implement it (Keohane and Nye 1989,26). Informal 
communications between non-state actors, without recourse to diplomatic channels, 
provided states with opportunities either to establish a new rule or to review and 
transform existing ones. Increased transnational interactions further hastened the 
emergence of different patterns of regulation. In this process, the government-business 
relationship underwent more consensual engagement beyond the conventionally 
bipolarized description on whether the state had autonomy or not from the market. 
Closer observation of the government - business relationship in the domestic 
politics of the ROK will offer clearer guidance to understand the political economy of 
inter-Korean trade. It also gives an answer to the question as to how the continued 
lobbying and petitioning by South Korean SMEs lowered the barriers that had 
constrained their access to the Fund over more than ten years. Three points should be 
emphasized to explore such conditions. Firstly, it is worth noting that the standing of the 
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South Korean SMEs underwent a certain degree of change in comparison with chaebol 
when it came to inter-Korean trade. South Korean industrial policy had largely been 
portrayed as a growth-oriented, unbalanced, chaebol-based strategy. SMEs were 
regarded as either a secondary player or a victim of economic concentration strategy 
jointly led by the ROK government and the chaebol groups. It should however be noted 
that such an analysis simply showed a part of what had been done in the ROK industry 
in the 1980s and 1990s. Since the downfall of the Park Chung Hee regime, the next 
president, former general of the Korean Army, Chun Doo Hwan introduced a 
stabilization policy to place more control over the chaebol. The monopoly regulation 
and credit restriction program by the Chun Doo Hwan government offered a greater 
space for SMEs to access previously scarce opportunities for their business expansion 
(Moon C. I. 1994). While the symbiotic government-business relationship began to be 
shaken, a set of new financial support programs was introduced to correct the heavily 
biased credit rationing that had favored the selected chaebol groups (Park H. J. 2001). 
Particularly after the economic crisis in the late 1990s, the South Korean chaebol 
strategy typified by unregulated expansion attempts became more questionable (Woo- 
Cumings 1999). Being forced to drastically lower their debt-equity ratio by the 
government, under pressure of the IMF conditionality, many South Korean chaebol 
sought to fundamentally reconstruct their investment system into an inward-oriented, 
risk-averting, and more conservative pattern (Crotty and Lee 2002). Chaebol were 
scarcely willing to participate in large-scale investment in the DPRK territory in pursuit 
of their stability-oriented strategy. The only way to push forward inter-Korean economic 
cooperation reemphasized in the 2000 Inter-Korean Joint Declaration was to induce 
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SMEs to respond to the government agenda. Concerted policy consultation with SMEs 
was indispensable if the ROK government was to continue to maintain the momentum 
to push inter-Korean economic projects forward. 
Secondly, the changed role of state in the modem political history of the ROK in 
terms of economic management should be investigated. Economic development in the 
1960s and 1970s, mostly under Park Chung Hee's leadership, showed that the ROK 
could be classified as a 'strong' state with a powerful state apparatus. Along with 'iron- 
fist' style leadership by Park, coherent cultural and ethnic homogeneity made the ROK a 
6strong' state. 39 The nature of a strong state under authoritarian leadership was 
maintained on the Political front throughout the Chun Doo Hwan government that 
replaced Park after his assassination. But Chun's economic advisory group led by 
someone with an American Ph. D in economics introduced a liberalized approach, unlike 
the military-dominated political line-up, to domestic economic management (Haggard 
and Moon C. I. 1990, Moon C. I. 1994,145-152)40. Indirect control and less arbitrary 
resource allocation were preferred in comparison to the coercion and one-way guidance 
employed by the Park Chung Hee leadership. Later in the 1990s, the IMF conclitionality 
imposed on the ROK government in return for the bail-out package further shrank the 
government's role in economic management (Wade and Veneroso 1998). The South 
Korean state could no longer take the role of sole authoritative planner in economic 
management. Rather, it turned into an enforcer and facilitator, or a mediator at times, 
39 According to Buzan, a lack of coherent cultural group, diversification in ethnicity, a presence of violent dissident group in connection with foreign agents constituted main elements of 'weak' state, which had 
mainly seen in the Third World immediately after decolonization (Buzan 1991,96- 100). 
40 Chun Doo Hwan appointed Kim Jae lk, Stanford University PhD holder with a neoclassical background in economic policy, as his chief economic aide and gave him great discretion to pursue liberalization 
policy in terms of interest and exchange rate. See Kang K. S. et al. (2003). 
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which sought to make the business activities chosen by private sectors more vibrant as 
well as viable. A range of consultative mechanisms between the state and non-state 
interest groups assisted such facilitation and mediation. But the fundamental driver to 
bring about the evolved SME policy by the ROK government was not the organized 
power of the SMEs but the refashioning of the state's nature. 
Thirdly, the emergence of various issue areas, as significant as conventional 
military issues in inter-Korean relations offered favorable conditions to make 
govemment-business consultation workable. The enactment of the 'South-North 
Exchange and Cooperation Law' by the ROK government in 1990 signalled that the 
exchange channels and agenda in inter-Korean engagement would be diversified. The 
increasing number of multiple issues in inter-Korean relations involved an increasing 
number of South Korean domestic actors and in turn caused an overlap of South-specific 
domestic issues and inter-Korean agendas. The inter-Korean agenda, in other words, 
required a realignment of domestic guidelines in terms of eligibility and conditions to 
give permission for South Korean actors to engage with their North Korean 
counterparts. As Keohane and Nye demonstrated, the overlap of domestic and foreign 
policy agendas tended to involve domestic legislation or regulation (Keohane and Nye 
1989,26-27). The issue diversification in inter-Korean agenda became one of the key 
elements that promoted government - business consultation in the ROK and that 
brought about the subsequent achievement of a range of deregulation. 
Nevertheless, a series of deregulation measures designed and implemented under 
the changed relationship between state and non-state actors and chaebol and SMEs 
failed to completely satisfy the inter-Korean traders on the South side. The South 
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Korean SMEs still claimed the governmental decision-making process for loan 
arrangements was so dilatory that the intended money could hardly be delivered to the 
firms in need at the proper time (Munhwa Rbo 28h December 1999). More substantial 
changes to galvanize the Fund were suggested such as no-collateral credit loan 
permission. Those who demanded bolder measures insisted that the government should 
guarantee a superior footing of the South Korean players who were struggling to 
compete with third country firms targeting the virgin North Korean market (Yoo S. H. 
2000,31-40). The opposition party in contrast urged tighter control over the Fund by 
curbing the arbitrary use by what they called 'pro-North Korean' government (National 
Assembly Secretariat 1998,191-192). 
It was the 'Investment Guarantee Agreement between the ROK and the DPRK', 
signed in December 2000 and taking effect in August 2003, that decisively eliminated 
the potential risk of the commercial loan program from the Fund. Until then, in the 
absence of such a guarantee system, the overwhelming majority of investment assets 
created by South Korean firms in North Korea were regarded as a potential loss on their 
balance sheet. They were of no use in applying for loans from the Fund as they could 
not be accepted as reliable collateral. However, following the ratification of the 
Investment Guarantee Agreement in both South and North Korea, the two parties had an 
obligation to permit and protect each other's investment in their own economic area. 
Most Favored Nation (MFN) treatment was also granted to the assets invested in the 
counterpart territory (MOU 2004). By insuring against the loss of the assets in the 
DPRK, the Investment Guarantee Agreement enabled the South government to approve 
loan applications based on assets in the North. 
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The ROK government, as a result, announced a set of preferential measures to 
boost SMEs' participation in inter-Korean business. From January 2004, the South 
Korean SMEs were permitted to claim loans based on their buildings, production 
facilities, parts, and materials they were planning to transfer to the DPRK. The SMEs 
specialized in POC trade were especially qualified to benefit from the Fund 
retrospectively (Hankyoreh 30th January 2004). From February 2005, the 
SMEs' 
production facilities and assets in the KIC began to be accepted as collateral 
for 
additional loans from the Fund, The ROK government's decision to indemnify inter- 
Korean traders for likely losses not caused by their own fault eliminated another 
obstacle. Although suggestions had been made since the 1990s arguing the potential risk 
from the inter-Korean trade should be taken, or at least shared, by the government (Lee 
K. H. 1999,17), it was still a controversial and explosive issue in that the major financial 
source of the compensation for private companies should come from taxpayers' money. 
The mainstream public opinion in the ROK was highly polarized surrounding the inter- 
Korean economic cooperation projects that provided the North regime with considerable 
amounts of hard currency. Considering this domestic public opinion, the ROK 
government did not take any action to indemnify any losses from inter-Korean business 
until 2004.41 In May 2004, the ROK government announced that a new loss 
compensation scheme under the Fund would take effect. The scheme was designed to 
safeguard the SMEs' potentially risky investment in the DPRK. It aimed to cover 
41 The only exception was the case where the Fund reimbursed 1.2 billion KRW (some 1.3 million USD) 
in 1991 for Chonji Trading Company in the South that undertook barter trade with its North Korean 
counterpart. In this deal, a North Korean trading company failed to send cement and coal in return for the 
rice delivered from the South. It was recorded as the first and the only case that the ROK government 
agreed to cover the loss with regard to the expenditure of the Fund. The government no longer underwrote 
any claim for the loss coverage since then. 
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unexpected financial loss not attributable to South Korean firms such as a North Korean 
refusal of currency transactions, delay in payment or delivery, and bankruptcy of the 
North Korean counterpart (Dong-A 11bo 14'h May 2004). Although the scheme had a 
maximum limit for compensation (50% of the amount of loss) and it charged an 
application fee with the amount depending on the applicant's credit rating, it was 
accepted as a significant progress in relieving risk in inter-Korean trade (Yoo Y. K. 
2004). Additional actions were taken in February 2007 to expand the scope of potential 
beneficiaries from the Fund. The ROK government made the decision to cover losses 
not only from North Korean breach of contract but also from the South government's 
policy change which was beyond the control of the SMEs (Naeil Shinmun 26 th January 
2007). As a result, the continued endeavor by the ROK government to ease the 
conditions for loan and expand the beneficiary group of the Fund made a favorable 
environment to get more SMEs involved in inter-Korean trade and investment projects 
during the unfavorable political climate. 
5.4 Results of survey 
The focus of this survey, as a key methodology to test the three hypotheses 
outlined in chapter 1, was to explain what motivated the South Korean SMEs to 
maintain or rather increase their trade volume with North Korea during the second 
nuclear crisis. Among the three hypotheses, government subsidy, more specifically, the 
injection of the IKCF and a series of measures to enhance the accessibility to the Fund, 
turned out to bring limited effect in sustaining inter-Korean business during the crisis. 
For the question asking for the main factor, only 11% of the respondents acknowledged 
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that the government intervention including the increased allocation of the Fund into their 
business had made a crucial contribution to the reinvigoration of inter-Korean trade 
during the crisis. For the question asking whether the reinvigoration package by the 
government influenced their decision-making with regard to the inter-Korean trade, 31% 
of the respondents said 'yes' whereas 35% said 'no' and 35% responded 'not sure'. This 
implied that the government's direct intervention had had a limited effect in promoting 
inter-Korean trade during the crisis. 
On the other hand, more than half of the respondents (54%) acknowledged that the 
worsened business environment of the domestic manufacturing industry influenced their 
decision. The majority of South Korean entrepreneurs (53%) chose the worsened 
domestic business environment as the first and foremost cause not to cut down their 
business volume connected with the North Korea entities. 
The ROK government have continued to make an attempt to increase accessibility 
for the domestic business actors to the IKCF since the Kim Young Sam administration. 
The Fund was a significant policy tool to technically increase or decrease the width and 
depth of the government intervention in inter-Korean trade subject to changes in the 
political environment. Nevertheless, the survey results suggested that the South Korean 
SMEs did not acknowledge the contribution of the lKCF as a top element that enabled 
them to keep engaging with the DPRK during the nuclear crisis. For example, Bae Ki 
Young, a veteran inter-Korean trader and advisor of Now Corporation, importer of 
North Korean minerals, said in an interview that the great majority of inter-Korean 
traders including his company did not receive even a single penny from the lKCF in 
planning and carrying out the agreed transactions with the DPRK counterpart. The 
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alleged massive amount of money raised for the Fund, according to his experiences, 
existed beyond most inter-Korean traders' reach due mainly to the long list of conditions 
required. He also said that the majority of inter-Korean traders tended to change their 
business field quite often depending on the industrial demands they discovered in the 
South Korean market. 
It showed that the South Korean businessmen responded even more sensitively to 
the push factor (deteriorating domestic business conditions) rather than the pull factor 
(government direct subsidization). The result of the survey illustrated that the 
government's role, as a director and powerful manager that had been supported by the 
advocates of the developmental state, considerably shrank under the complex 
interdependence in inter-Korean relations. Instead, the autonomous judgement by non- 
state actors purely based on commercial sustainability took priority in every decision 
making process in inter-Korean business. 
Apart from the three hypotheses, this survey also investigated a part of the likely 
main elements that promoted the South Korean SMEs' continued engagement with the 
DPRK despite the nuclear confrontation. As outlined in chapter 1, a couple of intuitive 
explanations have been attempted such as patriotic entrepreneurship and media attention 
as a reward for their business with communist regime that has been sharing national 
homogeneity with them. However, the data collected from the survey and interview 
conducted in the ROK dismissed the full credibility of those intuitive explanations. The 
majority (50%) of the respondents in the survey denied there was any consideration of 
non-economic causes such as peaceful coexistence and reconciliation of the two Koreas 
as a driving force to push inter-Korean trade forward despite the unfavourable business 
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climate. Only 35% answered that they took them into account apart from the 
commercial interest stemming from inter-Korean trade. It should also be noted that even 
this 35% did not mean political causes or the possibility of public fame were not a 
6primary' driving force to take things forward. It was at best confined to the secondary 
or less important factor that motivated their decisions. 
208 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrated that the IKCF was an integral part of the ROK 
government policy to locate inter-Korean economic interactions on a commercial basis 
by separating them from the political context. The Fund also offered an efficient policy 
tool to invigorate inter-Korean economic cooperation in the civil and private sectors. 
The evaluation of how the lKCF was formed and managed provided sufficient 
justification for the government intervention in inter-Korean commercial transactions in 
the private sector. The IKCF was far from the conventional pattern of the rent-seeking 
behavior by central government such as licensing and lax tax. Under the Kim Dae Jung 
and the Roh Moo Hyun administrations, the avenue through which the domestic actors 
were allowed to directly engage with the DPRK was broadened and diversified. Rather, 
international security variables uncontrolled by the government's domestic economic 
policy were likely to preclude a freer flow of resources between the two Koreas. The 
lKCF was devised and operated to install a buffer absorbing the unexpected risk likely 
to be caused by escalation of political or military tension. Whereas the players ought to 
cope as immediately as possible with the security issue areas, economic projects 
required longer time-consuming preliminary work such as the construction of 
12 infrastructure and large-scale manufacturing facilities. The lKCF offered a bridge to 
overcome this time-lag which could more often happen because of the destabilized 
relationship between the DPRK and the external powers. 
42 The abortive LWR project provided a good example of the failure of the agreed large-scale economic 
projects as a result of the re-emergence of military confrontation. The KEDO, the international 
organization that led the LWR project, was dismantled in 2006 in the wake of the continued confrontation 
since the outbreak of the 2002 nuclear crisis. 
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However, this chapter concluded that the government subsidization to reinvigorate 
inter-Korean trade through the IKCF brought about only limited effect. It was true that 
the ROK government intervention relieved political risks surrounding inter-Korean trade 
environment by offering the preferential loan program and loss compensation scheme. 
Nevertheless, the ROK government intervention typified by the lKCF did not constitute 
the first and foremost causal variable that shaped the change of the SMEs' behavioral 
pattern in economic engagement with the DPRK. Rather, the results of the survey 
suggested that the South Korean SMEs were more motivated by the worsening domestic 
business conditions stemming from rising production costs in continuing the inter- 
Korean trade but less motivated by the government's measures to take the risk from the 
inter-Korean business on their behalf. Such a response from the ROK businessmen 
suggested that the lKCF was handled within the perspective of foreign policy and 
without paying attention to industrial needs of the main actors involved - South Korean 
SMEs. Being dominated by the foreign policy concern aiming at creating a 
reconciliatory mood between the two hostile nations, a greater amount of money in the 
Fund was spent for one-off humanitarian events to meet the purpose. The Fund could 
have made a greater contribution to building a more stable foundation to improve a 
long-term relationship between the two Koreas, if it had been spent to meet the domestic 
industrial needs of the SMEs. 
At the same time, it became impossible to capture how business actors coped with 
the nuclear crisis without shedding more light on the deteriorating business conditions 
after the IMF crisis in the domestic context in the ROK. This key finding in this chapter 
will be further amplified in chapter 7. 
210 
CHAPTER 6 
Economic Reform in the DPRK after 2002 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter will argue that a set of changes in the economic environment in the 
DPRK since the announcement of the reform package in 2002 have had little impact on 
the perception of the business community in the ROK in terms of inter-Korean trade. 
Although the North Korean move for the economic opening since the 1980s maintained 
a consistent direction at least until 2006, the chapter will demonstrate that it failed to 
reconfigure the foreign economic relations of the DPRK. 
in dealing with the causal mechanism between domestic economic changes in 
North Korea and inter-Korean economic relations, the primary concern was whether and 
how much the South's trading with the North affected the pace and direction of the 
internal change in the North (Lee Y. H. 2004, Bughart 2009). However, this chapter, in 
contrast to such approaches, will follow the opposite direction. To do this, this chapter 
will ultimately investigate whether and to what extent the move of economic changes in 
the North affected the scale and pace of inter-Korean economic engagement. This 
investigation will assess the appropriateness of the second hypothesis (reform signals 
from the North) explaining the increased inter-Korean trade during the second nuclear 
crisis. 
This chapter is organized into four sections. The first section will review the 
theoretical and practical debate on how to evaluate the intention and direction of a series 
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of new initiatives announced in July 2002 to improve economic efficiency in the DPRK. 
The so-called 'measure for the improvement of economic management' announced in 
July 2002 covered various sub-areas of the North Korean economy. Although this whole 
chapter will be confined to tackling a specific part of the sweeping reform related to the 
DPRK's foreign economic relations, this particular section will address the overall 
picture of the reform to assess its motive and ramifications. The second section will 
trace back the historical ground of the reform which laid the foundation of the 
decentralization move, one of the key elements in the 2002 reform package. This section 
will shed light on the efforts of the DPRK in the 1980s and 1990s to escape from its 
ideologically based national economic order. The efforts included the designation of free 
trade zones and the partial permission for exchanges of materials between frontline 
factories outside the central allocation system. The third section will assess the impact of 
some aspects of the 2002 refon-n package likely to bring about a greater interdependence 
with the ROK, the second largest trade partner of the DPRK. The main features in the 
package related to how to improve the North's foreign economic relations were the 
measures such as decentralization, trade promotion, and the introduction of the profit 
motive in production management. The fourth section will provide survey results 
showing how big an impact the North Korean reform had on inter-Korean trade after 
2002. This chapter will conclude that the reforms in the DPRK had also limited impact 
on changing the perception and behaviour of the business community in the ROK when 
it came to inter-Korean trade. 
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6.2 Debate on the reform 
This section will explore the two contending arguments on how to evaluate the 
North Korean move of economic reform after 2002. Some viewed the reform 
experiments as aiming to introduce comprehensive market mechanisms in an attempt to 
reconstruct the ailing North Korean economy. Other scholars downplayed the likelihood 
of marketization in the socialist economy as long as the DPRK central government 
maintained strict ideological control in terms of the management of their socio- 
economic system. They rather argued the would-be reform measures were in fact a part 
of their endeavors to strengthen its regime control following a crisis caused by 
dysfunction within its public distribution system. 
New pathwayfor market mechanism 
According to those who supported the argument for marketization reform of the 
North Korean economy, the experiments undertaken in the DPRK from 2002 had 
illustrated various features of market socialism that China and Vietnam had previously 
pursued (Guo and Stradiotto 2007). A series of measures typified by the price reforms at 
least strongly suggested the coexistence of a state-directed economy and a market 
economy (Frank 2005a). This 'hybrid system' (Frank 2005b) of post-reform North 
Korean economy provided grounds for accepting it as a 'starting point of market reform' 
while acknowledging the provisional and unstable characteristics of the North Korean 
reform in nature (Kim Y. C. 2002). 
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Kornai emphasized three factors in defining 'reform' in a socialist system. He 
argued there must be 'moderately radical alteration' in at least one out of the three 
defining elements of what he called 'reform' : (1) undivided power of the Marxist- 
Leninist Party (dominant influence of the official ideology), (2) dominant position of 
state and quasi-state ownership, (3) preponderance of bureaucratic coordination (Kornai 
1992,387-88). Lavigne, on the other hand, identified three key characteristics of 
economic reform in a socialist regime based largely on the observation of the 
experiences of Eastern European countries. Those were (a) loosening of party control 
(b) reduced state ownership monopoly (c) combined market and planning (Lavigne 
1995,29-43). 
In light of these definitions, a series of North Korean policy packages since 2002 
was sufficient to be called 'reform' allowing limited introduction of market 
mechanisms. The implementation of the package from 2002 ranged from permission for 
discretionary trade in a part of agricultural output to the guarantee of autonomous power 
of factory managers. The most salient change emerged from ownership relations, which 
was one of the most sensitive areas in a socialist economy. The DPRK authority 
expanded the maximum size of private plots allowed for individual households to 
possess from 100-165 M2 (30-50 pyong) to 1320 M2 (400 pyong) 43 from July 2002. At 
the same time, the guideline determining the size of working sub-units within a 
collective farm was eased, which resulted in promoting competition between the sub- 
units. The post-reform working sub-unit could be composed of five to six people. In 
43 This figure includes so-called 'patch plots'(Toi-gibat). The DPRK authority allowed its population to 
run 'patch plots' apart from officially recognized 'kitchen gardens' (lut-bat). These became a useful 
resource in which the farmers could produce grains such as com and rice not only for their own need but for surplus trading in the marketplace. For details, see Lee K. and Chun H. T. (2001,212-16). 
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forming the sub-unit, family members were also allowed to join, which meant, in effect, 
family farming was condoned. A pilot project to officially introduce a private family 
farming system was launched in January 2004 to promote inter-family group 
competition (Kim Y. Y. and Choi S. Y. 2005). Although the economy remained largely 
state-owned and controlled, all these measures put in place in 2002 were significant 
moves to authorize private ownership. The Economist Intelligence Unit (2004), for 
example, reported that de facto private enterprises were emerging to complement or 
supplant the failing formal economy in the DPRK. 
In the process of forging a coexistence of state and private ownership, the 
dominant power of the Party in economic management was inevitably weakened. The 
role of the Party secretary in economic planning and oversight shrank while the factory 
managers became more powerful in exercising their right to make relevant decisions 
(Kim Y. Y. and Choi S. Y. 2005,24). Being less guided by the Party platforms, central 
bureaucratic control subsequently lessened with giving frontline managers more 
autonomy (Chung S. J. 2003). 
Consolidation ofplanning 
Those who believed the North Korean way of reform would not aim to introduce 
market mechanisms argued that the measures put in place in 2002 were designed not for 
economic revitalization but for regime stability. Although they did not expect the North 
Korean economic change would become completely pseudo-reforms, they put a greater 
emphasis on the intentions behind the measures rather than their direct/indirect impact. 
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The experiments were downplayed as efforts to increase Pyongyang's organizational 
control over its ailing economy (Hong I. P. 2002, Lee J. C. 2002, Hale 2005). They 
argued that economic reform in the DPRK without substantive reduction of military 
confrontation would be unrealistic (Shin J. H. 2002). Structural weakness of the DPRK 
economy hampering the success of Chinese style reforms was also pointed out (Cho 
D. H. 2004). The reform experiments were accepted as problematic especially in the 
event that Pyongyang encountered any type of regime instability. It was asserted that 
Pyongyang would be likely to take unhesitating action once it saw any indication of a 
decline in its regime legitimacy as a result of excessive economic adjustment (Ha S. S. 
2004). These arguments evoked sympathy as the DPRK turned more cautious in the 
economic adjustment process from about 2006. The market reform measures originally 
shown in the 2002 blueprint became less ambitious after four years' intensive 
experiments. According to North Korean defectors, the DPRK government began to 
prohibit women in the farmers market 44 from trading goods from about October 2007 
(Chosun Ilbo gth November 2007). The farmers market, as a place in which basic 
commodities could be traded by individuals, shrank as a result of a series of crackdowns 
by the DPRK authorities (Lankov 2008, Park H. J. 2008). Unlike China's reform in the 
1980s, Pyongyang intended to retain ideological control over its population while 
pushing economic liberalization forward (Liu 2007,17). It showed that Pyongyang 
accepted the spreading farmers market as a threat to its regime stability. Pyongyang 
44 As the food shortage worsened in the late 1990s due to the collapse of the North Korean central 
rationing system, individual farmers began to sell food grown on their household plots. The common 
place in which these transactions were made was called a 'farmers market'. Subsequently some makeshift 
stalls and kiosks run by local people began to appear for the purpose of selling non-farming goods such as 
shoes, clothes, and cosmetics in the farmers market (Smith 2005b). 
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became so reluctant to implement follow-up measures that the market function was not 
so much consolidated as curbed by the state apparatus. Pyongyang was concerned over 
the likelihood of erosion of its ideological foundation as a consequence of the free flow 
of resources and information in the open market. Since common belief in economic and 
moral superiority of socialism over capitalism constituted a fundamental commitment 
that the socialist bloc had shared (Kornai 1995), Pyongyang would not tolerate a 
situation where the superiority they have affirmed since the establishment of the DPRK 
was threatened. 
Pyongyang, as a consequence, failed to prove that the 2002 blueprint was not 
merely stopgap measures to cope with its decaying economy after the great famine. The 
skeptics, for these reasons, concluded these economic adjustment attempts were not a 
priority in the statecraft of the DPRK in 2002. They argued a series of economic 
adjustments were designed not to liberalize its command economy system but to 
tentatively slow the likely erosion of their economic system. 
These two viewpoints are not mutually contradictory. Whereas the former focused 
more on the expected effects of the economic changes of the DPRK, the latter put 
centrality on the fundamental intention and aim of the North Korean actions taken. The 
former in this context accepted the 2002 measures as at least a first step introducing 
market-oriented 'reform' and the latter understood it as a mere 'adjustment' attempt 
within its planned economy. However both underestimated the possibility that 
'adjustment' meant developing toward 'reform' in a socialist economy (Lee M. C. 2006, 
61-62). Instead of discarding one of the two contending perspectives, this chapter will 
pay intensive attention to the common elements that existed in the two theses by 
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exploring the longer history of economic changes in the DPRK. Decentralization, open- 
door policy, and pursuit of profit could be agendas that were located in the common area 
between the 'adjustment' and 'reform' arguments. Even those who dismissed the reform 
arguments agreed the DPRK pursued decentralization in the domestic economic policy 
and the partial opening of its economy to external capital well before 2002 (Hong I. P. 
2002, Lee J. C. 2002) 
6.3 History of reform 
This section will discuss a range of reform ideas experimented in the DPRK for a 
few decades since the 1980s. These ideas included partial decentralization in 
production/distribution/budget, attempts to attract foreign capital, and constitutional 
revision and so on. This section will particularly focus on the change in the central 
party control system in the DPRK . 
45 As Lavigne (1995) put it, loosening of party 
control was one of the most salient elements explaining economic reform in a socialist 
regime. Moreover, gradually loosening party control could be regarded, in the historical 
context of the DPRK political system, as an easily-embarked step to test, without 
causing a major shock to its closed system, how autonomy and discretion outside central 
command would work within their own system. This section will argue, on the basis of 
the historical examination of the North Korean efforts for decentralization, that the 
efforts laid a foundation, albeit it was not as successful as intended, for the 
announcement of a sweeping reform package in 2002. 
45 Since the focus of this chapter will be the reform signal from the DPRK to South Korean entrepreneurs in terms of inter-Korean trade, other reform areas in 2002 blueprint such as pricing reform and foreign 
exchange rate adjustment will not be dealt with in this chapter. 
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Open door policy: 1980s 
The central planning agency in the DPRK made a variety of attempts for the 
decentralization of economic management throughout the 1980s. They included 
assurance of relative autonomy of the state-owned enterprises and promotion of foreign 
direct investment. The North Korean system for enterprise management since 1961 has 
been known as the Tae-an Management System (TMS). The Tae-an system was so 
named when the then North Korean leader Kim 11-Sung offered on-the-spot guidance at 
the Tae-an Electrical Factory in South Pyong-An Province. 46 Under the Tae-an system, 
the Korean Workers' Party retained supreme and dominant control over the North 
Korean industrial management by establishing Party Committees in the individual 
factories. The introduction of this collective management method as a new underlying 
system for the North Korean industrial production was understood as an action to 
deviate from the Soviet-type manager responsibility system (MRS) (Lee K. 1992,950- 
952). 
The most striking change in the North Korean economy in the 1980s was the so- 
called 'campaign for production of people's commodities' initiated in August 1983. The 
central planning agency demanded production units in the frontline factories 
manufacture goods independently without recourse to central supply of materials and 
parts. The center encouraged the frontline units to recycle locally available resources 
such as scrap materials. The agency also condoned the exchange of parts and materials 
between factories to promote such independent production. The production based on the 
autonomous material sourcing led to the creation of an unofficial marketplace in which 
46 On the details of the Tae-an system, see Hong S. J. (1998) and Lee, H. S. (2001) 
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individual manufacturers participated. Moreover, according to an interview with a 
former North Korean factory worker, completed goods could be even transacted on the 
black market at a price determined not by the planning agency but by the demand and 
supply of the participants (Yang M. S. 2003,35-54) Although the campaign stemmed 
from the supply shortages held by the central planning agency in the 1980s, the 
production and transaction of goods outside central planning led to expanded autonomy 
for factory managers. Some watchers described this move in the DPRK as 'the 1980s 
hidden reform' (Lee H. S. 2000,52). 
Another attempt to ease the centralized economic management system was made 
in the foreign economic relations of the DPRK. The DPRK promulgated a Foreign Joint 
Venture Law in 1984 47 . Unlike Pyongyang's 
firm stance not allowing cross-border 
capital transactions, the Law opened the door for Western capital to establish a joint 
venture on North Korean soil. The DPRK embarked upon this new experimental 
opening to the capitalist world with the purpose of attracting foreign direct investment. 
Yet it was not successful in attracting as much Westem capital as they had hoped by 
enacting this law. The overwhelming majority of the established joint ventures were 
financed with pro-North Korea Japanese capital. Pyongyang still showed no favorable 
attitude in accommodating the capitalist management system even in the agreed joint 
ventures (Koh H. W. 2002,96-97). Critics said that Pyongyang was only interested in 
acquiring new technology they needed from advanced economies while demanding 
Western capital on North Korean soil follow the strict rules of socialist planning system, 
which was highly unrealistic (Lee J. C. 2006,21-22). Regardless of how far their 
47 On the details of the Joint Venture Law, see Kim, C. (1988). 
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attempts were successful, the more significant ramification of this experiment was the 
change of North Korean perceptions on its long-standing Juche ('self-reliance') 
ideology. Namely, the DPRK openly admitted the fact that its Juche-based autarky 
economy could no longer provide the communist system with the driving force for 
growth and development. Given the findings that economic and political change had a 
strong correlation especially in the communist system (Eckstein 1970), the North 
Korean move for economic change should be understood as a political step signalling 
further opening of its isolated economy. The DPRK authority in the 1980s, in other 
words, began to seek a coexistence of openness and self-reliance by embracing the 
notion of 'interdependence' as a part of their anti-dependency modernization strategy 
(Lee J. C. 2006,10-11). In the so-called 'modem imperialism theory' promulgated in 
1987, Kim Jong 11 went further when he insisted that the socialist economy could 
coexist with imperialism as long as both systems constructed a 'fair' economic order 
(Suzuki 1994,240-45). A series of new initiatives for economic opening in the 1980s 
became an overture for the bolder approach in the 1990s. 
More autonomy: 1990s 
The introduction of an independent enterprise budget system represented the 
transformation of production and distribution mechanisms in the DPRK economy in the 
1990s. Although there were occasional mentions of how to encourage the formation of 
an independent enterprise budget in the North Korean literature, until the 1980s, there 
appeared to be a wide gap between the statement and practice. It was in the 1990s that 
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the independent system gained widespread responses in the frontline enterprises. The 
key feature of the new system was the introduction of the notion of freely-disposable 
surplus which would be subject to the managers' decision. Under the new independent 
system, the local production units were allowed to keep the earnings from the sale of 
goods that overfilled quotas demanded by the central planning agency. The surplus 
could be disbursed for the purpose of either wage increases or more output in the next 
fiscal years (Yang M. S. 2003,49-52). 
In the 1990s, another pioneering experiment was made with regard to the DPRK's 
foreign economic relations. The DPRK set up the first foreign economic trade zone 
(FETZ) in its history in 1991, located in a 621 square kilometers region in the Najin- 
Sonbong area in the northeast corner of the country bordering China and Russia. The 
DPRK leadership made an announcement of the 3.3 billion USD initiative, with 
construction planned to be completed by 2001 to solicit foreign investment from the 
capitalist countries. By the end of the 1990s, however, only a few small-scale foreign 
investments in motorways, hotels, and telephone lines had been made. The completion 
date for the first phase of the regeneration plan was postponed indefinitely (Oh and 
Hassig 2000,64). 
A series of attempts in the 1990s to stimulate the paralyzed economy by providing 
frontline units with more economic autonomy within at least a limited realm were not 
successful. It showed that the lack of internal system transformation in economic 
management and the stubborn attitude to keep a fenced-off type of extremely limited 
economic opening were decisive obstacles in bringing about the required outcome. 
However, at the same time, it also suggested the DPRK leadership perceived the 
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necessity for the economic engagement policy with the foreign capital as an 
indispensable factor in order to overcome chronic underdevelopment. Kim Jong 11's 
statement below signalled such a perception change in the 1990s. 
Developing foreign trade is not contradictory to economic self-reliance. It 
was rather to consolidate the independent nature and strength of our national 
economy. It was to facilitate the modernization and scientification of our 
national economy. Even a well-developed economy cannot prosper without 
exchanging materials that are lacking with many foreign countries that retain 
them (Kim J. 1.1988,344). 
The mood of economic reform heightened again when the DRPK revised its 
constitution in 1998 for the purpose of accommodating the notion of private ownership. 
The DPRK leadership aimed at strengthening the power of the technocrat-laden Cabinet 
in economic management with this constitutional revision by granting it greater policy 
autonomy from the paramount doctrine of the Korean Workers' Party. Technocrats in 
charge of economic management were also freed from the oversight of the Central 
People's Committee, the Party's main decision-making body. Instead, local government 
became responsible for managing light industries and cooperatives, with cabinet 
ministers remaining in charge of the heavy industrial sector (Guo and Stradiotto 2007, 
766). The constitutional reform, as a result, led to the enactment of the Processing Trade 
Act in 2001 and also laid a foundation for the economic decentralization measures 
announced in 2002. 
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6.4 Reform package in 2002 
The reform ideas and a series of subsequent measures to enhance economic 
efficiency in the 1990s were significant moves challenging the dogmatic application of 
Juche ideology to economic affairs. Although there was little evidence that the reform 
experiments brought about a structural transformation of the DPRK economy, one point 
should not be denied. The sweeping economic reform measures announced in July 2002 
existed in the continuity of core ideas that flowered in the 1990s or beforehand. The 
unsuccessful reform attempts during this period, in other words, underpinned the 
comprehensive measures for the reconfiguration of the DPRK economy. 
On the other hand, the DPRK authorities began to curb transactions in the newly- 
appeared farmers markets from about 2006. They took precautions against the perceived 
drift toward capitalist type of transactions. From 2006, they began to make an attempt to 
limit the age and gender of the traders entitled to sell their own products in the farmers 
market. They also banned the discretionary employment of factory workers. The official 
authority to supervise inter-Korean economic cooperation was transferred to the Party 
from the Cabinet organization in 2007 (Park H. J. 2008)48 . The economic reform mood in 
the DPRK, in this respect, peaked between 2002 and 2006. 
This section will particularly pay attention, among a set of reform measures 
announced in 2002 and developed thereafter, to decentralization and the notion of 
profitability. The section will argue these two elements brought about the notion of 
private interest of North Korean trade companies and in turn led to promoting trade with 
48 The planning and implementation of the domestic and foreign economic policy by the Cabinet 
ministries implied a more flexible approach than the ones by the Party organizations in the North Korean 
economy. For further discussion, see Carlin and Wit (2006). 
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their South Korean counterparts. Consequently, inter-Korean trade was hypothetically 
affected by this changed environment in terms of the trade companies' attitudes seeking 
more profit, which had not been essential in the centralized command economy in the 
past. 
Decentralization 
Decentralization in a socialist economy should be understood as a purposeful 
endeavour of the central government to enhance the efficiency and productivity of its 
economic management. Decentralization could be divided into administrative 
decentralization and economic decentralization. Whereas the former refers to the central 
government's attempt to hand over its right to set up rules to the local government, the 
latter means a series of processes in which the right went to the factories and enterprises 
level from the central planning agency (Schurmann 1968,175). The decentralization, in 
order to achieve more productivity and efficiency, should be pursued systematically and 
simultaneously in the two fronts. By doing so, it aims to gain a diversification in 
economic management and a greater autonomy of non-central units in the economic 
decision making. 
What needs to be emphasized here is the fact that the purpose of decentralization 
prior to substantial transition of the socialist economy was not to equip a political drive 
aiming at democratic development. It was constrained within the willingness to more 
efficiently operate the existing socialist regime. The pursuit of decentralization should 
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therefore be understood as a top-down effort by the regime leadership to make its 
system more stable (Lee M. C. 2003,47-55). 
Given such a purpose of decentralization, one could find the key logic of the North 
Korean reform program well before the central government made the announcement of 
official implementation in 2002. The following statement made in 2000 in the North 
Korean literature provided one example. 
Under the condition that the inter-relationship of production and 
consumption between factories and enterprises became complex and 
diversified, a state will neither be able to set up concrete production 
guidelines for every unit nor need do so. While directing the state guidelines 
to the implementation of major tasks, it is important for factories and 
enterprises to creatively pursue economic management activities under 
overall state planning (Kim M. C. 2000,15). 
The socioeconomic move for decentralization observed in the DPRK was not in 
this sense incompatible with the planned economy the regime had maintained since the 
establishment of the nation in 1948. The move could be interpreted as one axis of the 
'hybrid system' or the 'dual structure' (Frank 2005a). The concept of 'second society' 
by Hankiss could also be useful in interpreting the simultaneity of a centrally planned 
economy and the shift of decision making power into the local units in the DPRK after 
2002. Hankiss recognized the parallel coexistence of a first society having a formal and 
institutional nature and a second society characterized by an informal and private realm 
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in a socialist economy (Hankiss 1988,22). If one borrows the notion of second society, 
it could be said that the DPRK leadership condoned the de facto development of the 
second society which had spread in the black market due to the collapse of rationing 
system after the famine in the 1990s. 
In the announcement of the reform package in 2002, the DPRK central 
government made a decision to devolve its own right for production and distribution, at 
least in part, to local production units. The central government would plan strategically 
significant industries while letting other enterprises and factories work out their own 
plans within the framework of the overall state planning. By decentralizing the decision- 
making procedure and separating the local economy from the central planning, the local 
governments and the relevant sub-organizations were permitted to determine their own 
production targets and prices. This change accordingly encouraged inter-organizational 
competition for the purpose of gaining more profit. As a result, a growing number of 
enterprises used their own capital and bank loans to cover operational costs (Cho D. H. 
2003,14 1). 49 A financial deficit even led to the resignation of the manager of a 
particular enterprise, according to the testimony of North Korean escapees who left the 
DPRK after 2002 (Yang M. S. 2003). The political right to control and administer 
production used to be exclusively exercised by the relevant Party commissions. But it 
was partly devolved to the frontline managers of the enterprises and factories in 2002. 
The role of the Party secretary was confined to offering political guidelines. 
" As China's reform experience suggested, enterprise reform in socialist economy was as crucial as 
pricing reform, as long as it aimed to introduce at least in part the market principle. Lagging enterprises 
could not respond appropriately to the market signals created by the redesigned pricing system (Liu 2007, 
18). 
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Additionally, a new accounting system was introduced in 2003 to reflect these changes 
on the balance sheet. The ultimate goal of the DPRK enterprise in the relevant law was 
officially turned in this year from 'cost reduction' to 'net income increase' (Kim Y. Y. 
and Choi S. Y. 2005,24-26). 
Nevertheless, the central authorities still retained the ability and power to make a 
number of management decisions. It included decisions on salaries, promotions and 
demotions, and employment reductions (Guo and Stradiotto 2007,767). 'Collectivism' 
and the Party leadership were still the first and foremost elements in economic 
management in the DPRK (KWP 1999,419-42 1). 
However, further decentralization was announced in 2004 to give frontline 
managers more powers to tackle these issues. By this additional step, the managers in 
several selected enterprises could get involved in the more crucial management 
decisions such as fixing wages and hiring of new workers (Kim Y. Y. and Choi S. Y. 
2005,24-26) 
A series of decentralization measures implemented after 2002 consequently 
resulted in real changes in terms of the practice of the North Korean trade organizations. 
This was because the decentralization required the local units' responsibility as well as 
giving them more expanded autonomy. South Korean entrepreneur, Yu Wan Young 
(2008) who maintained his business with North Korean counterparts under the second 
nuclear crisis witnessed the remarkable change after 2002. 
The North Korean trade units had no choice but to make their own way for 
survival as the central authority required material sourcing by their own 
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efforts and profit creation without recourse to full-scale assistance from the 
central planning agencies. They seemed to be more active in engaging with 
their South Korean counterparts under the changed environment. In other 
words, North Korean trade companies were required to create external 
money sources by strengthening their trade channels with South Korea 
simply in order to survive in the new political and economic climate. 
Under the newly-built center-local unit relationship, the conventional command- 
obedience structure in the planning economy underwent a remarkable change. As 
Kornai stated that negotiation supplanted command in the early stage of the socialist 
reform (Kornai 1985,489-490), there was a certain level of dissent between the central 
planning agencies and the frontline trade units in the post-reform period in the DPRK. 
Yu. Wan Young (2008) also stated, 
Even if the planning agency ordered a trade company to make a transaction 
with supplier W, if the company predicted more gain through a 'non-A' 
supplier in a third country like China, it did not adhere to the guidance by 
the agency. The command-obedience relationship between the planning 
agency and the trade company collapsed. 
The primary factor that caused the relationship change was the desperate need 
for profitability in managing trade companies. The emphasis on the profit motive in 
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the 2002 refonn package also required a greater role for enterprises in the overall 
economic planning. 
Profit motive 
The goods in the spontaneously built farmers markets were largely traded at free- 
floating prices. The response of the central authorities to this grass-root market was tacit 
approval in the first place. It recognized its contribution in making up for the state's 
inability to maintain a food rationing system. Pyongyang later legalized the farmers 
market and allowed freer transactions within a designated place in the capital as well as 
some of the major cities and towns. 
The combination of greater autonomy in production planning and the emergence 
of selling outlets for surplus goods encouraged the North Korean people to pursue more 
profit. The industrial goods outside the central agency's plan, after fulfilling the state 
quotas at predetermined prices, could be sold at more flexible market prices (Kim Y. Y. 
and Choi S. Y. 2005). In this production and distribution pattern, the key element to 
stimulate a profit motive was the performance assessment by so called 'real income' 
(called 'bon-sooip' in Korean). By introducing the new assessment tool, the real income 
index began to replace the old notion of 'production index' in the DPRK industries. 
Before the 2002 reform, the DPRK planning authority had assessed the 
performance of the enterprise only by measuring what it had produced based on a 
physical quantitative index such as tons and meters. The paramount aim for the 
enterprises was to meet this state quota no matter how much it would be cost-effective 
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and how many articles could be sold on the market. However, after 2002, the planning 
agency began to encourage enterprises and factory managers to create more profit while 
stressing less the quantitative production plan. This could be achieved by either of two 
new approaches : lower production costs or bigger turnover. As 'real income' (bon- 
sooip) was defined 'aggregate income by sale - production cost + wage', under the 
condition of an equal wage level, bigger sales or lower costs implied an increase in 'real 
income' (bon-sooip) (Ahn H. C. 2003,41). The changed assessment criterion helped the 
new concept burgeon in the behavior of North Korean enterprises and factory managers. 
The monetized economy began to supplant quantitative planning as a result (Newcombe 
2003). They had to pay more attention to more efficient production management or the 
possible cost reduction strategy to maximize their 'real income (bon-sooip)', which had 
not existed before 2002. 
Given that the socialist economy in the USSR and many Eastern European 
countries had faced serious similar incentive problems that hampered efficiency and 
stifled innovation, such a step that emphasized 'real income' (bon-sooip) was 
considerable progress. Profit as a main economic motivator subsequently resulted in 
fostering a more incentive-based economic management at the level of enterprise. In 
terms of inter-Korean trade, the introduction of a comprehensive incentive system 
catalyzed North Korean economic units to engage more with South Korea to find 
alternative sources of profit outside the paralyzed North Korean economy (Chong, 
K. 1.2009). The payment of employees was tied more closely to the performance of the 
enterprise in the post-reform North Korea. The wage gap between workers, for example, 
widened depending on their skill level (Cho D. H. 2003,134-35). As Kornai argued that 
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firms' success should be measured by profits in the post-reform socialist economy 
(Kornai 1992,45), the widespread expansion of the profit motive in the DPRK's official 
economy reconfirmed that the 2002 package produced an outcome they had desired. 
There were some episodes that showed how the profit motive changed the practice 
of North Korean economic organizations in terms of inter-Korean transactions. South 
Korean businessman Yu Wan Young said that 
In the past, the North Korean host organizations did not care where South 
Korean visitors spent their money to shop for what they want. But after 
2002, South Koreans were strongly recommended to shop only at the store 
with which the host organization maintained transaction records. This 
implied that the concept of kickback had begun to emerge between the stores 
and the quasi -governmental organizations. 
All in all, the change in enterprise management in the DPRK not only influenced 
the domestic economy but its practice for economic transactions with foreign capital. 
The frontline economic units that maintained persistent contact with the South Korean 
counterparts seemed to realize that mutual benefit in trade was essential to make the 
business sustainable. In other words, the opportunity cost was expected to be occurred if 
the relationship between the two Koreas is disrupted. The vulnerability interdependence, 
in this regard, as one of the two key elements that constitute the notion of the 
interdependence in international relations (Baldwin 1980) began to emerge in inter- 
Korean relations. However, this did not imply that economic interdependence between 
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the two Koreas downgraded security concern in North Korean foreign policy in shaping 
its reaction to broader inter-Korean relations. It rather demonstrated the unilateral 
dominance of security in DPRK foreign relations was reduced as long as economic 
cooperation did not incur a direct security threat to its regime. 
Trade promotion 
Other pioneering moves were observed in North Korean foreign economic 
relations. Since the early 1980s, the DPRK had adopted a more liberal trade and foreign 
investment policy in order to revive the isolated economy. The proclamation of the Gnew 
trade regime' in 1992 helped the individual economic units including cabinet ministries 
and the local organs of the Party to invigorate foreign trade by abolishing the 
monopolistic standing of the central government in foreign trade. In this new regime, the 
central government permitted the Party, the Cabinet, the military, and other individual 
economic organizations to run their own trade companies. The number of trade 
companies across the DPRK as a result dramatically increased. Despite official 
emphasis on central control by the leadership, since the early 1990s, the North Korean 
trade system was in effect decentralized in the wake of the introduction of the 'new 
trade regime' (Lee M. C. 2003,174-75). The diplomatic normalization with many 
European countries from 2000 to 2001 and accession to the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(July 2000) reflected the government's attitude change on the necessity of creating a 
more inviting environment in order to attract capitalist investment. The DPRK 
government made threefold efforts to promote international trade : institutional 
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reorganization, the devaluation of the North Korean won, and the designation of special 
trade zones. 
The diminution of the trade monopoly by the central government became clearer 
as individual Party subunits and Cabinet ministries began independently to run trade 
companies as major sources of foreign currency. Although all the trade companies 
across the DPRK were under the control of the Cabinet in principle, the trade 
transactions by these companies were in effect made independently. It should also be 
noted that there were many trading companies not belonging to the Cabinet ministries. 
They were under control of the Party units and special organizations like the intelligence 
agency, which had been enjoying exclusive and privileged power. For example, Chong 
Kwang 11 (2009), a former branch chief of Chosun-Pyongyang trade company who 
defected from the DPRK in 2003, stated that non-Party affiliated, underprivileged trade 
companies could not reach out to South Korean businessmen. His company affiliated 
with the Pyongyang city government, for this reason, was not able to open transactions 
with South Koreans as it was listed as a so-called 'social organization', not a 'party 
organization'. 
There were data showing that the number of trade companies rose to seventy-one 
as of the early 1990s, an even greater number than those of China and the Soviet Union 
when they had embarked on economic reform. A dramatic increase in the number of 
trading companies, which were not entirely controlled by the central leadership, was a 
sign that confirmed the decentralization in the DPRK economy was undertaken not only 
in the production management and distribution but in foreign economic transactions. 
The growing number of trading companies in the DPRK did not mean the advent of a 
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liberal trading order. It rather reflected the growing desire for the Party and many other 
power groups to secure foreign currency by possessing their own foreign trading 
channels. In this sense, such a trend was interpreted as a disorder to seek individual 
economic rent far from the essence of socialist planned economy (Ko I. D. et al. 2008, 
261-305). 
However, it was certain at the same time that the pursuit of trading companies to 
build up channels with their own counterparts consequently affected patterns, channels, 
and frequency of communication between them and external partners. It created 
competition between the companies, and the external counterparts were prepared to reap 
benefit from that competition. One of the main potential beneficiaries was no doubt the 
South Korean traders who began to encroach on North Korea's heavy trade dependence 
on China. 
The most striking change in the DPRK trade policy after 2000 was its ever- 
increasing dependence on the trade with the ROK. The determined will of the DPRK 
government to further inter-Korean economic cooperation to earn foreign currency was 
expressed once again when it established the National Economy Cooperation 
Commission (NECC) in July 2004, which would control the existing National Economy 
Cooperation Federation (NECF) on behalf of the Cabinet. The NECC grew into a key 
organization responsible for overall planning and control of inter-Korean economic 
cooperation after that (Dong-A 11bo, I O'h April 2009). The North Korean authorities also 
showed great confidence for a bold approach to precipitate the process of handling 
foreign economic transactions. Their commitment was openly made in the investor 
relations event organized by the NECC in Pyongyang (Hankook Ilbo 4 th October 2005). 
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The emphasis on international trade by the DPRK government was followed by 
the devaluation of the North Korean won in 2002. As part of the reform package in July 
2002, the DPRK government abandoned the artificially high value of the won, 
depreciating the currency from 2.2 won to 150 won to I USD. The devaluation aimed at 
attracting foreign investment and providing export incentives for domestic firms (Guo 
and Stradiotto 2007,767). The devaluation of the domestic currency in the socialist 
transition economy must be large enough mainly for two reasons. One is to generally 
improve the trade balance and the other is to avoid the subsequent inflation expectations 
in case the initial devaluation was not credible (Lavigne 1995,138-39). Given this past 
experience of East European countries, the sudden devaluation of the North Korean won 
was a big enough step to stimulate the planned trade promotion. It was particularly true 
given the similar currency exchange rate adjustment of Chinese renminbi against the 
U. S. dollar during Chinese economic reform in the 1980s and the 1990s (Liu 2007,15- 
16). 
While the reform package in July 2002 was aimed primarily at revitalizing the 
domestic economy, the designation of the special economic zones was part of an open- 
door policy to attract more foreign capital. The DPRK revealed an ambitious plan to 
proclaim special economic zones in which foreign capital and labor could be part of the 
economic activities in a freer environment. The zones included Kaeseong, Shineuiju, 
and Mount Kumkang. The limited economic experiment in the fenced off zone raised 
doubts about the genuineness of the DPRK's willingness to implement the sweeping 
openness (Smith 2005c). The designation of Shineuiju as a special administration zone 
in 2002 was clearly abortive. But this was not because of the isolated nature of the 
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region, but because the premature attempt was not concerted with Beijing which did not 
want to permit a capitalist wave in the very city on the border between the DPRK and 
itself Except for the Shineuiju case, the Kaeseong and Mount Kumgang projects, at 
least from 2002 to 2006, were fruitful in terms of a deeper engagement with the ROK 
and subsequent foreign currency influx. 
As a result of the measures taken to promote international trade, the DPRK 
economy was able to have an opportunity to understand the notion of the regional 
division of labor. The trade promotion initiative induced the DPRK authorities to make 
use of comparative advantage rather than producing everything domestically to meet the 
people's needs (Liu 2007,14). As Choi Young Ok, a North Korean economist, asserted 
in 'Economic Studies (Kyongie Yongu)' in 2004, economic autarky was no longer on the 
agenda in the North Korean economy (Choi Y. O. 2004,33). 
6.5 Result of survey 
Although there were historically accumulated experiences in the DPRK for a more 
open and flexible economy, the North Korean style experiment for economic refon-n 
showed little impact in improving its actual economic relations with the external world. 
This was also true when it came to its trade with South Korea. South Korean SMEs felt 
that the DPRK foreign economic policy still lacked predictability, which was an 
essential element for them establishing a long-term business plan. Moreover, they 
claimed that the state trading companies in the DPRK often made exorbitant demands in 
determining detailed condition of contract. Another complaint made by the South 
Korean traders included North Korean people's tendency to more emphasize 
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fraternalism rather than the commercial logic of transactions, which resulted in many 
South Korean traders giving up inter-Korean trade (SBC 2007,34-41). This negative 
perception of the South Korean SMEs on North Korean economic practice was also 
shown in the survey results for this study. 
To the question asking for the main factor that enabled South Korean 
entrepreneurs to maintain inter-Korean trade volume despite the nuclear crisis, nobody 
answered that positive expectations for the North Korean economic reform affected their 
decision. It showed a sharp contrast with the fact that the majority of the South Korean 
SMEs involved in inter-Korean trade were encouraged by the IKCF and the domestic 
business environment to push North Korean business forward. It showed that the South 
Korean SMEs were more responsive to the domestic (push) factor and much less 
receptive to the external (pull) factor in making decisions on inter-Korean business. 
Another question to investigate whether the North Korean economic reform package 
influenced the South Korean entrepreneurs' decision-making in general also showed that 
its impact was not as significant as the other push factors. Only 27% of the respondents 
said the move of economic change in the North influenced their decision in the South. 
This was slightly lower than the government's subsidization (3 1 %) and much lower than 
the domestic business environment (54%). 
Even before 2002 the North Korean leadership conducted plenty of policy 
experiments aiming to revive the domestic economy and foreign economic relations. 
The decentralization of economic power both in the domestic realm and international 
trade was central in these initiatives. Under the initiatives, the profit motive was 
introduced and the greater power was given to factory managers to facilitate more 
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production. Therefore the South Korean business community who had actually engaged 
in the North more during this period than any other previous time seemed to accept a set 
of reforin measures in the North significantly promising to promote inter-Korean 
economic links. As Nye earlier elaborated, a more equal level of development leads to a 
higher level of economic ties between actors (Nye 1970,815-18). The South Koreans 
might have high expectations that they could find a highly desirable potential partner 
which could replace low-cost production in China or Vietnam. However, as shown in 
the results of the survey, the change in the North failed to influence the willingness of 
the business community in the South for more engagement with themselves. The only 
noticeable contribution of the continued experiment of trade reform to the invigoration 
of inter-Korean trade came from the creation and activity of a quasi -governmental 
organization such as the NECF and the NECC as a fast-track trade promotion channel, 
which will be discussed more in chapter 7. 
6.6 Conclusion 
The agenda of North Korean studies in the area of international relations has 
largely been dominated by how to interpret Pyongyang's 'diplomatic' signals in terms of 
its provocative and 'non-diplomatic' actions. The continued 'tit-for-tat' style nuclear 
confrontation since 1993 fostered such a bias in which the vast majority of the scholars 
and analysts paid overwhelmingly more attention to this pendulum of the diplomatic 
game. The endogenous development of the North Korean strategy to revive its economy 
attracted less attention until Pyongyang made an announcement about the market- 
friendly reform package in 2002. Despite intensive debate on how to interpret the reform 
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initiative, few pundits dealt with how the internal reform affected its external economic 
relations. As the volume of the DPRK's economic transaction with the ROK 
significantly grew from the 1990s, there was a growing need in the South to analyze and 
predict the direction where the North intended to proceed. As a result, the causal 
relationship between the attempts to realign the domestic economy in the North and its 
ramifications in the South became worth analyzing. 
This chapter investigated how and why the DPRK introduced and developed the 
reform ideas since the 1980s in domestic and external economic relations. By doing so, 
it attempted to find out to what extent the move of the economic reform in the North 
affected the behaviour of the business community in the South in terms of inter-Korean 
economic engagement. Firstly, this chapter concluded that the North Korean economic 
reform package announced in 2002 was developed from the earlier version of the 
adjustment policy in the 1980s and 1990s pursued with the purpose of containing the 
decreasing productivity. The adjustment program ranged from the decentralization 
policy, giving more power to the frontline manager group, to the open-door policy to 
improve external economic relations. The DPRK authority also introduced the notion of 
the profit motive in most production units in order to boost production. Secondly, the 
result of the data collected through the survey showed that the reform signals from the 
North during 2002-2006 had little influence in changing the pattern and volume of inter- 
Korean trade in this period. The North Korean reform package had a considerable pre- 
history and held enough potential to be developed to the marketization of the production 
and distribution mechanism. Yet the survey results suggested that the positive signal for 
more profit-oriented economic environment in the North failed to transform external 
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watchers' perceptions expecting its willingness for more audacious reform. Although 
there was some anecdotal information which showed a more flexible attitude of the 
North Korean frontline trade partners after the reform announcement, it did not lead to 
an overall perception change toward the practice of North Korean trade with the South. 
This chapter rejected the argument that the North Korean reform package was 
designed simply to disguise its ailing economy with pseudo-reform measures. The 
chapter rather supported the idea that the package and the subsequent expansion of the 
reform ideas proved that the reform drive in the economy could be compatible with the 
North's military provocation in politics which was still intact under the Kim Jong 11 
leadership, which was previously denied by some scholars (Noland 2000,348). But, at 
the same time, the chapter also challenged the account that the reform per se 
strengthened the interdependence between South and North Korea. A closer relationship 
between states depends more on their expectations of future trade relations and not 
necessarily on the degree of the current interdependence (Copeland 1996). In this 
regard, this chapter concluded that the future of the inter-Korean trade was still unclear 
despite the reform mood from 2002 to 2006 in the North that signalled closer economic 
ties between the two Koreas. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Domestic Business Conditions in the ROK 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter will argue that the domestic business environment in the ROK 
constituted a key causal variable to explain the increasing trade volume between the two 
Koreas during the nuclear crisis from 2002 to 2006. This chapter is organized into five 
parts. The first part will briefly point out the under-researched nature of South Korean 
SME-related studies with focusing on manufacturing industry in difficulty, The second 
part will highlight the predicament of the South Korean SMEs from the 1980s from a 
variety of angles. This part will reveal the nature of the SMEs crisis in the ROK 
manufacturing industry in terms of their competitiveness in production costs. It will 
show how seriously the business community treated the worsening production 
environment in South Korea, The third part will address the South Korean SMEs' 
attempts at overseas production in an attempt to reduce soaring production costs. This 
part will show the rising obstacles from production in China and Vietnam followed by 
the major benefits of the inter-Korean economic engagement many SMEs expected. The 
fourth part will show the benefits and risks the South Korean SMEs could encounter 
through business with the North Korean counterparts. This part will suggest various 
elements by which the South Korean businessmen are likely to make a decision on 
whether they would increase or decrease their business volume in association with the 
242 
DPRK. The fifth part will analyze the survey results which showed how the South 
Korean SMEs reacted to the growing nuclear tension in the Korean Peninsula with the 
special focus on why they increased their trade volume with the DPRK between 2002 
and 2006. 
7.2 Studies on the South Korean SMEs 
In tackling cross-border production and distribution, SMEs should be understood 
in a different perspective from a range of theories that explained the global sourcing and 
manufacturing by multinational companies. A range of studies on the global production 
networks by corporate giants that dominated world oil, mineral, and agricultural 
products was central not only to international economics studies but also international 
relations theory (Held 2000,236-82, O'Brien and Williams 2004,167-223, Lairson and 
Skidmore 2003,347-372). In contrast, the studies focusing on the attempts to exploit 
overseas manufacturing outposts by SMEs, in pursuit of cheaper labor and facility costs, 
were omitted from mainstream IR studies. The situation in the ROK had many 
similarities to this. The South Korean SMEs that sought alternative production facilities 
and workers in North Korea were not multinational firms which had a range of outlets or 
subsidiaries across the globe. They were largely low-profit manufacturing firms that had 
struggled to survive due mainly to the rising labor, land, and facility costs in the ROK 
since the late 1980s. 
Many South Korean scholars who studied the reality of the South Korean SMEs in 
the 1990s and 2000s, in terms of their internationalization strategy, paid greater attention 
to the prospect for fostering Silicon Valley-style information-technology (IT) based 
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innovative companies as a new business model (Hong S. T. et al. 2001 Bae J. W. and Bae 
J. T. 2003, Yang Y. S and Lee J. H. 2004). Having been stimulated by the Kim Dae Jung 
administration's strong encouragement for small business to get involved in IT related 
industries, the mainstream research trend on SMEs largely turned away conventional 
manufacturing industry. The worse the plight of the South Korean SMEs became, the 
less research was conducted in this respect. 
7.3 Business conditions of SMEs in the ROK 
This section will show the vulnerable standing of the South Korean SMEs in the 
1990s in connection with the changed business environment in the domestic economy of 
the ROK. To do this, the section will firstly highlight the unevenness between chaebol 
and small and medium sized manufacturers in terms of the South Korean government's 
industrial development strategy. Secondly, it will show the disadvantaged position of 
conventional manufacturing industries after the economic crisis in 1997, which further 
reconfigured the South Korean industrial structure. 
Standing of SMEs in the ROK 
The South Korean SMEs began to lose their international competitiveness from 
the late 1980s. The strong pressure from organized labor unions, while being chased by 
other underdeveloped Asian economies, made a low-wage based business strategy no 
longer viable. Particularly labor-intensive manufacturing industry with a low technology 
level was hit worst by the changed environment. 
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The wage pressure caused many SMEs serious difficulties in securing enough 
workers to meet their production targets. Low wages offered by the SMEs could not 
satisfy potential workers' demands. Thus it led to chronic shortage of workers in the 
relevant industries. One survey conducted by the Korea Federation of Small and 
Medium Businesses (KFSMB) in July 2004 showed that the majority of the South 
Korean SMEs singled out 'relatively low wage' (41.1%) as a primary factor that 
hindered them from securing sufficient workforces. The wage concern was followed by 
4unsafe working environment' (28.7%) and 'distorted reputation for the small business 
workers' (29.3%). The South Korean SMEs in the labor-intensive manufacturing 
industry, as a result, underwent continued shortage of workers despite the overall 
redundancy of workers and insufficient job opportunities across the South Korean 
economy. According to the interviews of employers in the survey above, 42% of the 
respondents answered they lacked the workers required (KFSMB 2004). 
Lack of satisfaction as SME workers in terms of wage level coupled with 
vulnerable welfare schemes led to an unstable employment situation. The survey of the 
average length of employment of manufacturing workers demonstrated more frequent 
shifts of SME workers than in larger companies because of their continuous search for 
higher wages. More than 50% of manufacturing workers in South Korean SMEs 
continued to work less than three years on average in a chosen company according to 
the survey in 2004. As a consequence, the calculated rate that indicated the shortage of 
workers for the South Korean SMEs rose from 0.7% in 1998 to 9.4% in 2002 (KFSMB 
2004). 
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The shortage of workers whom the SMEs could afford to pay forced many small 
businesses to shut down their production facilities. Many SMEs could not meet their 
production target simply because of the shortage of workers even though they had a full 
line of facilities. Whereas the auto-making and the shipbuilding industry led by a 
handful of chaebols showed improved trade balance, other industries where SMEs 
accounted for higher proportion, for example, footwear, apparel etc. recorded continued 
trade deficits according to the KITA. The entrepreneurs who actually undertook 
individual business in the increasingly tough South Korean domestic market also 
expressed pessimism about the outlook of their business. The survey result by KFSMB 
conducted in July 2003 demonstrated that 86% of the respondents out of 278 CEOs 
answered that their business was in 'crisis'. In contrast, only 7.2 % of the CEOs among 
those who were surveyed expressed optimistic views on the same question (Lee K. S. 
2003,4-5). 
Chaebol vs SMEs 
The predicament of the SMEs becomes clearer when contrasting them with the 
South Korean chaebols that enjoyed governmental support in terms of allocation of 
financial resource as well as a range of deregulation to nurture strategic industries. One 
research showed that the relative labor productivity of the workers in the SMEs, 
compared with that of large companies, plummeted from 53.7% in 1980 to 28.8% in 
2002. In parallel with this increasingly low productivity, the per capita annual income of 
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the SME workers in comparison with the chaebol also dramatically dropped from 84.2% 
in 1980 to 49.9% in 2002 (Chung Y. S. et al. 2005, ii). 
Being motivated by the deepened polarization between the chaebols and the 
SMEs, the ROK government announced a series of policies that stressed the role of the 
SMEs to accomplish balanced economic growth. As a result, cooperative role-sharing 
and joint development of innovative technologies, and fairer deals without 
acknowledging the chaebols' vested interest were emphasized to forge equality between 
the chaebols and the SMEs (Chung Y. S. et al. 2005, Lee K. S. 2003). Nevertheless, the 
vulnerable standing of the South Korean SMEs remained largely unchanged even after 
the economic crisis occurred in 1997 where the chaebol, built on its 'high debt model', 
had been singled out as a primary cause of the economic meltdown of the ROK. 
After the IMF Crisis 
The extensive economic crisis initiated in 1997 exposed a highly vulnerable 
economic structure in most of the corporate sectors in the ROK. Rising labor costs were 
pointed out as one of the many factors that resulted in the low profitability of both small 
businesses and state-sponsored chaebols (Kim J. K. and Lee C. H. 2002). All the 
companies in the market were accordingly forced to build a higher prof it-oriented, cost- 
down structure. The chaebols at the same time faced strong government regulation with 
regard to their financial soundness such as debt ratios. A new cohort of small businesses 
armed with strong computer-based technologies emerged as an alternative form of 
strategic industry as the octopus-leg style diversification strategy by the chaebols was no 
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longer supported by the government. These computer and digital technology-driven 
small companies changed the conventional image of the South Korean SMEs (Park H. J. 
2002). One comparative study on the South Korean SMEs before and after the 1997 
crisis clearly demonstrated the transformation of their business structure after the crisis. 
They achieved a more technology-intensive business model with strong financial 
backing from domestic and foreign stock markets after the crisis (Yang H. B. 2002). 
The labor-intensive manufacturing industry, however, was far from this new 
development of the SMEs. A survey by KITA in February 1998 showed that 93% of 40 
companies surveyed were badly affected by the 1997 financial crisis. The sharp decline 
in domestic demand caused by the economic recession and the high exchange rate 
(depreciation of the Korean won) further shrank the South Korean manufacturing 
industry heavily dependent upon import of parts from overseas. Unlike the industrial 
reconstruction in the realm of the SMEs in general, the conventional and labor-intensive 
manufacturing industry was rather marginalized. The attempt to seek alternative 
production sites overseas was an inevitable choice for the South Korean SMEs that had 
been struggling to survive in the changed domestic market. 
7.4 Overseas production of the ROK SMEs 
China and Vietnam became the countries the South Korean SMEs primarily chose 
as alternative production outposts to escape from the increasingly tough business 
environment in the ROK. Geographical proximity and cheaper labor and land cost 
provided the struggling businesses in the ROK with the foremost attractive conditions. 
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However, as the benefits from production in these countries are falling, the small 
businesses began to seek alternative sites again in nearby areas. 
One case study that analyzed the experiences of 42 South Korean companies in 
China showed that there were many obstacles to stable growth of their business. The 
problems varied ranging from the cultural differences in business practices to the 
increasingly heavier burden of social insurance for their employees in comparison with 
domestic investors in China. The vast majority of South Korean businessmen in China 
claimed that labor costs rose by up to 20% every year after 2000. They also pointed out 
that the Chinese government tightened up the preferential conditions which had been 
given to foreign capital. As well as decreasing benefits stemming from low labor cost 
production, they also appeared to feel increasingly higher pressure to provide their 
employees with a set of fringe benefits by the tougher government policy to protect 
domestic workers' basic rights (Han J. H. et al. 2005). 
Another on-site survey conducted in four Chinese cities including Beijing and 
Qingdao showed the worsening business environment for the South Korean SMEs in 
China. According to this survey that involved 18 South Korean companies, although 
their output increased by 20 percent on average from 2004 to 2006, the net profits they 
reaped during the same period decreased on the contrary. Analysts who took part in this 
on-site survey pointed out the main factors that caused this discrepancy were mainly the 
increased production cost in China and the abolition of tax benefit from local 
government. What is more, 20-30 percent of the workers tended to leave for better 
conditions every year resulting in serious difficulties in recruiting new employees. This 
situation highlighted the relative preference of the KIC for the South Korean struggling 
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manufacturers to maintaining their business in China. The KIC had relative superiority 
in production in China, according to those who answered this survey, in terms of labor 
productivity, quality level of produced goods, and facility operation ratio (SBC 2008, 
42-49). To make matters worse, the Chinese government announced a set of policies 
aiming to protect its own POC trade in 2006. The government lowered the tax refund 
rate which had been given to foreign POC traders and banned POC trade in particular 
products to protect domestic industry. The banned products list accounted for 6.5% Of 
all the products imported from and exported to China (SBC 2007,13). 
Another case study on South Korean investment in Vietnam after the diplomatic 
normalization between the two countries in 1992 showed a positive outlook and a 
couple of limitations at the same time. The volume of ROK investment in Vietnam 
continuously grew and the ROK became the biggest investor in the former communist 
economy as of 2006. According to the study, however, the South Korean companies in 
Vietnam faced difficulties in terms of personnel management and recruitment of skilled 
factory workers. The difficulties in finding able supervisors on the production line and 
in infusing frontline workers with willingness for demanding tasks were pointed out as 
main obstacles. Shortage of local workers who are able to play a supervisory role to 
discipline and manage frontline workforce resulted in companies being forced to send 
more Koreans to Vietnam pushing up the overall production cost. The lack of an 
incentive system that has long grown under paternalistic communism was not changed. 
This continued socialist working culture in industrial development bred cronyism-based 
human relationships, widespread kick-back practices, and deep-rooted corruption. All 
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these past legacies created difficulties for South Korean businessmen in maintaining 
their production in Vietnam (Han J. H. and Yoon D. J. 2007). 
7.5 SMEs and inter-Korea trade: benefits 
The existing IPE theory-based accounts of cross-border production were not able 
to capture the essence of continued or increased trade between the two hostile nations 
led by the small businesses in trouble. To explain what made the South Korean small 
businesses take the risk of political destabilization in the Korean Peninsula, one needs to 
pay greater attention to the perception of the South Korean business community as well 
as the mutually dependent structure of the South and North industry. From the 
experiences in the 1990s and 2000s, the South Korean small business community 
became well aware of the potential benefits from the business utilizing human and 
natural resources in the DPRK. But the reality was that they were not prepared to pursue 
this risky business without recourse to governmental efforts to remove any uncertainties. 
The Small Business Corporation (SBC), a quasi-governmental organization to 
promote the SME business, conducted in 2000 a comprehensive survey to see how many 
companies had an interest in launching business in North Korea. According to this 
survey, 96% of the respondents out of 955 small and medium sized companies were 
optimistic in terms of the future prospects for inter-Korean economic cooperation. On 
the contrary, the majority (66%) of the survey participants were not aware of the 
detailed procedures and conditions of inter-Korean trade. As a result, very few 
companies (7%) turned out to be willing to embark on business with the DPRK in the 
near future but the vast majority (79%) remained lukewarm about doing so, saying they 
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only had a long-term plan to pursue inter-Korean business depending on how the 
political and economic situation changed in the future. They were extremely cautious in 
pursuing North Korea-related businesses on their own and still maintained 'wait and see' 
positions. The majority of them (69%) at best preferred collaboration with other 
companies in an attempt to minimize the likely risk from inter-Korean business which 
could arise in the initial stages (SBC 2000). 
As this survey result showed, the perception of the South Korean business 
community before 2000 in terms of how to view inter-Korean business remained within 
the realm of unspecified and ambiguous likelihood. It lacked detailed feasibility analysis, 
thus realistic demands to immediately launch inter-Korean business were not made. 
However, wide-ranging change in the environments of inter-Korean economic relations 
was introduced as a consequence of the 2000 summit talks which began to transform the 
likelihood into reality. The realistic benefits that the South Korean SMEs could enjoy 
are summarized in four points. These elements also explain major features of inter- 
Korean economic transactions actually spearheaded by the SMEs. 
Firstly, the South Korean small businesses that had struggled from the 
deteriorating production environment in both domestic and overseas factories such as 
China and Vietnam expected that economic transactions with North Korea would create 
an alternative solution to survive in a more competitive business environment. As 
Tables 7.1 and 7.2 show, the wage level in the KIC initiated in 2000 by the Hyundai- 
DPRK agreement was significantly lower than that of China, Vietnam, and Indonesia let 
alone the ROK. 
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Table 7.1 Comparison of wage levels in Kaescong, China and the ROK 
(Unit: USD) 
Kaeseong(A) China (B) ROK (C) A/13 A/C 
Minimum wage 
( er month) 
50 100-200 642 019-0.58 0.12 
Source : SBC (2005) 
Table 7.2 Comparison of wage levels between the DPRK and other Asian countries 
(Unit: IJSD) 
The DPRK Vietnam China Indonesia 
Average wage 
(per month) 
I 
7.5 (non-skilled) 
100 (ski 
50 (non-skilled) 
120 (skilled) 
1 
100-200 60 80(non-skilled) 
100-200 (skilled) 
_ 
Source : SBC (2005) 
In addition, other peripheral factors including statutory working hours and 
insurance in the DPRK were good enough to attract the South Korean businessmen. All 
in all, the business opportunities in the DPRK with more favorable conditions opened a 
new horizon for the South Korean SMEs that had been experiencing a deteriorated 
business climate in overseas production outposts such as China and Vietnam. 
The South Korean businessmen, in addition to the immediate profits, considered a 
far-sighted goal in pursuing inter-Korean business. They tended to view inter-Korean 
trade as an efficient tool to realize what they called the 'sangsaeng' economy between 
the two Koreas. Kim Yong Gu, the president of the KFSMB, asserted that inter-Korean 
economic cooperation was a pathway toward the inter-Korean 'sangsaeng' (Kim Y. G. 
2003,114-18). The term 'sangsaeng' (9 t) implied harmonized coexistence and 
communication based on a symbiotic structure. However, given the term derived from 
Daodejing (140), a scripture on the key philosophical principle of the Chinese 
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cosmogony elaborated by Laozi, the founder of Daoism (Kohn 2000), 'sangsaeng' had 
been understood to include more profound connotations. The word 'sangsaeng' in South 
Korean society had been spread to the rank and file as well as political leaders, meaning 
more than merely peaceful and static coexistence or symbiosis. It rather indicated more 
dynamic and developing structure or system of morality through which South and North 
Korean economy could seek to develop economic co-prosperity and political 
reconciliation in the future. The emphasis on 'sangsaeng' by the South Korean business 
community meant that their concerns went further than short-term economic gains such 
as industrial restructuring and market expansion. Economic gain through individual 
trade and investment projects was not a final goal but a building block to develop the 
project into a more interdependent, reciprocal and ultimately unified Korean economy. 
At the same time, the ultimate aim of the 'sangsaeng' economy had strong parallels in 
the ideal of the creation of a South-North economic community which the ROK 
government had openly proclaimed from the 1990s. The South-North economic 
community was defined as a collaborative and functional framework in which South and 
North Korea would seek common prosperity without radical change in their respective 
economic systems (Oh S. R. 2001,162-64). In this regard, the first step to shape the 
'sangsaeng' based inter-Korean economic relations would be to find and develop a 
reciprocal industrial structure between the two Koreas. 
Secondly, the expectation that North Korean production factor endowments could 
well be combined with the desperation of South Korean industrial needs provided 
another explanatory variable in interpreting the shift of production facilities, especially 
for the POC trade, into the DPRK. As one study that investigated the two Koreas' 
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industrial comparative advantage over 13 years (1977-1995) concluded, apparel, 
footwear, and nonferrous metal manufacturing in the North was supposed to particularly 
suit the South's capital interested in the investment in the North (Joo, S. H. and Cho Y. K. 
1999). The fact that these industries were likely to be less affected by the 
underdeveloped North Korean industrial infrastructure offered another attractive point to 
enable the South Korean SMEs to embark on inter-Korean collaboration from these 
areas. Whereas heavy industry firms required massive apparatus, equipment, and 
infrastructure, light commodity manufacture such as apparel and footwear needed them 
less. 
Thirdly, the light industry collaboration, in this regard, between the two Koreas 
including the POC meant low-risk, mutually beneficial economic cooperation. While the 
North Korean economy could acquire more advanced manufacturing technology from 
the South, the SMEs in the South could take advantage of North Korean production as a 
first-step test market in an attempt to enlarge their business. As the SBC assessed, the 
skill of the North Korean workforce in the apparel industry showed remarkable capacity 
for which no more technological assistance was needed (SBC 2006). The existence of a 
well-trained workforce in particular industries in the DPRK further stimulated the South 
Korean SMEs that had been seeking overseas production, with minimal initial risk, to 
choose the nearest neighboring country. 
Furthen-nore, the closed nature of the DPRK economic system provided the SMEs 
with the favorable business conditions they were seeking. There were many South 
Korean SMEs that had initiated business in China and Vietnam but were hoping to shift 
their production facilities back to more competitive industrial complexes in the Korean 
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Peninsula such as Kaeseong subject to governmental support (Nam S. W. 2007). For 
those employers who wanted to avoid the sensitive issues like industrial relations and 
fringe benefits that they had faced in China and Vietnam, business in the DPRK was a 
good opportunity to divert it. By maintaining a single contact channel through quasi- 
governmental organizations such as the NECC or the NECF, the SMEs could relieve the 
burden to deal with the various requirements from individual factories and enterprises in 
terms of their labor conditions. South Korean businessman Ok Song Sok (2008), who 
ran a POC-style factory in Pyongyang, stated, 
Many South Korean companies hired experienced agents based in China in 
an effort to smoothly enter into contract with North Koreans and to avoid 
likely risk and delay in this overall process. In the contract concluding phase, 
all we needed to do was pay for the POC fee through the agent. We do not 
care what is going to happen between the agent and North Korean 
counterparts such as the NECC. Taking welfare and working conditions of 
the factory workers into account was their business, not ours. 
Given the fact that the South Korean SMEs lacked experience and know-how in 
tackling industrial relations, the underdevelopment of distribution and welfare issues in 
the DPRK economy enabled them to give undivided attention to how to manufacture 
goods efficiently in a cost-saving way. 
Fourthly, the ROK government pursued a policy, in the bilateral negotiations to 
conclude a series of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), of requesting that its FTA partners 
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allow exports from Kaeseong to be considered as 'made in Korea'. The ROK 
government by doing so made every effort to enable these products to receive the 
preferential status conferred by the FTA. The ROK negotiators mandated by the Roh 
I 
Moo Hyun administration managed to put such a provision into the free trade 
agreements with Singapore, the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA), and the 
ASEAN. Ensuring the inclusion of Kaeseong products in the FTAs further convinced 
the majority of export-led SMEs to be active in considering this uncertain place as a new 
outpost to exploit its overseas export market. 
On the other hand, the formula to treat the products made in Kaeseong in the ROK 
- U. S. FTA negotiations was built on the conflict of more complicated strategic interest 
between the two parties than the previous FTA deals. The ROK side insisted on its 
inclusion as a way of ensuring stability on the Korean peninsula and of easing the 
presumed costs of an eventual Korean reunification. The negotiators in the United 
States, on the contrary, argued that the DPRK authority did not meet internationally 
recognized core labor standards in Kaeseong. They pointed out the lack of basic 
democratic rights such as freedom of assembly and association by the workers in the 
DPRK. In addition, they harboured a suspicion that the DPRK government had 
exploited workers in Kaeseong by taking a large share of their monthly wage under the 
title of social security payment (Kim S. H. 2007). 50 
50 The workers in the KIC are not hired directly by the South Korean employers. Instead, the North 
Korean government agency has a right and responsibility to recruit and allocate the workers for employers 
in the Complex. Thus the wage is also paid to the workers through this agency after deducting the social 
security payment. For more discussion on the labor standard issues in the Complex from the U. S. 
perspective, see Schott et al. (2006). 
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Even though there were thorny issues between Seoul and Washington on whether 
the FTA would include Kaeseong-produced goods, the two parties did not rule out the 
possibility of endorsing it when concluding the negotiation in 2007. They reached an 
agreement to establish the so-called Committee on Outward Processing Zones on the 
Korean Peninsula for future discussion on this issue. This Committee is supposed to 
monitor labor standards in the KIC and to establish criteria before they consider 
Kaeseong-produced goods as FTA items, depending on the progress of the 
denuclearization of the DPRK (MOFAT 2007). The ROK government by this endeavour 
envisioned that large production plants in the DPRK would provide not only alternative 
production sites for South Korean manufacturers but ultimately frontline export outposts 
for the global market (Cho B. H. 2003,3). It should be noted that the Roh Moo Hyun 
administration had an ambition to make the project one of the flagship achievements in 
inter-Korean relations during his term. The ROK government's special concern and 
efforts to develop the KIC within the context of its export-led economic policy 
constitute one of the key initiatives to induce more SMEs to be involved in this complex 
in North Korea. 
These clear advantages - cost-saving, complementary cooperation in factor 
endowment, risk-averting and export promotion - that the South Korean firms could 
gain through production on North Korean soil offered a backdrop to further stimulate 
inter-Korean economic engagement despite the security instability. In other words, when 
it came to on-site production by South Korean SMEs in North Korea, it could be argued 
that the government and small business had a strong shared interest. From the 
perspective of the government, the greater participation of the SMEs in manufacturing 
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in the North provided an efficient solution by moving production facilities to less risky 
foreign soil while avoiding the likely danger of industrial hollowing-out in the ROK 
economy. The Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations accepted that the 
industrial investment and the construction of production facilities and social 
infrastructure in the North Korean territory would strengthen the South's long-term 
economic capacity. They at the same time accepted that the greater investment could 
underpin the stronger potential of the Korean economy in the event that the two Koreas 
form an interdependent and unified economic community in the future (Kim Y. Y. et al. 
2005). Coupled with the SMEs' own needs for more cost-efficient production, this 
positive response by the ROK government to the investment in the DPRK Korea 
constituted one of the elements that encouraged the South Korean SMEs to increase 
their trade volume despite the security threat at the state level. 
7.6 SMEs and inter-Korean trade : pitfalls 
Twenty years' experience of inter-Korean economic cooperation revealed as many 
pitfalls to be avoided as the benefits that ROK business had enjjoyed. Among many 
pitfalls the South Korean firms had come across, the unpredictable political 
environment, the discrepancies in business practices, and the difficulty of direct contact 
between the two parties have been the main obstacles that made the inter-Korean 
transactions more demanding than domestic businesses. 
Firstly, the political climate in the Korean Peninsula has been so volatile that it led 
to a fragile condition for sustainable businesses with the DPRK on a longer term basis. 
During the nuclear crisis since the 1990s, the elements that were likely to trigger 
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military turbulence have all along existed intact. They included not only the likelihood 
of increasing tension by the North Korean nuclear development program but also 
intermittent clashes by conventional armed forces of the two Korean militaries. The 
United Nations resolutions that resulted in economic sanctions against the nuclear 
DPRK and Pyongyang's subsequent condemnation for the international punitive actions 
also destabilized the future prospects for the peace building process in the Peninsula. 
Once inter-Korean relations were embroiled in political turbulence, it was likely that 
South Korean businesses would be affected realistically and psychologically by the 
turmoil. Unpredictable and changeable regional politics created obstacles to make South 
Korean businesses hesitate over launching large-scale investment projects in North 
Korea. 
Secondly, different business practices that have been developed through the 
different economic system since the respective nation buildings in 1948 created a barrier 
between the two parties. According to the South Korean SMEs' experiences, most of all, 
their North Korean counterparts tended to stress fraternalism in dealing with the South 
Korean investors rather than acknowledging the pursuit of profit as a basic principle of 
business world. Such an attitude far from the purpose of the South Koreans involved in 
inter-Korean business led them to request unacceptable concessions from the South in 
the name of national cooperation. This far-fetched requirement consequently created 
unexpected stumbling blocks in continuing to carry out the business. In addition, South 
Koreans believed that North Koreans lacked proper understanding about price 
mechanisms, delivery deadlines, and complaints procedures on faulty goods (Kim Y. Y. 
2005,46-47). Some South Korean businessmen even faced a situation in which the 
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North Korean partners claimed their ownership of the production facilities which had 
been built and managed by the South Koreans even while the facilities were not in full 
operation. Totally different business practices and the consequent disputes between the 
South and the North discouraged the South Koreans and made them doubt whether the 
inter-Korean business could be sustained on a mutually beneficial basis. According to 
the survey result in 2006, more than half of the companies involved in inter-Korean 
business turned out to have continued it less than 3 years (SBC 2007,34-41). The 
difficulty in establishing a long-term business plan and widespread uncertainty in terms 
of the continuity of inter-Korean business was an unavoidable outcome of such a 
discrepancy between the two parties. 
Thirdly, face-to-face contact or telecommunication between the South and North 
Korea was so uneasy compared with other cross-border transactions that it caused great 
difficulty requiring the intermediary role of a third party. Complicated and time- 
consuming customs clearance procedures from the South to the North also needed to be 
improved. Most South Korean entrepreneurs running their business in North Korea 
insisted that without solving the so-called 3C problems - commuting, communication, 
and customs clearance - it was not realistic to expect sustainable business with the 
DPRK (Lee S. K. et al. 2007,428-29). After long discussions to improve this situation, 
the South and North authorities reached two remarkable agreements in order to 
streamline inter-Korean transaction procedures. As a result, the Inter-Korean Economic 
Cooperation Liaison Office was opened in October 2005 in the KIC and the two Koreas 
made an agreement on limited improvement of the 3C issues in November 2007. This 
progress was an attempt to provide both parties with prompt and uncomplicated contact 
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channels to revitalize their business. However, the improvement measures such as the 
extension of border-opening times and allowance of internet use was not satisfactory for 
South Korean businessmen who had been experiencing great inconvenience in the 
business in North Korea. Moreover, as the commuting of the South Korean managers 
from and to Kaeseong, a former military outpost, required the North Korean military's 
consent, it led to more problematic inter-Korean negotiations. The contribution of the 
Liaison Office was also more limited than expected as the majority of the South Korean 
businessmen still preferred inter-Korean contact through intermediary agencies or 
individuals acting in border cities between China and the DPRK. According to the 
survey by the SBC in 2006, those who made use of the Office in Kaeseong as an inter- 
Korean business channel (27%) were less than those who used an existing North Korean 
counterpart such as the NECF (41%) that had been working in China (SBC 2006,9). 
Getting in touch with the quasi-govenmental body in the North was not a proper solution 
to resolve the entangled contact channels. Although the NECC was the only body 
authorized to issue a certificate of origin and invitation letter for the South Korean 
partners, it could not fulfil the South's desire to deal directly with the frontline 
production unit from the outset. This influential body rather increased the administrative 
cost of the inter-Korean business by charging a5% fee for its intermediary role. 
Fourthly, poor industrial infrastructure including harbours/docks and 
transportation systems in the DPRK caused significant delays in material flows 
impacting on cost competitiveness and profitability. Shipping schedules were often 
changed as few goods were transported. Unloading was often delayed even in the largest 
harbour in the DPRK. Inferior road conditions sometimes damaged materials being 
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delivered before it reached a final destination (Kim Y. Y. 2005,40-41). Delays in every 
step of transactions involving the North Korean infrastructure made South Korean 
investors unable to sufficiently utilize North Korean domestic factor endowments. They 
generated unexpected additional costs for the South Korean business as a result. Lack of 
certainty and stability in terms of predictability became the main obstacles to long-term 
commitment by the South Korean businessmen. At the same time, how to cope with the 
disadvantageous conditions such as underdeveloped logistics, transportation, and 
shipping system in the DPRK became a challenge that most new South Korean investors 
will have to overcome. 
7.7 Actors and drivers 
The pace and scale of inter-Korean business from the perspective of the South 
Korean businessmen was an outcome of the strategic comparison of benefits and risks 
(pitfalls) explained in sections 7.5 and 7.6. If the potential benefits from the business in 
the DPRK are expected bigger than the risks, they are willing to take the risks to gain 
bigger benefits. On the contrary, they will refrain from taking the risks if the latter are 
likely to outweigh the expected benefits. 
The hypothetical explanations about the increased inter-Korean trade made in 
chapters 5 and 6, as pull factors, are related to the benefits and potential expectations 
from trade. On the other hand, the last hypothesis - worsening business conditions in the 
ROK - is associated with a push factor explaining why the South Korean businessmen 
took the risks despite many pitfalls they could anticipate. 
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The push factor-led inter-Korean trade particularly involves new actors and 
drivers, reflecting growing importance of economic exchanges compared with political 
dialogues, SMEs compared with chaebols, civic level coordination compared with 
traditional government level contacts. Local governments under the opposition party 
GNP also played a greater role in economically engaging with North Korean 
counterparts irrespective of the anti-Sunshine Policy by its central leadership. The 
survey result also corresponds with these changes. 
Result of survey 
According to the results of this survey, the most powerful driving force that 
enabled the South Korean SMEs to consistently pursue inter-Korean trade was found not 
in the pull factors but in the push factor. Whereas 11% of those who increased or 
maintained the same inter-Korean trade volume before the crisis chose the South Korean 
government's support including the lKCF subsidization as a key driver that made inter- 
Korean trade sustainable, those who took the deteriorating business conditions as the 
most important factor reached 53%. The majority of the South Korean businessmen who 
continued the economic engagement with North Korea admitted that they kept engaging 
with the North in an attempt to secure alternative external production outposts to 
overcome constantly deteriorating domestic conditions. The government's stimulus 
package such as the lKCF to promote inter-Korean economic engagement, in contrast, 
turned out to remain a secondary consideration. 
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Figure 7.1 What was the most important reason to increase or maintain the trade volume with the DPRK during the 
nuclear crisis ? 
Others 136% 
Government support 
Domestic business conditions 53% 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 
Another type of question to see whether the domestic business conditions affected 
their decision-making related to inter-Korean trade also showed the significance of the 
internal factor. 54% of all respondents (including those who decreased the trade volume 
during the crisis) in the survey said that the domestic production and management 
environment affected their decision with regard to trade with the North. Only 19.2% 
answered that it did not. It was salient that a substantial portion of the inter-Korean 
traders in the South acknowledged that the domestic business conditions, as the primary 
factor, made them choose business with the DPRK. Those who cited the domestic 
factors were almost double those who took reform signals in the North and government 
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intervention in the South as the most important reasons for the engagement. The 
individual elements that constituted "deteriorating' and 'unfavorable' business 
conditions varied. Among other things, the South Korean businessmen took labor costs 
as the most significant factor, followed by land and facility costs and powerful labor 
unions. 
Figure 7.2 Did the domestic business environment in the ROK influence your decision making'? 
No 
Yes 
0% 
Benefits ofSMEs 
54% 
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 
Reflecting anxiety of the South Korean small business community as to how long 
their business would remain economically viable in an increasingly disadvantageous 
environment, the number of companies that embarked on investment in the DPRK 
continued to grow despite the nuclear crisis from 2002 to 2006. Particularly, South 
Korean SMEs could enjoy special benefits from inter-Korean trade in this period. 
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Firstly, the SMEs were less sensitive to the change of political climate and its 
impact on trade with a politically hostile entity as their business needed fewer political 
decisions at the central authority level. Prompt and flexible adjustment as the situation 
changed with respect to their investment decision was more likely for the SMEs than for 
chaebols who essentially required more structural and far-sighted business plans. As one 
FKI official said in an interview, large conglomerates could not and should not risk 
political turbulence until the nuclear uncertainty is eliminated simply because their 
investment risk in the event of failure is too high (Dong-A 11bo 3 rd September 2004). The 
political risks the conglomerates have identified came not only from security uncertainty 
but also from central I y-control led business system still dominating North Korean 
economy. As one survey data conducted by the FKI shows, the executives of the large 
conglomerates pointed out assurances of unfettered business opportunities (26.5%) as 
the first precondition that needs to given before getting into the KIC, outnumbering full 
equipments of a railway/electricity infrastructure (26.3%) and freedom of 
telecommunication and commuting (20.3%) within the Complex (Dong-A Rho 16"' 
September 2002). The security risks and the unresolved suspicion of danger in 
launching large scale business in communist economy significantly undermined 
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chaebols' high hope on the potential benefit from inter-Korean business. The 
reluctance of the major economic players in the ROK economy offered the SMEs a 
bigger space to do inter-Korean business, combined with the government efforts to 
revive the SMEs-led manufacturing industry. 
" Economic gain that South Korean industry can acquire from inter-Korean transactions was measured as 
double as that of North Korea, according to the research by the FKI, longstanding mouthpiece of Korean 
chaebol (Hankook Ilbo 9; h October 2002). 
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Secondly, large scale investment projects in the DPRK carried out by the South 
Korean chaebols were less feasible, if not unlikely, given the poor industrial 
infrastructure in the North and the underdeveloped institutional supports from the South. 
Samsung Electronics, the world's largest electronics company and a flagship subsidiary 
of Samsung Group headquartered in Seoul, for example, arrested repeated attention on 
whether or when the company will launch inter-Korean business in response not only to 
the ROK government's implicit hope for its participation but to the DPRK government's 
invitation as Hyundai was facing a liquidity crisis from about 2000. Samsung 
Electronics has actually been conducting a joint project for a computer software 
development in collaboration with the Korea (Chosun) Computer Center (KCC), the 11' 
industry arm of the North Korean cabinet. Moreover, a group of executives of Samsung 
Electronics has visited Pyongyang and discussed industrial cooperation issues with the 
NECF officials (Hankook Kyongie 26 th March 2003). But whenever the wide 
speculation of its joining inter-Korean business is spread, the multinational company, of 
which more than half of its shares were owned by foreign investors, denied the 
possibility by pointing out the foreign shareholders' concern about Samsung's 
investment decision in such a highlY volatile region, along with the potential risks 
coming from underdeveloped basic infrastructure as main stumbling blocks. As a result, 
South Korean chaebols, with an exception like a few subsidiaries of Hyundai Group, 
were largely reluctant to pursue a joint project with North Korean counterparts. On the 
other hand, SMEs looking for alternative production base could gain promising 
opportunities in the North to make use of low-wage, well-trained labor force with less 
risk than chaebols. 
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Thirdly, chaebols tend to be more likely to be interested in strategically exploiting 
a new consumer market and large enough export revenue based on their own advanced 
technology. Samsung Electronics' abortive preliminary plan to build an assembling 
plant in the KIC was an example to show how the large manufacturer's strategic 
business goal was not met in the context of North Korea. In contrast, the purpose of the 
South Korean SMEs in pursuing business in North Korea was relatively simple. As long 
as the North Korean labor force gave them more cost-effective means of production, 
indigenous economic conditions in the socialist economy did not have a great influence 
on their decision to go to the DPRK for more profitable business (Dong M. H. 2002,39- 
42). 
What was striking was not only the growing number of investors during this 
period but also the expansion of the business areas involved. From about 2006, joint 
computer software program development projects, animation and other digital contents 
production projects became one of the most promising areas that could benefit from 
inter-Korean cooperation. The initial investment budget needed to embark on a joint 
software development project was not as costly as that of manufacturing industry that 
needed a full set of production facilities. This feature of IT industry constituted a good 
starting point for South Korean SMEs to launch their business in the DPRK without 
taking great risks of investment failure (MOU 2007,44-47). 
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Growth of the KIC 
On the other hand, the constant growth of the KIC during the nuclear crisis 
showed that the driving force of inter-Korean economic cooperation was not 
undermined by the crisis despite deteriorating security instability. The driver that 
enabled the KIC to overcome the political obstacles from the crisis came not only from 
the political steadfastness of the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo 11yun to push forward 
inter-Korean reconciliation initiative but from, more importantly, South Korean 
economy's own needs for domestic industrial development. 
Since the ROK government embarked on ground-breaking work of the KIC site in 
2003, the 3.3 million M2 joint industrial complex continued to show stable subsequent 
development in the following years. The first-ever product in the Complex began to be 
sold in the domestic and international market from 2004. The KT (Formerly known as 
Korea Telecom) and Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), quasi-governmental 
industrial organizations in the ROK, began to transmit in 2005 electric power and to 
install direct telephone lines to the Complex in the DPRK for the first time since the end 
of the Korean War in 1953. Overcoming the chronic shortage of electric power and 
unaffordable cost of telephone bills that had previously used satellite systems via Japan 
enhanced the possibility of success of this joint production experiment by considerably 
reducing the transaction costs that South Korean investors had to pay. At the same time, 
the South and North Korean authorities made joint efforts to streamline the entry 
procedure of South Koreans involved into the North Korean territory, customs 
clearance, and quarantine regulations in an attempt to eliminate institutional barriers in 
operating the KIC. 
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All the progress has been made since the security in the Korean Peninsula had 
been engulfed in the mounting crisis caused by the North Korean revelation of its 
nuclear program in 2002. The improvement of the industrial infrastructure for an 
enhanced production environment was mainly aimed at resolving, to the satisfaction of 
South Korean businessmen, the practical inconvenience that has been raised by the 
managers of individual companies since the opening of the KIC. The uninterrupted 
development of the inter-Korean economic projects during the nuclear crisis showed 
observers of the Korean Peninsula the evolving significance of economic interplay in the 
political relations between the two Koreas. The role of the economic transactions 
between the two Koreas was developing from a mere dependent variable heavily 
affected by the high politics in and around the Korean Peninsula into one of the defining 
factors shaping inter-Korean relations even during the political crisis. 
On the other hand, the growing significance of economic exchanges in inter- 
Korean relations was also acknowledged by the North Korean leadership. The capital 
investment made by the South in the North territory was proved by Kim Jong 11's 
remark as a welcome move irrespective of the generally anticipated likelihood of 
political reliance, caused by the capital influx into the isolated system, upon external 
power. 52 The 'Kim Dae Jung Memoir' (2010), published after his death, unveiled Kim 
Jong 11's thought on the relationship between politics and economy in managing inter- 
Korean relations, by introducing a part of Kim Jong 11's remarks in the summit talks. 
" On the broad literature review of the dependence relationship in international relations and its negative 
ramification in a weak state's foreign policy, see Baldwin (1980), pp. 492-495. 
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I would have disagreed with the idea of inter-Korean summit if your visit to 
Pyongyang had driven by the NIS as I have unfavourable impression on the 
Korean spy agencies in the past. In contrast, the smooth progress of the 
inter-Korean economic projects at the civic level jointly developed by the 
CAPPC and Hyundai convinced me to have a summit talks with the South. 
(Kim D. J. 2010,277) 
Kim Dae Jung previously anticipated that his 'Jongkyong BuIlP policy will in the 
end bring about attitude change of North Korea in dealing with inter-Korean economic 
affairs. He wrote in his memoir after Chung Ju Yung, the president of Hyundai Group, 
had a unprecedented direct meeting with North Korean supreme leader Kim Jong ll.. 
it was a meaningful change that Kim Jong 11 began to be directly involved in 
inter-Korean business. I reckon that North Korea responded to our repeated 
door-knocking by opening it at last. I think there were some changes in the 
North Korean system after Kim Jong il took office as a Chairman of the 
National Defence Commission. My guess was that the pragmatic group 
within the leadership began to raise their voice. I suspect that my 
government's consistent pursuit of 'civic level economic cooperation first, 
inter-authority dialogues later' policy successfully made North Korea move 
towards internal change. As a result, I expected to have an opportunity to 
meet up with North Korean leader Kim Jong 11 within my term. (Kim 
D. J. 2010,125) 
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The economic exchange projects driven by private firms and pioneering 
entrepreneurs also became a key driver for the successful growth of the KIC. In this 
sense, the South Korean government's industrial policy and North Korea policy 
constituted both sides of a coin. The South government's economic policy to allow the 
business community to engage with North Korea with their own domestic agenda 
enabled the SMEs to pursue the continuity of inter-Korean business amid the mounting 
nuclear crisis. 
Local governmenis 
The significance of domestic needs of the South Korean SMEs in pursuing 
economic cooperation with the potentially nuclear power also signalled a couple of 
transformations in terms of the drivers and actors of the economic engagement strategy C%/ , 
The ROK government's initiative to promote inter-Korean economic engagement has 
been developed with close links to the domestic economic policy in order to find a way 
out of the economic impasse the South Korean SMEs had faced. Even before the 
proclamation of the 'Sunshine Policy', the Kim Young Sam administration made it clear 
in 1994 that his government would give priority to SMEs pursuing inter-Korean 
economic projects. As part of the SMEs-first policy in inter-Korean business, Kim 
Young Sam opened ten professional consultation centers across the nation in an attempt 
to assist the SMEs that showed interest in it but were unable to launch the business 
without any external help. KITA, the South Korean private organization for trade 
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promotion, provided a venue and professional advisors for the consultation (MOU 1995, 
53 
258-263) . 
The active involvement, in pursuit of inter-Korean economic transactions under 
the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations, by a group of local governments 
dominated by the opposition party demonstrated the priority of a similar 'domestic 
economy first' policy. For example, since the local elections in 2002 in the ROK, 
Incheon Metropolitan City and Gyeonggi Province, the very southern regions of the 
DMZ, were under the control of the Grand National Party (GNP), which strongly 
condemned the 'Sunshine Policy' labelling the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun era as 
a 'lost decade'. The two local govemments however vigorously pushed forward their 
own economic projects that required close collaboration with the relevant organizations 
in the DPRK (Choi Y. H. 2006,28-4 1). 
The Mayor of Incheon, while maintaining the key position in the GNPs local 
government leaders line-up, became the first-ever governor who visited Pyongyang and 
made broad agreement on a range of joint socioeconomic projects. His visit was made in 
May 2005, while the North Korean state media has been vehemently condemning the 
GNP's foreign policy line labelling it a warmonger and fascist conspirator. Incheon city 
government's joint projects in this mood with the North Korean counterparts included 
its bid to co-host the 2014 Asian Game with Pyongyang and many other civic level 
economic exchange programS. 54 The Mayor was accompanied in the Pyongyang visit by 
" Unlike the administration's plan, the majority players of inter-Korean economic engagement as of 1999 
were filled up by non-SMEs (Cho B. H. 2003,4). 
" The co-hosting bid failed to achieve a wider consensus within the Olympic Council of Asia (OCA) and 
Incheon alone ended up successfully wining the bid in December 2006. But it was not because of the lack 
of endeavor by the City but because of the likely legal row in the Committee on the co-hosting issues 
(Seoul Shinmun 26 th September 2006) 
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a delegation from local business council and civic organizations to deal with above all 
different economic cooperative projects. Welcoming this bold approach from the GNP- 
dominated local government, the North Korean counterparts, National Reconciliation 
Council (NRC), nominally representing North Korean political parties and social 
organizations, gave the delegation an exceptional permission to use non-diverted direct 
flight route between the South and the North and sent out passengerjet to transport them 
back 
Gyeonggi Province, which surrounds Seoul and Incheon and shares the northern 
part of its area with North Korea, also served as the main channel for inter-Korean 
economic exchanges. Gyeonggi Provincial government has also been dominated by the 
GNP since 2002 local election. But Gyeonggi was so active in pursuing inter-Korean 
economic exchanges that has been running a rice farm as a pilot project in the vicinitY of 
Pyongyang in collaboration with the North Korean agricultural authority. Based on the 
achievement of the pilot stage project, the deputy governor-led delegation visited 
Pyongyang in 2006 to take part in signing event of the agricultural modernization 
project. This visit was made amid the hesitant mood for the central government to 
enforce the scheduled visit of the Unification Minister to Pyongyang as a result of the 
military tension created by the U. S. -ROK joint military drill in that particular period. 
Sohn Hak-kyu, the Gyeonggi governor stated in an interview. 
What is actually important is not to merely offer a humanitarian aid or one- 
off economic support program alone but to carry out consistent inter-Korean 
cooperative projects through which North Korea can consolidate its 
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economic foundation and the both Koreas achieve co-prosperity. The key 
tenet of what I would like to label 'peace management policy' in this regard 
is strengthening constant inter-Korean economic cooperation from the 
perspective to accomplish 'the Korean Peninsula economy' in the global 
context. I would not save our provincial budget in pursuing inter-Korean 
economic exchanges, cooperation, and peace-building (Naeil Shinmun 6 th 
October 2005). 
As a governor who has been championing the foreign direct investment for a 
provincial government, his commitment to inter-Korean cooperation was also built upon 
his emphasis on economic need to exploit North Korean resources in order to boost 
domestic economy of his own constituency. 
The undiluted support for economic cooperation between Gyeonggi and its 
Northern counterparts was inherited by Sohn's successor Kim Mun-Soo from the GNP, 
a passionate North Korean human rights campaigner who had dramatically departed 
from his early career of the socialist trade union movement leader. Kim has been 
requiring his Party an uncompromising posture on the human rights violation of the 
North Korean regime but at the same time he firmly advocated economic exchanges 
with North Korea and continued to put forward various cooperation agenda. It included 
the initiative of the DMZ Eco-peace Park and the joint investigation project for flood 
prevention of the Han River, passing through North Korean territory and Gyeonggi alike. 
He further stressed the role of Gyeonggi in economic cooperation with its Northern 
neighbor by asserting that the Province has potential credential to carry out the role of 
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; special envoy' to break up the stalemate in inter-Korean broader economic cooperation 
apart from Kaeseong Project under the Lee Myung-bak administration (Kyeongin Ilbo 
30th October 2008). 
Other provincial governments dominated by the GNP were of no exception, 
although it was not as likely as Gyeonggi and Incheon to discover feasible and 
commercially viable cooperation projects with the North. For example, Gangwon, the 
eastern coastal province, of which its territory was divided into South and North as a 
result of the Korean War, put forward a couple of inter-Korean economic agenda even 
though the anti-North Korea sentiment still prevailed in people's memory, derived from 
their experience of brutal killing occurred during the War less than half-century ago. 
The Gangwon Provincial government, from the perspective of its domestic economy, 
was recognizing the rivalry relationship with outpaced Gyeonggi in building up a 
cooperative relationship with its neighboring economy (Gangwon domin Ilbo 15"' 
August 2007). 
Pusan Metropolitan City and North Kyungsang Province, a long-time stronghold 
of the conservative GNP, also tried to find opportunities to be involved in inter-Korean 
business. Pusan, the biggest harbor city in South Korea, showed interest in boosting its 
shipbuilding industry in connection with North Korean workforces and resources. North 
Kyungsang that has heavily populated eastern coastal cities wanted to develop a cruise 
travel package along the coastal line in cooperation with North Korean coastal cities, 
along with many other projects likely to support its local business including herbal 
medicine or fishery product processing (Sekye Ilbo 8h October 2007). 
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The leaders of Incheon Metropolitan City and Gyeonggi, Gangwon Provincial 
governments took great advantage of the geographical proximity to North Korea despite 
the political creed of the party they belonged to, which proclaimed it would reverse the 
course of actions by the Kim Dae Jung administration. The vast majority of the 
economic cooperation projects with the North initiated by these local governments were 
planned to meet the needs of the local SMEs. Other GNP-led local governments' 
exploratory plans for inter-Korean business were also driven by their industrial demands. 
Furthen-nore, the GNP central leadership, who has coherently been unsympathetic to the 
economic appeasement toward the DPRK, did not object to these deviations from the 
party line. This suggested that the need to find an alternative business partner under dire 
economic climate for local SMEs became a top priority at all levels of public 
administration transcending party lines. At the same time, the local governments' 
economic engagement with the DPRK provides visible examples to explain how the 
benefits from the economic exchanges are likely to supersede security-dominated 
political dynamic in the Korean Peninsula. 
Transnational level coordination 
The role of the South Korean non-governmental and business organizations 
became crucial in determining, by negotiation, the pattern and pace of inter-Korean 
economic projects. From the South Korean business's point of view, two dimensions 
should be noted to understand this subnational level cooperation between the two 
Koreas. The detailed agreements that actually drove inter-Korean trade were discussed 
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and concluded through these channels. One is located in the context of inter-Korean 
interactions and the other is in the domestic economic management in the ROK. 
The creation of the NECC in 2004, as a North Korean key institution to promote 
inter-Korean trade, made a remarkable contribution to forming a fast-track channel 
between traders. The NECC activities signalled the North Korean desire to more 
actively pursue economic engagement with South Korea and subsequently offered a new 
institutional model to reinvigorate inter-Korean trade. With more than doubled staff and 
an enhanced political power, the NECC showed an ability to stem the growing 
discontent of the North Korean military toward the expansion of the inter-Korean 
engagement (Lee K. S. 2005). The partial devolution of the leadership in inter-Korean 
relations to the NECC implied the negotiation channel was being pluralized as 
Pyongyang looked forward to gaining more from economic engagement with Seoul. A 
statement by a South Korean businessman showed the growing power of the NECC in 
trade with the ROK. 
When I first proposed that inter-Korean trade goods needed to be transported 
by land route from Kaeseong to Pyongyang to the NECC, they were 
unwilling to accept it as it required an additional approval from the North 
Korean military to make it happen. But later they managed to elicit 
agreement from the military, which demonstrated their political power 
within the North Korean authority (Lee K. S. 2005). 
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Another South Korean businessman Ok Song Sok (2008), who moved his 
production base from China to North Korea after 2001, confirmed that the NECC 
officials had close networks with high-ranking figures in the power group in Pyongyang. 
According to his experience, the demands from South Korean investors such as prompt 
supplement of factory workers through the NECC channel was accepted quicker than 
they had expected. Contractual obligations to meet agreed delivery dates were quite 
often disregarded in the practice of trade with the DPRK but if an ultimatum was 
delivered through the NECC, the production progress was visibly improved. 
The growing influence of North Korean subnational organization in inter-Korean 
trade was also reflected in the survey results. South Korean businessmen answered in 
the survey (Figure 7.3) that a greater contribution to the inter-Korean trade after 2002 
came from North Korean counterparts like the NECC (39%) rather than domestic 
consulting organizations such as KITA (19%) or the SBC (8%). This also suggested the 
partnership between actors outside official diplomatic negotiation under complex 
interdependence had been consolidated. 
But the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly reportedly abolished the NECC in 
April 2009. The relevant roles were reallocated within the central authority but many of 
them were transformed and moved from the Cabinet into subunits of the Party. This 
decision confirmed widespread rumors of a kickback scandal and the impropriety of US 
dollar transactions between NECC frontline officials and South Korean businessmen 
(Dong-A Ilbo I Oth April 2009). South Korean businessman Ok Song Sok (2008) too said 
that there was a rumor of a corruption scandal connected to a very competent NECC 
official in which the North Korean central authority uncovered a massive amount of 
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hoarded US dollars in his house. In the ROK business community, the abolition of the 
NECC was interpreted as a sign showing North Korean determination to crack down on 
the spread of liberal economic ideology from South Korea amid the increasing inter- 
Korean exchanges. At the same time, this showed paradoxical evidence that the period 
from 2002 to 2006 could be interpreted as a golden age when it came to inter-Korean 
trade involving subnational actors in the two Koreas. 
Figure 7.3 What was the key organization apart from the ROK government that aftlected your trade with the DPRK 
positively? 
Others 
South Korean partners 
KITA 
SBC 
North Korean partners 39% 
40% 50% 
The other dimension that contributed to promoting South Korean business 
community9s engagement with the North came from many civic organizations that had 
been established on the ROK side. These organizations were created for the purpose of 
directly and indirectly supporting inter-Korean economic engagement in an attempt, at 
least in part, to make a breakthrough for the struggling SMEs. The organizations would 
drive forward non-political, civic level exchanges between the two Koreas on the one 
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hand, dampen or internalize the opposition voice from conservative groups in South 
Korean society on the other. 
The Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation (KCRC) established in 
1998, for example, offered a venue in which contending political voices, respectively 
representing the conservative and the progressive groups in South Korean politics and 
NGOs, could make efforts to fill the gap between them. There was no evidence that the 
conservative group fully endorsed what they called the appeasement policy toward 
Pyongyang by participating in bipartisan organizations such as the KCRC. But it was 
evident that the Council led intra-Korean dialogues on the controversial North Korea 
policy which had been inconceivable under the previous regime as well as organizing 
many social and cultural events with its North Korean counterparts. In particular, the 
South Korean presidents displayed their special interest in this bipartisan organization 
by appointing a heavy-weight figure from their top aid group members as chairman of 
the KCRC 
55. 
Other organizations built purely as NGO-style political campaigns emerged to 
drum up support for the then government's actions. The Civil-headquarters for 
Activating South-North Economic Cooperation in Korea (CASNEC) established in 2003 
aimed to indirectly support the government's plan for inter-Korean economic 
engagements by hosting a variety of academic conferences and cultural events on 
similar issues. The Solidarity for Practice of the South-North Joint Declaration (SPJD) 
further contributed to radical reformation of the conventional discourse in South Korean 
55 For example, the standing chairman of the KCRC in the Kim Dae Jung administration, Han Kwang Ok 
was a former chief secretary of the presidential office and Cheong Se Hyun, standing chairman in the Roh 
Moo Hyun govemment was a former minister of MOU. 
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society in viewing North Korea. These two examples showed South Korean civil 
society's involvement in forming a political discourse on the DPRK which had 
previously been monopolized by the government. 
There had long been quasi-governmental organizations such as the National 
Unification Advisory Council (NUAC) since the 1980s, established in an effort to 
mobilize nationwide support and consensus for the unification policy by the then 
government that had lacked public legitimacy. The NUAC based on the ROK 
constitution was largely funded by the government and boasted an overseas network in 
31 nations as well as a local network across the ROK. The Council made contributions 
in the 1980s-90s to trumpeting the key announcements by the ROK government on its 
unification agenda but had connections neither with North Korea nor with civic society 
in South Korea. Unlike the NUAC, however, the newly-emerging civic organizations 
built on grass-roots support for the engagement policy by the ROK government showed 
a new possibility that the multiple channels of contact between the two Koreas could 
connect both societies in a broader area. The emergence of new contact channels in the 
bilateral negotiation constituted one of the key features of transnational level 
coordination and in turn complex interdependence that framed inter-Korean relations 
after 2000. 
7.8 Conclusion 
Even though cross-border production and distribution constituted one of the most 
significant agendas in the realm of IPE, they were largely focused on global networks of 
global firms. The desperation of small businesses that struggled in their domestic market 
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due to rising production costs was not sufficiently explored in the mainstream IPE. 
Division of labor at a regional - not a global - level could be an alternative recipe in the 
first place to overcome the handicap of domestic production. The most preferred area for 
the South Korean manufacturers to relocate their production facilities used to be the 
eastern fringe of China, within an hour's journey by plane from the Western coastal 
cities of the ROK. However, as the wage conditions and the government regulations got 
tougher, the less competitive South Koreans faced the necessity to find alternative 
production bases. Although occasional economic exchange programs had continued 
since the 1990s, launching a large scale cooperative project in North Korea required the 
resolution of the nuclear crisis first to ensure the continuity of the business. The 
common goal of the South Korean government and the SMEs was how to maximize the 
gain of economic engagement with North Korea and at the same time how to minimize 
the potential risk to inter-Korean business. 
This chapter investigated a key factor for the South Korean SMEs in the 
manufacturing industry to increase their trade volume with North Korea from 2002 to 
2006. The chapter concluded, based on the survey results, that they were forced to 
choose economic engagement with North Korea due mainly to rising production costs in 
the domestic market. The ROK government policy to financially and institutionally 
support inter-Korean trade on the other hand brought about a positive effect in attracting 
more attention to the economic engagement even though there was a growing tension in 
the Korean Peninsula. However, a more crucial driving force came from the commercial 
judgement by entrepreneurs to reduce their production costs according to the survey. 
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The combination of the private interests of business community on the one hand 
and a government initiative to promote inter-Korean trade on the other became an 
engine to expand economic relations between the two Koreas. The state's role in this 
mechanism was rather supportive and secondary in this market-driven economy. 
Domestic trade interests had a strong voice that was able to prevent an escalation of 
tension into real conflict. 
One of the key findings in this regard was how the ROK government made a 
contribution to the invigoration of inter-Korean trade. The substantial role of the 
government did not come from its direct intervention such as preferential finance but 
came from its 'parallel -track' strategy that equally valued political and economic 
relations typified by the 'Jongkyong Bulli'. The Vongkyong Bu11P policy by the Kim 
Dae Jung administration permitted the business actors in the South to engage with the 
North as long as it was commercially justifiable and viable. The policy made it possible 
by ensuring the disconnection of the tight linkage between the economic engagement 
and the nuclear issues maintained in the previous administrations. 
Additionally this chapter examined the changed route of mutual engagement 
between subnational actors in the two Koreas. The result of the examination showed that 
a new channel between the two Koreas emerged to exclusively deal with economic 
projects. Pyongyang condoned the quasi -governemental organizations such as the 
NECC to exercise relative autonomy in planning and implementing the cooperative 
projects despite objections from the military. Such a diversification of inter-Korean 
contact channels also contributed to cementing inter-Korean economic engagement until 
Pyongyang decided to withdraw the political power the NECC had enjoyed. 
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All in all, the standing of the South Korean SMEs has consistently been 
undermined in the domestic market since the late 1980s. The ROK government and 
business community took advantage of this opportunity to engage more with the DPRK 
in an attempt to strengthen peaceful coexistence between the two countries. The 
liongkyong Bulli' policy by the South government and the broadened contact channels 
between the South and the North made the economic engagement more sustainable 
despite the growing military tension in the Korean Peninsula. 
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CHAPTER 8 
Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter will suggest final concluding points by revisiting the key findings and 
arguments made in the earlier chapters. It is organized into six parts. The first section 
will briefly summarize the findings of the earlier chapters, focusing on the casual 
relationship between the nuclear crisis and inter-Korean trade. The second section will 
re-summarize the contribution of this study to a broader knowledge on inter-Korean 
relations into three points. The third section will attempt to apply these findings to an 
interpretation of broader inter-Korean relations during the nuclear crisis. The section 
will show that the economic relationship between the ROK and the DPRK since 2000 
was not necessarily subordinated to progress in political relationships between the two 
parties. It will also argue that the economic variable is increasingly significant in 
interpreting the goals of the DPRK's nuclear development. The fourth section will re- 
examine the complex interdependence model as the main theoretical framework of this 
thesis and stress what needs to be refined to better explain the case of inter-Korean 
economic and other patterns of relationship. The fifth section will propose a set of 
policy prescriptions from the viewpoint of the ROK government in dealing with 
economic relations with the DPRK together with its nuclear program. The sixth section 
will provide a brief recommendation as to how to utilize the achievement of this study in 
developing ROK and/or DPRK related research in the future. 
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8.2 Summary offindings 
This study has attempted to identify whether and to what extent the nuclear crisis 
that erupted in 2002 in the Korean Peninsula affected the trade relationship between the 
ROK and the DPRK. For this purpose, it examined the flow and changed pattern of 
inter-Korean trade from 2002 to 2006. After 2006, the DPRK regime began to crack 
down de facto liberal economic activities resulting in partial closedown of exchange 
avenues between South and North Korea at the subriational level. In the ROK, on the 
other hand, the conservative government that came into power in 2007 introduced a 
stricter guideline in allowing the South Korean economic actors to engage with the 
North. Based on such a sharp contrast before and after 2006 since the outbreak of the 
second nuclear crisis, this study concluded that this five years period (2002-2006), 
although the nuclear crisis constantly heightened in this period, created a golden age 
when it came to inter-Korean economic transactions. 
An equally important purpose of this study was to explore the main causal 
variables that drove South Korean entrepreneurs to conduct business with allegedly 
'nuclear' North Korea during the crisis between 2002 and 2006. For this purpose, this 
study tested three hypothetical claims such as the financial incentive program offered by 
the ROK government, economic reform package introduced by the then DPRK 
leadership, and the domestic industrial factors in the ROK. Based on such a structure of 
this study, the key findings so far can be summarized as below. 
Firstly, as shown in the inter-Korean trade statistics and the results of the survey of 
South Korean SME businessmen, the second nuclear crisis did not predominantly affect 
the practice and conditions of the ROK's trade and investment with the DPRK. The 
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traditional assumption that trade and other forms of economic exchanges could be 
drastically reduced, if not stopped, under the condition of mounting military tension can 
be challenged by this finding. Non-commercial trade such as the humanitarian aid 
program turned out to be affected by the nuclear crisis as it saw little progress especially 
in 2006 in the wake of the North Korean nuclear test. But as commercial trade continued 
to grow during the crisis, it developed into a ma or pattern of inter-Korean economic j 
exchanges. The joint manufacturing projects in Kaeseong grew dramatically in the same 
year that the nuclear crisis reached a peak. All these moves provided evidence showing 
little causal relationship between the military crisis and commercial interactions between 
the two Koreas. 
It is true that South Korean entrepreneurs perceived the nuclear crisis as a serious 
'risk' which was a significant blow to their business with the DPRK. But there was no 
clear evidence that they took the crisis as a real 'threat' to destroy their achievement. 
They rather accepted it as a controllable and manageable 'risk' as long as the ROK 
government's supportive attitudes continued. The earlier chapters show that the 
fundamental change in the inter-Korean relationship provided a background variabie 
that prevented the risk from developing into an uncontrollable threat. 
Secondly, in terms of which factor primarily affected the South Korean business 
community's behavioural pattern in inter-Korean trade, this study showed that domestic 
factors in ROK industry played a crucial role. In contrast, the institutional changes 
toward economic liberalization and decentralization within the DPRK regime had little 
influence on the South Korean business community's decisions related to trade and 
investment in the DPRK. It was likely that the South Korean SMEs expected to see 
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North Korean economic entities as potentially more viable partners than China or 
Vietnam. But what this study showed is the SMEs in the South were less receptive to the 
external factors, which they perceived as only a secondary influential factor, than to 
domestic factors such as their own labor costs and taxation. 
The South Korean SMEs faced great difficulties in sourcing enough low wage 
workers to meet their production targets from the late 1980s. Low-wage based business 
strategy became less viable due mainly to the organized labor unions movements in the 
wake of the democratic transition embarked in 1987. As the wage offers from the SMEs 
did not satisfy employees' expectations, employers faced a chronic shortage of workers 
particularly in low-wage based traditional manufacturing industries. The SMEs were in 
a vulnerable predicament in comparison with the chaebol that had enjoyed strong 
government backing as the most powerful growth engine of national economy. A vast 
majority of low-wage based manufacturing industries shifted their production facilities 
to China and Vietnam to seek lower labor and land costs. But they began to feel higher 
pressure stemming from increasing labor cost and tougher government regulation from 
about 2000. The deteriorating business environment surrounding the South Korean 
manufacturers in danger provided a primary cause for them to choose the DPRK as an 
alternative production site or trade partner. The ROK governments in power from 1998 
to 2007 encouraged them to engage more with their Northern partners by putting a set of 
deregulation measures in place for the purpose of making inter-Korean non-political 
exchanges easy. The governments had the aim to make the accomplishment of inter- 
Korean reconciliation and cooperation one of the flagship achievements in its foreign 
policy. 
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This finding challenged traditional beliefs on the history of inter-Korean relations. 
The traditional view was based on the thinking that the North tended to engage with the 
South to seek economic support whereas the South did so with the purpose of political 
and humanitarian objectives (Noland 2000,112, Burghart 2009). However, this study 
showed that the economic needs of the ROK began to constitute a more significant 
motivation to engage with the DPRK. The South Korean SMEs, as key actors in inter- 
Korean trade since the 1990s, that had sought a more competitive production 
environment played a critical role in creating such needs. The then ROK government 
also made every effort to push forward the inter-Korean economic cooperation strategy 
as one of the key axes of its functionalist approach toward the DPRK. 
Thirdly, inter-Korean relations after the inter-Korean summit in 2000 showed 
comprehensive and encouraging changes which subsequently led inter-Korean trade to 
continue to grow despite the second nuclear crisis from 2002. These changes ranged 
from the emerging mood of political reconciliation to the rapidly growing socio-cultural 
and economic exchanges as a result of a set of agreements between Kim Dae Jung and 
Kim Jong 11. The most salient feature among these changes was the increasingly 
important role of non-state actors such as civic organizations and business in planning 
and implementing exchange programs with the counterparts in the DPRK. Instead of 
having a monopolistic and exclusive diplomatic power, the ROK government permitted 
South Korean subnational actors to engage with North Korean entities based upon their 
own plans and timeframe. 
As the survey results showed, the South Korean business community also 
acknowledged the substantial expansion of inter-Korean dialogue channels. Direct 
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contacts between South Korean firms and their counterparts in the North, without 
recourse to the government's leading role, became a dominant way to discuss and 
determine the conditions of inter-Korean economic transactions. The establishment of 
quasi-govemmental organizations in the DPRK such as the NECC with the purpose of 
expanding economic cooperation with the South gave South Korean businessmen an 
opportunity to streamline their trade procedures with the North. The NECC allegedly 
enjoyed relative autonomy in dealing with ROK counterparts, in comparison with many 
other government agencies, to implement the agreed cooperation projects. 
The dramatically increased number of trading companies in the North that had 
their own target to meet in earning foreign currency was another factor to explain 
multiple channel economic contacts between the two Koreas. The 'new trade regime' 
introduced in the early 1990s also involved a new initiative which allowed local 
governments, provinces, and a variety of governing committees within the Cabinet alike 
to run their own trading companies. As a ramification of this decentralization in trade 
management, from the North Korean point of view, inter-Korean trade became one of 
the sought-after routes to earn foreign currency resulting in diversifying contact 
channels between the two Koreas. 
Such a widened inter-Korean contact channel also contributed to cement inter- 
Korean economic engagement until Pyongyang reportedly decided to withdraw 
economic power from the frontline organizations in about 2006 fearing likely 
ideological contamination from the capitalist economic transactions with Seoul. This 
changed environment and high expectations for further development of inter-Korean 
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trade enabled South Korean business actors to maintain their trade volume and pattern 
despite the uncertain prospects for the continuity of inter-Korean trade. 
Fourthly, the complex interdependence model proposed by Keohane and Nye 
(1989) provides the most useful explanatory model to analyze the substantial changes of 
inter-Korean relations after 2000. The complex interdependence model is characterized 
by three key features : multiple channels, lack of issue hierarchy, decreasing role of the 
military. The essence of extensive changes in inter-Korean relations triggered by a set of 
agreements from the inter-Korean summit demonstrates a great deal of affinity with the 
complex interdependence model. The Kim Dae Jung (1998-2002) and Roh Moo Hyun 
(2003-2007) administrations put great efforts into forging economic and cultural ties 
between the two Koreas even while the nuclear crisis showed no sign of coming to an 
end. This policy change dramatically broadened the horizons of inter-Korean direct 
dialogue at the sub-national level. As the two Korean governments in this period agreed 
to seek ways to ease military tension and to avoid unexpected conflict by miscalculation, 
the use of military force as a means to resolve inter-Korean conflicts became less likely. 
8.3 Contribution to knowledge in inter-Korean relations studies 
Firstly, this study offered a new analytical tool to overcome security biased 
interpretation of inter-Korean relations. The dominant studies on the DPRK and inter- 
Korean relations suggest that a new proper viewpoint needs to be arranged to capture the 
essence of the growing economic exchanges between the two Koreas after the 1990s. 
Particularly, a variety of economic cooperation projects that had persisted during the 
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second nuclear crisis required a new perspective to understand security assurance and 
economic interest in an interconnected fashion. This study demonstrated that the 
security variable in the Korean Peninsula was no longer a unitary factor shaping and 
transforming inter-Korean relations. Economic interest based on domestic industrial 
needs instead emerged as a more influential causal variable in bringing sustainable inter- 
Korean reconciliation. Dramatic increase of multi-level interactions between the two 
Koreas after 2000 enabled South Korean SMEs to continue to carry out economic 
transaction with the North even though the security situation was significantly 
destabilized. This study offered an alternative perspective to explore the security 
dynamics in the Korean Peninsula by focusing on the importance of economic interest 
of state and non-state actors and by showing under which conditions economic issues 
could rise to the surface. 
Secondly, the conclusion of this study showed that domestic economic policy 
needed to be equally considered, along with international security concern, as an 
analytical starting point to explore inter-Korean economic cooperation. The vast 
majority of studies on inter-Korean economic exchanges in reality have been focusing 
on the impact and ramification of the economic interactions between South and North 
Korea. This meant that the primary focus of research was the influence of economic 
exchanges on whether it was likely to contribute to peace building or not. In IR studies 
on the Korean Peninsula situation, political reconciliation and security building have 
always been the priority even when tackling economic exchanges in a burgeoning stage. 
As a result, most economic activities by the South which were likely to benefit the North 
were regarded as irresponsible behavior bolstering the ailing regime. The lack of 
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viewpoint to explore growing economic engagement led to poor policy 
recommendations in managing inter-Korean relations. The conclusion of this study 
however demonstrated the possibility of sustainable progress of inter-Korean economic 
projects by examining whether and how much the major actors of inter-Korean trade 
were affected by the nuclear crisis. By showing that inter-Korean economic projects 
gave South Korean small and medium sized manufacturing industry an important 
survival kit, this study provided a novel viewpoint to understand inter-Korean economic 
transactions as a mutually beneficial interaction in the business context, not cash- 
pouring political action toward the ailing North Korean regime. 
Thirdly, this study demonstrated, by relevant literature and interviews, that inter- 
Korean endeavors to pursue economic cooperation continued even during the second 
nuclear crisis. The efforts were made not only by South Korean actors in desperate need 
to secure cheaper production costs but also North Korean institutions that have declared 
the so-called military-first policy. The simultaneous pursuit of nuclear development and 
expansion of external economic engagement by the North showed that military 
confrontation and economic exchanges were not incompatible in the Korean Peninsula. 
This finding, at the analysis level, suggested that a single analytical tool could be used to 
shed light on the relationship between security and economy. At the policy level, at the 
same time, the continued pursuit to find out how to improve external economic relations 
by the allegedly nuclear-armed North Korean leadership indicated that economic means 
had a feasibility to mitigate, if not resolve, the nuclear tension. It also indicated a 
sequential approach meaning the idea that the nuclear crisis should be thoroughly 
resolved before embarking substantial level of economic cooperation is unrealistic. The 
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achievement of this study on the coincidence of military tension and economic 
cooperation could offer an appropriate base for policy analysis for not only South Korea 
but also all the actors involved including the United States. But the lack of this notion 
will in the end lead to fail to grasp the growing complexity of diplomatic relations 
between North Korea and the external world. 
8.4 Implicationsfor broader inter-Korean relations 
The findings in this study suggest that, under particular political conditions, the 
external security threat is not able to outweigh domestic business needs seeking a more 
favorable environment outside its territory for more profitable transactions. This study 
has attempted to sketch out such a political condition by borrowing the analytical 
concept of the complex interdependence model. In general, South-North Korean 
relations between 2002 and 2006 fit closely the key characteristics of the complex 
interdependence model. This finding resulted in bringing at least two significant 
conclusions as to (a) how to define the role and goal of inter-Korean engagement amid 
the nuclear confrontation in the Korean Peninsula (b) how to interpret the essence of the 
nuclear ambitions created by the DPRK between 2002 and 2006. 
Firstly, this study demonstrates that fluctuation in inter-Korean economic relations 
during the nuclear crisis was shaped outside the military standoff caused by the crisis. In 
other words, the increasingly tougher military stalemate, in the long run, did not 
necessarily mean a dwindling inter-Korean engagement and cooperative projects. Inter- 
Korean relations were not merely a dependent variable bound up with the progress of 
nuclear negotiation even during the development of the crisis. Inter-Korean economic 
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cooperation indeed turned out to have its autonomous space, in which their economic 
relations could continue regardless of ongoing military tension, as long as the proposed 
joint projects were economically viable. 
Since the early 1990s, how to frame a policy line on inter-Korean economic 
cooperation in line with the U. S. -DPRK nuclear confrontation has been a highly 
debatable issue in both Washington and Seoul. Washington is believed to harbor an 
unexpressed suspicion about the sanguine views of Seoul. They seemed to reckon that 
Seoul has provided Pyongyang with sufficient cash, by which it is able to muddle 
through in spite of Washington's containment attempts in addition to an already 
devastated economy (Eberstadt 2007,159-195). Thus, in dealing with nuclear 
Pyongyang, Washington tended more to stress a 'universal' template that could equally 
be applied to any other nation with nuclear ambitions such as Iran. Economic 
engagement with a potential nuclear power was unthinkable for the administration. 
However, its key ally in the Korean Peninsula dismissed the 'universality' 
argument. Policyrnakers in the Roh Moo Hyun administration who dealt with the second 
nuclear crisis largely believed that Seoul's posture for the engagement policy with 
Pyongyang could and should be consolidated irrespective of Washington's containment 
strategy toward the Kim Jong It regime. They did not agree that inter-Korean relations, 
which they believed mutually beneficial, should be halted in the event of the peace and 
security of the Korean Peninsula being threatened by the nuclear crisis. They rather 
advocated the argument that economic engagement was a more efficient tool to persuade 
Pyongyang to conform to international norms by providing them with alternative 
options other than the nuclear card they had been using since the 1990s. This perception 
297 
gap between Washington and Seoul became the genesis of the cacophony between the 
two allies in establishing North Korea policy throughout the Roh Moo Hyun 
administration (Park H. J. 2007,12-19). 
The conclusion of this study supports the latter argument. As the survey results 
demonstrated, the domestic factors that meant the business community's desire to secure 
a cheaper workforce and production facilities turned out to be a primary driving force to 
push inter-Korean trade forward during the nuclear crisis. It indicates that the external 
security risk in and around the Peninsula was not able to outweigh the domestic 
desperation of economic actors for more profitable production environment. At the same 
time, it dismisses the 'universality' thesis of the Bush administration in tackling the 
denuclearization deal by showing the potential possibility for regional actors to achieve 
engagement with the DPRK through economic means. Twenty years' history of inter- 
Korean economic cooperation opened up and consolidated such a possibility by 
generating mutual, not unilateral, gains between the DPRK and external actors. 
Particularly, the KIC projects which gave more than 40,000 North Korean people stable 
jobs turned economic collaboration with the DPRK into a reality. 
Secondly, the finding of this study reinforces the argument that the desperation 
of the DPRK leadership to seek more economic resources from the external world 
constituted the fundamental motivation of its nuclear development. One of the findings 
of this study was that North Korean endeavors to revive its economy by involving 
external players including its neighboring South Korea peaked from 2002 to 2006 
during which the second nuclear crisis was heightened. During this period, the North 
Korean authority knowingly condoned widespread economic deviation from its dirigiste 
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system indicating 'marketization from below'(Smith 2005b). On the contrary, the North 
Korean government began to gradually regulate eligibility of de 'faclo 
market 
participants after 2006 as the nuclear crisis led Washington and Seoul to provide 
Pyongyang with a set of quid pro quo programs. Cracking down on market-oriented 
economic activities also coincided with the reported dismissal of North Korean 
economic officials who played a key role in the inter-Korean economic dialogues. 
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From about 2006, as a ramification, the multiple channels between the two Koreas that 
had contributed to shaping inter-Korean subriational level exchanges began to be closed. 
The conservative voices openly opposing the economic adjustment program built upon 
market-based ideas emerged more often than before. The arguments stressing 
ideological rearmament to protect the regime from capitalist encroachment began to be 
seen more frequently in the North Korean state media. Comparing the relatively 
accommodative posture of the DPRK leadership up until 2006 and the regressive mood 
afterwards led external observers to infer that the real goal of North Korea's nuclear 
game was more economic concessions from the external world in general and South 
Korea in particular. Some empirical information actually shows that the bigger 
Pyongyang's desperation for external economic support grew, the tougher their nuclear 
threat became. The DPRK leadership continued to send Seoul a conciliatory signal in 
terms of inter-Korean economic engagement at the same time as they heightened nuclear 
tension toward Washington. In doing so, Pyongyang took advantage of various quasi- 
"' In the meantime, media reports quoting unnamed North Korean sources were spread that the North 
Korean negotiator, Choe Sung Chul, who played a key role in arranging the Roh Moo Hyun - Kim Jong 11 
summit has been either sent to a re-education camp or executed. The sources stated that his dismissal 
could be prompted by his misjudgement on the policy toward the ROK or personal corruption scandals 
with engaging with the South (Dong-A Ilbo I 9th May 2009). 
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governmental channels they had established since 2000 to pursue cooperative projects 
with Seoul by giving them power and discretion. To put it differently, this five years 
period, during which the nuclear tension had culminated, could be paradoxically 
portrayed as the time when complex interdependence was embodied fairly well when it 
comes to inter-Korean relations. 
Critics of this claim, on the other hand, emphasized that Pyongyang has employed 
a so-called 'divide and cope' strategy to pursue two goals -- economic survival and 
security stability - at the same time to sideline South Korea in the nuclear negotiation 
(Kim K. R. et al. 2007,34). According to them, as Pyongyang's nuclear deal with 
Washington went into trouble, the North Korean leadership showed a tendency to take 
advantage of Seoul's compassionate sentiment by repeatedly emphasizing homogeneity 
between the two Koreas. They insisted that the slogans such as 'minjok kongio (national 
cooperation)' or 'Uri min ok kkiri (by the joint efforts of the entire Korean people)' Y 
frequently seen in their state media alluded to Pyongyang's 'divide and cope' strategy 
dealing with Washington and Seoul separately. Central to their claims was that the 
DPRK pursued economic cooperation with the ROK only when they were driven to the 
last ditch in the nuclear negotiation, with the purpose of securing enough cash to survive 
confrontation with the United States. 
However, this claim was hard to prove even though it is not totally unfounded. In 
order to demonstrate that the 'divide and cope' strategy by Pyongyang was its consistent 
posture since they had embarked on nuclear development, above all, a similar strategy 
must be shown to have been pursued during the first nuclear crisis in the 1990s. But 
little evidence was provided in the 1990s that the DPRK pursued a substantial economic 
300 
engagement policy with the external world. They showed neither intention nor readiness 
to accept trade and investment from its southern neighbor. The changed attitude of the 
DPRK during the second nuclear crisis in terms of how to deal with foreign economic 
resources and power showed that the second crisis could not be interpreted without 
paying sufficient attention to its economic atrophy. This study thus provides one of the 
explanatory tools to understand why the heightening of the nuclear tension engineered 
by the DPRK leadership and more economic engagement coincided. 
8.5 Theorelicalframework revisited 
This study adopted the complex interdependence model to capture the essence of 
the substantial change in inter-Korean relations after 2000 as the background against 
which a wider range of inter-Korean exchanges was carried out. The model was 
proposed and developed from the 1970s to the 1990s in an attempt to interpret a newly 
emerging pattern of state interactions which had begun to replace the traditional, 
security and power-balance dominated world order. Given the fact that inter-Korean 
relations were largely built upon unsettled military dynamics even after the demise of 
the Cold War, it was true that this new analytical tool is not likely to gain indisputable 
support from IR scholars and policyrnakers dealing with military-centered regime 
dynamics. But, on the other hand, the model provided an alternative means to observe 
the way in which sub-national or quasi -governmental actors in the two Koreas engaged 
with one another as a result of the 2000 inter-Korean summit which could have hardly 
been explained by the existing realism-based analytical methods. 
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International political theory focusing on economic interdependence was the 
product of the ever expanding development of international political economy in the 
1970s and 80s. From the viewpoint of conventional IR theories, economic 
interdependence was by no means tantamount to diplomatic leverage to be able to deter 
one's counterpart. It was able neither to prevent security threats nor to jeopardize its 
enemy. But from an IPE perspective, asymmetric economic interdependence could have 
potential power over the other party's behavioral patterns depending on political 
bargaining (Keohane and Nye 1989,11). In this sense, the attempts to interpret the ROK 
government policy toward the DPRK by employing the complex interdependence model 
appropriately reflected the change in inter-Korean relations that had involved ever 
growing economic interactions. The Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations , 
consistent engagement efforts with the DPRK were alike built upon the belief that 
shared interests created by economic exchanges are likely to have a potential either to 
eliminate or to diminish security instability in the Korean Peninsula. 
Despite the analytical convenience that the complex interdependence model 
provided, however, it is by no means a completely pertinent tool kit to analyze the 
essence of inter-Korean affairs from 2002 to 2006. It rather needs to be refined to fully 
explain the ROK government's unchanged capacity in determining the scale and pace of 
inter-Korean economic engagement in consideration with overall security dynamics in 
the Korean Peninsula and beyond. It is also clear that, in the context of the 
interrelationship between security and economy, economic considerations in the 
Peninsula are not entirely likely to outweigh security concerns. Further reformulation 
will therefore be needed to embrace these points that the complex interdependence 
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model did not fully take into account in order to scrutinize this inter-Korean case of 
economic engagement. 
It is not the case that various elements in inter-Korean relations made equal 
contributions to frame the relations at all times since the summit in 2000. 
indiscriminately combining all the aspects involved in inter-Korean affairs is another 
misleading approach in identifying a key force that has driven the trajectory and reality 
of the relations. It is thus important that one acknowledges the military tension was 
accepted with different impact and strength depending on the level of interdependence 
in particular period. But the complex interdependence model did not explain under what 
conditions military tension is either highlighted or overshadowed by many other 
interactions that reinforced interdependence between states. 
Military capability in both South and North Korea is a still essential source of 
power for self-defence. The Yellow Sea naval conflict which occurred in June 2002 that 
left six South Korean sailors dead provided a good example. This incident abruptly 
broke out while the two Koreas were enjoying the thaw following the inter-Korean 
summit two years previously. What became more salient was the fact that this 
unprovoked fighting revived a hostile mood in the South Korean public opinion toward 
inter-Korean economic exchanges. Political opponents of the Kim Dae Jung 
administration stepped up their campaign arguing the cash delivered to the North as the 
reward for the economic exchanges ultimately resulted in killing South Korean soldiers. 
Although this skirmish did not create a decisive obstacle in the post-summit inter- 
Korean relations, it reminded the relevant actors that relations may well become fragile 
again in the event of a recurrence of military insecurity. Unfinished military 
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confrontation and intermittent clashes created a situation where the realist assumption 
could be more persuasive in dismissing the applicability of the complex interdependence 
model. In this sense, framing the theoretical debate over economic exchanges and 
political conflict in terms of a paradigmatic clash between liberalism and realism would 
not be appropriate in accounting for inter-Korean relations. 
Whereas the complex interdependence model stressed the absence of a clear and 
consistent hierarchy of issues in foreign policy, the case of inter-Korean political and 
economic relations implies that a hierarchy still existed in an implicit way. In other 
words, the security threat from the North, whether it was an attempt to extract 
diplomatic concession or a real effort to build up military muscle, had the potential to 
determine the conditions of progress in many other non-security issues. It meant that the 
two Koreas did not reach the situation where non-security national interests, economic 
benefits from the other for instance, could constantly outweigh security concerns. On 
either side, there was a possibility that the implicit hierarchy could surface depending on 
the change of security dynamics surrounding the region. However, the dominant factor 
to affect when and under what conditions the implicit hierarchy reappears is not the 
foreign policy climate made by the external regional players but the internal regimes of 
the individual players. 
What was more central was the South Korean government's firm posture in 
prcventing the second nuclear crisis from developing into destruction of inter-Korean 
economic reciprocity that had been accomplished since the early 1990s. The Kim Dae 
Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations continued to support inter-Korean economic 
engagement despite growing domestic opposition demanding either suspension or 
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reduction of the scale of any activities believed to give Pyongyang economic gain. The 
consistent efforts to maintain the momentum of inter-Korean economic cooperation 
prevented security concerns from dominating again the hierarchal order in South Korean 
foreign policy toward North Korea. 
However, the Lee Myung-bak administration that took office in 2008 made clear 
that it would no longer pursue 'unconditional' economic engagement with Pyongyang. 
instead, it placed the denuclearization commitment of the DPRK at the top of the agenda 
and charted a 'conditional reciprocity' strategy subject to Pyongyang's willingness to 
abandon its nuclear program (Snyder 2009,14-22). This substantive change of the ROK 
government's attitude toward the DPRK brought about the re-emergence of hierarchical 
order in the agenda setting strategy of North Korea policy. Progress in inter-Korean 
economic cooperation was significantly hampered with increasing concern over 
unsettled nuclear tensions since Lee Myung-bak, who had once labelled his predecessors' 
North Korea policy a 'lost decade', came to power. 
On the North's side, a series of measures from about 2006 were put in place to 
crack down on the spontaneous market-based economic activities at which they had 
implicitly connived since the great famine in the 1990s. It was understood as an effort 
by the North Korean leadership to prevent ideological contamination through the influx 
of external information and to emphasize the moral superiority of its own economic 
system. As the Lee Myung-bak administration adopted a substantially different 
approach on inter-Korean economic exchanges from his predecessors, the North's 
rhetoric toward the South became even more belligerent. They took a set of actions 
likely to endanger the existing cooperation track in return for the new South 
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government's lukewarm attitude in maintaining the inter-Korean business capacity as 
large as that of the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations. In December 
2008, the DPRK made an announcement to expel ROK government officials from the 
consultation office of the inter-Korean economic cooperation office in the KIC. The 
DPRK also reduced the number of South Koreans staying in the Complex by half. Inter- 
Korean trade as a result plunged nearly 25 percent in the first four months in 2009 
(Yonhapnews gth June 2009), 
Lee Myung-bak's commitment to differentiate his policy from his two 
predecessors' engagement approach rooted on the 'Sunshine Policy' was formed on the 
basis of the mýjority of his supporters group opposing the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo 
Hyun policy. Although Lee Myung-bak initially labelled his policy as pragmatism, 
conservative domestic public opinion urged that more priority ought to be given to the 
dire security crisis created by the North Korean nuclear program. 
Even in the North Korean regime, domestic factors constituted one of the claims 
that explained the troubled relationship with the South. There has been a great deal of 
publicity surrounding Kim Jong 11's critically ill health since summer 2008. Kim Jong 
11's health problem caused much speculation that it was highly likely that the North's 
military circles would take over a key role in managing not only the nuclear deal but 
also inter-Korean relations (Cheong S. C. 2009). It was none other than North Korea's 
chief military negotiator in inter-Korean talks who announced a series of hard-line 
economic measures (The Hankyoreh December 18 th 2008). The intervention in inter- 
Korean economic relations by the North Korean military provides evidence showing the 
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economic issues in the DPRK are highly related to the internal regime stability linked to 
security concerns. 
On balance, examining each side's internal political dynamics is essential to 
capture when and by which pattern the implicit issue hierarchy reappears. The 
problematic points of the complex interdependence model to explain inter-Korean case, 
in other words, can be refined by careful scrutiny of each player's domestic environment. 
After all, the environment will contribute to crafting each individual player's foreign 
policy agenda and its impact toward each other. Analytical observation of internal 
political dynamics should be a core point in the reformulation of the complex 
interdependence model as an analytical framework to shed light on the present and 
future of inter-Korean relations. 
8.6 Policy implication on the ROK government 
The conclusion of this study shows that there was no particular and direct causal 
relationship between the nuclear crisis and inter-Korean trade. It gives the ROK 
government a lesson that an attempt to make use of economic leverage to gain 
advantage in a nuclear deal is unlikely to bring an intended result. In other words, any 
endeavor for the ROK government to adjust the pace and scale of inter-Korean trade by 
using the leverage in an attempt to dissuade Pyongyang from further developing its 
nuclear program is not likely to succeed. Instead, it stresses the necessity of consistent 
patience by the ROK government in dealing with economic relations with the DPRK, 
not mobilizing economic means with immediate effect to try to coerce Pyongyang. The 
policy implication to be drawn from this finding is that the ROK government needs to 
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acknowledge that economic cooperation with the DPRK is not a diplomatic tool to seek 
politically higher ground in the relevant negotiation. Rather it gives the ROK 
government a message that inter-Korean economic cooperation should be understood as 
a buffer zone to prevent a further deterioration of political relationship between the two 
hostile countries. 
Inter-Korean economic exchanges and cooperation have dual and complex 
features in the context of the overall relationship between the two Koreas. It is above all 
a commercial transaction undertaken on the basis of pure profitability as the first and 
foremost driving force. But the other side of the coin shows that it needs a proactive 
intervention by government in the light of its contribution to the reconciliation of inter- 
Korean relations and beyond. The latter however does not mean that the government 
should control or take over inter-Korean economic transactions at the business level. 
What is needed for the ROK government in this sense is to orchestrate the conditions of 
inter-Korean engagement in order for entrepreneurs to easily access human and natural 
resources in the DPRK. 
As long as the SMEs play a major role in inter-Korean business, the policy focus 
of the ROK government should be supporting their own domestic interests associated 
with commercial transactions with the DPRK. It means the role of government 
intervention should not go beyond that of a facilitator to guarantee the stable flow of 
resources between the two parties. It is neither possible nor desirable for the ROK 
government to be a regulator that controls all the conditions of these commercial 
transactions. The government's role as a facilitator could also be justified in light of the 
key features of the North Korean market. It is demanding for private firms to acquire 
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profitability and productivity at the same time in an underdeveloped market like the 
DPRK (Hong S. J. 2004). Government support for the SMEs' business with North 
Korean counterparts in this context is unavoidable for a certain length of time. This 
policy direction fits also well with the ROK government's stance in dealing with 
Pyongyang through means of economic engagement. The ROK governments since 1990, 
no matter how hawkish or dovish, have believed that using economic means is likely to 
bring about productive changes in the DPRK system. They have advocated (Noland 
1999,96-97) that a desirable solution could be achieved when the DPRK pays sufficient 
heed to trade through which it could materialize comparative advantage. Promoting the 
South Korean SMEs to launch business with DPRK counterparts at various areas 
constituted one of the key policy leverages of the ROK government in striving for 
substantial change in Pyongyang. 
8.7 Recommendation forfuture research 
This study has challenged the inclination that Korean studies had shown in the 
past, which was dominated by the dichotomy of being separately focused on security 
and economy. Instead, this study paid intensive attention to how the change of security 
dynamics affected economic interactions between the two potentially hostile countries. 
Such an approach led to expanding the main research agenda of the existing Korean 
studies by exploring inter-relations between security and economy under unstable 
military dynamics. In terms of the main actors in such an interaction between security 
and economic transactions, this study observed the South Korean SMEs' pattern of 
behavior to see how they responded to the mounting security tension. Consequently this 
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study will provide a platform for researchers to focus on a non-state, subnational actors- 
centered approach in inter-Korean politics which had previously attracted less attention 
in Korean studies. Taking the importance of so-called track-two diplomacy 57 i nto 
account will also lay the foundation for a better understanding of the nature of 
increasing inter-Korean exchanges. 
On this basis, future research in Korean studies in association with the DPRK 
needs to place more emphasis on various elements outside the conventional military 
dynamics. Among the elements, human rights, human itari an/devel opment aid, capacity 
building, social insecurity, and the likelihood of economic transformation are likely to 
constitute the research agenda. This particular study moreover shows that efforts should 
be made in two dimensions. 
Firstly, the range of actors in inter-Korean exchanges, as a main research theme, in 
terms of how they reshaped inter-Korean relations, needs to be diversified. It is true that 
non-state actors such as civil organizations and private firms are not decisive players 
that brought about a dramatic and sweeping transformation of the political environment 
in the Korean Peninsula. However, the experience of the twenty years' history of inter- 
Korean economic exchanges indicates that North Korean society has become more 
susceptible to external economic relations. Hyundai's crucial role in engineering the 
inter-Korean summit and its continued and exclusive engagement with the DPRK top 
leadership requires a new look at the significance of the back channel network, created 
by non-state actors, in dealing with North Korea. The socioeconomic change of the 
DPRK in part reported by the growing number of defectors who settled in the ROK 
57 For a well-defined explanation on track-two diplomacy in the international politics, see Montville (1991) 
and for its application to the case of the DPRK, see Cuthbert (2005) and Burgharts (2009). 
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should also be further investigated to reveal the whole aspect of internal mechanism of 
the DPRK. 
Secondly, within the realm of inter-Korean economic activities, future research 
should pay more attention to the consequences and impact of such activities on the 
North Korean internal system. Research questions should include the extent to which 
South Korean economic engagement efforts affected the North and the direction to 
which the engagement contributed in framing the North Korean foreign policy. 
Exploring whether the economic engagement policy caused constructive change in the 
DPRK or rather strengthened its ailing regime by offering a life-support system would 
be another worthwhile question to be answered in dealing with the economic side ofthe 
engagement. 
Additionally, a longer period of observation and/or an investigation into the 
different aspects of inter-Korean subnational level engagement will be needed to 
overcome the limitation of this study based on single case analysis from the ROK side. 
This effort may reveal how the various domestic actors on both sides are differently 
affected by the repetitive pattern of the security crisis in the Korean Peninsula. In the 
end, such an effort will lay a foundation on which new conceptual synthesis comes up to 
better explain how and to what extent economic interdependence affects interstate 
conflict. 
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Appendix 
Questionnaire 
As a PhD student in the Department of Politics and International Studies, the University 
of Warwick in the United Kingdom, I am now conducting a research project focusing on 
'the role of the South Korean small and medium sized enterprises in the inter-Korean 
trade after nuclear crisis in 2002'. 1 am writing to ask for your participation in this 
project by answering the questions below. All the questions are related to your own 
decision making and judgement regarding your inter-Korean business from 2002 to 
2006. Your answer will definitely be kept confidential and the information collected by 
this questionnaire will be used for research purpose only. Your cooperation would be 
highly appreciated. If you have any queries, please do not hesitate to contact me. 
Ki-Young, Sung, PhD student of the University of Warwick, United iýýi_nggd_o_m 
K-Y. Sung @warwick. ac. uk 
Sectionl . Influence of the 2002 nuclear crisis on the inter-Korean trade (1-6) 
1. To what extent, was your inter-Korean trade been affected by a series of security 
instability caused by the North Korean nuclear program which was revealed in 2002? 
a. Never been affected 
b. Not affected 
c. Not sure 
d. Affected 
e. Seriously affected 
2. Did the volume of your trade with the DPRK change between 2002 and 2006? 
a. Increased b. Not changed c. Decreased 
2-1. (For those who answered 'a' and 'b' in the question 2) What were the most 
important reasons to do so ? (You can choose more than one) 
a. Governmental support including the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund 
b. Domestic factors including the worsening business environment in the ROK 
c. External factors including the North Korean economic reform measures announced in 
2002 
d. Others ( 
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2-2. (For those who answered V in the question 2) What were the reasons? (You can 
choose more than one) 
a. Uncertain profitability 
b. Concern for the exacerbating security stability 
c. Hostile public opinions in the ROK 
d. Requirement of the trade partners in the DPRK 
e. Others ( 
3. Did the ROK government intervention including the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund 
influence your decision-making ? 
a. Yes b. Not sure c. No 
3-1. (For those who answered 'a' in the question 3) Which aspect of the Government ,s 
decision to revitalize the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund was the most important factor 
in your decision ? (You can choose more than one) 
a. Compensation mechanism of profit loss 
b. Reducing the interest rate of the loan 
c. Expansion of the loan facility 
d. Others ( 
3-2. Do you think you maintained the volume of the inter-Korean trade as planned when 
assuming that there was no change in the government guideline on the inter-Korean 
cooperation fund? 
a. Yes b. No c. Not sure 
4. Did the domestic business environment in the ROK influence your decision making ? 
a. Yes b. No c. Not sure 
4-1. (For those who answered 'a' in the question 4) Which aspect of the ROK business 
environment had the biggest influence on your decision ? (You can choose more than 
one) 
a. High labor cost b. High land cost c. Trade union activities d. Others 
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4-2. Do you think you maintained the volume of the inter-Korean trade as planned when 
assuming that the South Korean business environment was not deteriorated? 
a. Yes b. No c. Not sure 
5. Did the DPRK economic reform measures announced in July 2002 influence your 
decision ? 
a. Yes b. No c. Not sure 
5-1. (For those who answered 'a' in the question 5) Which aspect of the DPRK 
economic reform measures was the most important factor in your decision ? (You can 
choose more than one) 
a. Reform of price mechanism b. Decentralization in firm 
management 
c. Introduction of incentive system d. Others 
5-2. Do you think you maintained the volume of the inter-Korean trade as planned 
when asurning that the DPRK did not announce the economic reform measures ? 
a. Yes b. No c. Not sure 
6. Please state the other factors that affected your decision not mentioned so far. 
Section 2: The interrelationship between the inter-Korean relations and the inter- 
Korean trade after the inter-Korean summit talk in 2000 (7-14) 
7. Were there any changes in the inter-Korean contact channel after the inter-Korean 
summit talk in 2000? 
a. Yes b. No c. Not sure 
8. Did the ROK government permit non-governmental level contact with the DPRK 
entities after the 2000 summit talk? 
a. Yes b. No c. Not sure 
9. Which was the key contact channel with your North Korean business partners after 
the inter-Korean summit in 2000 ? 
a. Governmental level talks on behalf of the business unit in the both parties 
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b. Direct contact between the firms in the South and their counterparts in the North 
c. Indirect contact between the two parties through the intermediary body in the third 
country 
10. Do you think the policy priority of the ROK government was changed in dealing 
with the DPRK issues after the inter-Korean summit talk in 2000 ? 
a. Yes b. No c. Not sure 
11. Do you think the military tension in the Korean Peninsula was changed after the 
inter-Korean summit in 2000 ? 
a. Yes b. No c. Not sure 
12. Do you think the ROK government policy on the inter-Korean trade had a positive 
effect on your business toward the DPRK? 
a. Yes b. No c. Not sure 
12- 1. (For the respondents who answered 'a' in the question 12) What was the most 
positive factor in providing more congenial environment for the inter-Korean business? 
a. Pursuit of the Kaeseong Industrial Complex project 
b. Inter-Korea railway reconnection 
c. Inter-Korean agreement for light industry in 2004 
d. Others 
13. What was the key organization apart from the ROK government that affected your 
trade with the DPRK positively? 
a. Local authority 
b. Small Business Corporation (SBC) in the ROK 
c. Korea International Trade Association (KITA) 
d. Trade partners in the DPRK 
e. Other firms in the ROK involved in the inter-Korean trade 
f Others 
14. Did you take the non-business factors into account, such as peaceful coexistence, 
reconciliation between the two Koreas, along with your profitability in pursuing the 
inter-Korea trade ? 
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a. Yes b. No c. Not sure 
Section 3: Background Information (1-6) 
Please tick (V) your answers. (please note all the questions below are about the situation from 
2002 to 2006). 
15. Which pattern of the inter-Korean trade have you carried out from 2002 to 2006 ? 
a. General trade b. Processing-on-commission trade c. cooperation project 
c. Others ( 
16. How much did your inter-Korean business account for among your business as a 
whole in 2002-2006 ? 
a. Less than 10% b. 10-30% c. 30-50% d. 50%-70% e. 70-90% f. More than 90% 
17. Which year were you given an approval on your inter-Korean business from tile 
ROK Government? 
18. Which year did you initially embark the inter-Korean trade? 
19. Which year did you withdraw from the inter-Korean trade? 
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